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Abstract 
This thesis examines the use of first-order hereditary Harrop formulae, a gen-
eralisation of Horn clauses due to Miller, as a foundation for logic programming. 
As this framework is constructive, this will sometimes dictate an approach whicli 
differs slightly from the traditional (classical) one. 
We discuss the foundational problems involved in adding negation to the frame-
work of first-order hereditary Harrop formulae, including the role of the Negation 
as Failure (NAF) rule and the Closed World Assumption (CWA) in a constructive 
setting, and introduce the notion of a completely defined predicate. This notion 
may be used to define a notion of NAF for a more general class of goals than 
literals. We also discuss the possibilities for forms of negation other than NAF, 
and explore the relationships between NAF and more explicit forms. 
Clark's completion of a program is often used in this context, and we show 
how a more explicit version of the completion may be given in hereditary Harrop 
formulae. We may think of the completion as specifying a theory in which an 
atom A fails if A D I, and hence is an explicit axiomatisation of failure, which 
in our case is more computationally meaningful than Clark's completion. 
The problem of finding answer substitutions for existentially quantified negated 
goals requires more powerful techniques than unification alone, and so we give an 
algorithm which is suitable for this purpose, and show how it may be incorporated 
into the goal reduction process. 
A constructive framework necessitates a different approach to model theory, 
and we give a Kripke-like model for the extended class of programs for which 
negation is implemented by the Negation as Failure rule. This is based on the 
model theory developed by Miller for hereditary Harrop formulae. No restriction 
on the class of programs is used, which requires some departures from the usual 
Tw process, but the spirit of the construction remains the same. 
The Kripke-like model suggests some structural properties of first-order hered-
itary Harrop formulae which are of semantic interest. One important question is 
11 
the precise strength of the class of formulae involved. We consider the redundant 
features of Miller's language, and show how they may be removed. This leads to 
a discussion of equivalence for this class of programs, which necessitates the use 
of an intermediate logic, in which programs which are operationally equivalent are 
logically equivalent. 
Implication in the bodies of clauses also allows a notion of meta-programming 
within a first-order framework. We explore this possibility to some extent by 
showing how the application of some of our results allow memoisation to take place, 
which may be thought of as reflecting meta-level information back into programs by 
a subtle separation of object and meta- levels. This also demonstrates an elegant 
connection between removing redundancies from programs and the derivation of 
a goal in this framework. 
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1.1 Logic and Programming 
The discipline of mathematical logic arose from a desire for rigour in mathematics 
during the 1800's. There had been various attempts at systemisation of mathe- 
matical thinking before that time, such as the famous 10 axioms of Euclid, but 
this was the first time that the foundations of mathematics came under intense 
scrutiny by the community-at-large. This was due to a number of paradoxes and 
counter-intuitive results which disturbed many mathematicians. Earlier mathe-
maticians often did not feel the need to rigorously define terminology and give 
formal detailed proofs of every last step in their line of thought. Many felt that 
the use of infinitesimals needed no justification, whereas the analysts of the 19th 
century worked to expel them from the vast body of mathematical reasoning. Such 
a vigorous desire for a minimum standard of rigour led to the evolution of gen-
eral principles of reasoning, which in turn led to the formal development of the 
concepts used in mathematics. 
The widespread interest in foundational issues led to a variety of important de-
velopments - Frege's scheme for the "laws of thought", set theory as conceived by 
both Zermelo and Fraenkel, and Hubert and Bernays, Zermelo's Axiom of Choice, 
Russell and Whitehead's Principia Mathematica, to name but a few. Mathemati-
cal logic grew out of this flurry of results into a well-defined discipline, which could 
serve as a backdrop to any mathematical debate. If a dispute arose over the va-
lidity of a supposed proof, then mathematical logic was designed to be the arbiter 
of the dispute. The claimant would need to demonstrate that his or her proof 
1 
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was valid with respect to the logical foundations of the theory under discussion, 
and the doubter would need to demonstrate that the proof was faulty by the same 
strict standards. Thus, a universal method had been found by which all manner 
of mathematical disputes may be settled. 
There is a vast amount of literature on mathematical logic, and we do not 
attempt a general introduction here. The interested reader may find further in-
formation in [51,71,9], and many other works 
A similar desire for rigour may be detected amongst computer scientists today. 
There is a growing realisation that programming is a more varied, widespread and 
complicated task than originally conceived, and that experience has suggested that 
rigour is needed in the definition of programming tasks, in order to avoid annoying 
and costly mistakes. Proofs of program correctness are important for large and/or 
critical systems, and for the comprehension of complex algorithms. Formal and 
definitive semantics for programming languages is important for the maintenance 
and alteration of programs, and for portability considerations, so that the lan-
guage, and hence the application, need not be tied to a particular architecture. 
The design and analysis of hardware may also be improved by the use of formal 
techniques. As computer applications become more and more widespread, and the 
reliability, speed and availability of hardware continues to increase, the need for 
formalism will not diminish. 
It is perhaps not surprising that the same era which produced some fundamen-
tal advances in mathematical logic was also the era in which the foundations of 
modern computing were laid. The 1930's and 40's produced Gödel's Incomplete-
ness theorems as well as the world's first digital computer. Turing's conception 
of a universal computing machine, the )-calculus, and recursive function theory 
all emerged around the same time that Church proved the undecidability of first-
order logic. Not surprisingly, there are some obvious similarities between some 
of these results. The undecidability of the halting problem for Turing machines 
may be considered as stating that the halting problem is undecidable for any ma-
chine model in which the machines have sufficient power. For example, the halting 
problem is decidable for finite state automata, which are less powerful than Tur- 
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ing machines. Similarly, Cödel's first incompleteness theorem may be considered 
as stating that any sufficiently powerful mathematical theory will contain state-
ments which are true but not provable. The proof of this result uses recursive 
function theory, which in itself may be used as a basis for computation, as well 
as an encoding of statements of the theory as natural numbers. Such an idea 
of encoding formal statements of mathematics in a syntactical manner would be 
instantly familiar to a computer programmer. 
One of the best examples of the close relation between logic and programming 
is given by proof theory. One may consider the work of Gentzen in this area as 
systematising the notion of proof to such an extent that any idiot can understand 
any proof, given enough patience. Such a detailed specification is precisely how a 
programmer instructs a machine. 
1.2 	Computability and Constructivity 
Naturally the availability of an umpire did not stop mathematicians arguing. 
Whilst the umpire's decisions were irrefutable, there was still a dispute about 
who the umpire should be. There were three distinct schools of thought: the for-
malists, whose champion was Hubert, the logicists, whose champion was Russell, 
and the intuitionists, with Brouwer as their champion. Briefly, the logicists were 
Platonists, believing in a divinely beautiful mathematical world, which mankind 
was free to discover, whereas the formalists believed that mathematics was, in 
essence, a game of symbol-pushing, correct with respect to itself, but with no 
external interpretations. 
Brouwer could accept neither of these views. He felt that there had to be 
something intuitive about mathematics, and hence it could not be as the formal-
ists believed, but that mathematics had to be constructive as well, in that one 
needed to be able to exhibit a given mathematical object in order to discuss it 
meaningfully. A famous example involves the decimal expansion of ir; if we con-
sider a number a whose value is 0 if a sequence of one thousand 5's does not appear 
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anywhere in the decimal expansion of 7r, and otherwise is 1 if the sequence begins 
at an even digit, and -1 if the sequence begins at an odd digit. To an intuitionist, it 
is meaningless to discuss such a number, as it requires that the decimal expansion 
of 7r be written out in full and examined as one entity. If at some stage in the 
future such a sequence is discovered, then the matter may be settled, but before 
such an event happens, if ever, it makes no sense to an intuitionist to discuss the 
value of a. A follower of the other schools may say that a exists, but its value is 
not currently known, and may never be known. In this way an intuitionist requires 
that an explicit, unambiguous construction be given for a number before he will 
accept that it exists. 
Brouwer's critique of classical mathematics centred around the treatment of 
infinite sets. It is clearly acceptable to apply the law of excluded middle to finite 
sets, so that given a finite set S and a number x, it is true that either x e S or 
x 0 S. An obvious way to test the truth of this proposition is to list all the elements 
of S, and check whether or not x occurs in that list. Clearly this process must 
terminate. However, the same technique cannot be applied to infinite sets, as it 
is not possible to finitely enumerate all the elements, and so to Brouwer, applying 
the law of excluded middle to infinite sets was akin to examining an infinite set 
after all its elements had been enumerated, and hence was unacceptable. Unless 
there is some way to finitely represent the infinite set, the law of excluded middle 
could not be true. In this way one may obtain intuitionistic logic from classical 
logic by removing the law of excluded middle and all its consequences. More on 
intuitionistic logic may be found in [21,51,42,64]. 
To the modern mind, Brouwer's arguments are those of a believer in algo-
rithms, so that in order to demonstrate an object's existence, one must produce 
an algorithm which constructs the object. In this way one may view the intuition-
ist's thinking as one like that of doubting Thomas; the only way to convince him 
is to produce the given object in front of his own eyes, rather than try to convince 
him on the grounds that it couldn't be otherwise. 
One of the more compelling properties of intuitionism in this context is the 
way that proof is identified with truth. For example, in the Tarksi semantics for 
Chapter 1. Introduction 	 5 
classical logic, A V B is true if A is true or B is true. In Heyting's conception 
of intuitionistic proof, a proof of A V B is a pair (i,p) such that if i = 0, p  is 
a proof of A, and if i = 1, p  is a proof of B, and so A V B is provable if A is 
provable or B is provable. Hence, in order to claim that a statement is true, it 
is necessary to find an appropriate "proof object" which proves the statement, 
rather than to perform a model-theoretic construction. Much ink has been spilt 
over the precise definition of proof objects, but the point here is that there is a 
direct proof-theoretic interpretation of truth, which seems to be more in keeping 
with the spirit of computing than the assignment of truth values. 
This ideal is often reflected in the way certain mathematical properties are 
viewed. For example, a proof that an odd perfect number exists would be less 
satisfying than exhibiting a certain odd number and proving that it is perfect. 
In a similar vein, it is just about unthinkable that it is possible to prove that 
there is a polynomial-time algorithm for 3-SAT without explicitly producing such 
an algorithm, and any such proof would be considerably less rewarding than a 
constructive one. 
The close link between computability and constructivity is illustrated by the 
trend in computer science in recent years towards constructive logics (i.e. logics in 
which only constructive conclusions may be reached, of which intuitionistic logic 
is one). Martin-Löf type theory [70] is one example, as is the Edinburgh LF [47, 
97]. Linear logic [42] is another recent development, about which Girard explicitly 
stated that the idea was to recapture the spirit of intuitionistic logic. It has also 
recently been shown [20] how a constructive interpretation of recursive function 
theory may be more appropriate than the classical one. This trend is not surprising 
given the natural inclination of computer science towards constructive ideas. Just 
as constructions with a compass and straightedge are natural tools of Euclidean 
geometry, so are algorithms, i.e. constructive proofs, natural tools of computer 
science. 
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1.3 Traditional Logic Programming 
There is some confusion about the early years of logic programming, and about 
when the first logic programming language was implemented. Logic program-
ming was certainly a consequence of Robinson's seminal paper on unification and 
theorem proving [101], and it now seems that the AbSys system was probably 
the first implementation of a logic programming language [24,23]. Certainly the 
most influential implementation was that of the programming language Prolog 
by Colmerauer and his colleagues at Marseilles [19]. However, the real impetus 
behind logic programming was given by Kowalski in his seminal paper of 1974 
[52]. Since then, Prolog has been found to be a useful and practical programming 
language for many applications [18,106]. 
Here we give the essentials; more details and proofs may be found in [61]. We 
will use FO to stand for the application of the substitution 0 to the formula F. 
(F) stands for the existential closure of all free variables in F, and similarly V(F) 
stands for the universal closure of all free variables in F. 
Kowalski's key idea was that the Prolog clause 
A:-B1,...,B 
where A and the B3  are atoms, may be interpreted both declaratively and proce-
durally. The declarative interpretation was given by considering the above clause 
as a shorthand for the formula 
VX 1 ... Xm ACB1 AAB 
where xi are all the variables appearing in A and the B3. Such a formula is known 
as a Horn clause. A program is a finite set of Horn clauses. The procedural 
interpretation is given by interpreting the above clause as a specification of a 
procedure, whose "head" is A and hence names the procedure being defined, and 
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whose "body" specifies calls to further procedures B1 ,. . . , B,. Input and output 
is to be dane through the variables of A and the body. A sequence of procedure 
calls, then, is a conjunction of atoms, and execution takes place by starting with 
an initial number of procedure calls specified by 
where the G1  are atoms, generating more procedure calls by matching each G 
against clauses in the program and proceeding until the subsequent calls are ex-
hausted. The initial sequence of calls is known as the goal, and may be thought 
of in declarative terms as the formula 
Yl ... YrClAGk 
where the yi are all the variables appearing in the G3 . In this way computation 
may be interpreted as the manipulation of a sequence of first-order formulae. Not 
surprisingly, such operations have a direct connection to proofs of the goal, and 
in particular to a certain method of finding a proof of the goal. This method was 
related to the resolution methods of automatic theorem proving, and has become 
known as SLD-resolution (or LUSH-resolution). 
This process may be defined as follows: given a goal 
GI) . . . , Gk 
we use a computation rule R to choose G3 for some 1 < j < k, which is known as 
the selected subgoal. Next, if there is a clause A :- B1,.. . , B (where n > 0) in the 
program such that AO = G3 0 where 0 is the most general unifier (mgu) of A and 
C3 , then we replace C1,. . . , Gk by 
(C1,. .. ) G_ 1 , B I) .... 	.,Gk )O 
and continue. 	Due to the fact that ii may be 0, this goal may be smaller in 
size than the original, and so termination occurs when the goal is empty. As 
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there may be many choices for clauses with heads which match G, for a given 
computation rule R we define an R-computed SLD-tree, whose root is the initial 
goal, and in which the children of each node are the results of applying the above 
transformation to the parent, with one choice for each possible matching clause 
head. The leaves of this possibly infinite tree may be either the empty goal or 
goals for which there is no clause head which matches the selected subgoal. A 
branch from the root to a leaf containing the empty goal is known as a successful 
SLD-derivation. A branch from the root to a leaf containing a non-empty goal is 
known as an unsuccessful SLD-derivation. If 0k ,.. O are the substitutions used 
in a successful SLD-derivation of the goal G, then the answer substitution 0 is the 
composition of 01 ,. . . O,. This may be thought of as finding a goal GO such that 
GO succeeds, and so we refer to GO where 0 is an answer substitution as an answer 
for C. 
Now as the declarative reading of the program and goal are both formulae of 
first-order logic, we may ask what connection SLD-derivations have with proof 
theory. It is possible to show that this procedure is sound and complete with 
respect to provability in classical logic of goals from Horn clauses; that isa goal 
G has a successful SLD-derivation from a program P if P F-c G [61]. 
Having established a proof-theoretic notion of consequence, it is natural to ask 
about model theory. Clearly, one such notion may be given by the standard model 
theory of first-order (classical) logic. It is not hard to see that any model in which 
P is true should also have C true whenever C has a successful SLD-derivation from 
P. With this in mind, we say that G is a logical consequence of P if C is true 
in all models of P. It is clear that this will be satisfied if C is true in a minimal 
model of P, and such a minimal model may be given by the least Herbrand model 
of P. It should be clear that we expect G to be true in the least Herbrand model 
if G has a successful SLD-derivation. This is indeed the case, and is proved by 
constructing the least Herbrand model as follows. This construction is due to 
Kowalski and van Emden [25]. 
Firstly, for a given program P, we define an operator T mapping from and 
into interpretations, as 
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T(I) = {A I there is a ground instance A C B1 A... A B of a clause in P such 
that B, E Ifor all 1< i <n} 
T(I) may be thought of as all things which may be deduced from P and the 
assumptions I in one step, so that T is sometimes referred to as the "immediate 
consequence" operator. We then define ordinal powers of Tp as follows: 




The least fixpoint of T turns out to be the least Herbrand model, which has 
an elegant ring about it, in that one starts from no assumptions and repeatedly 
applies the Tp operator until no new deductions are made, and that the set of 
deduced facts is then precisely the consequences of the program. This idea was 
extended in [5]. 
In this way Horn clauses were used as a logic programming language because 
of the two possible interpretations: one as formulae, and the other as specifying 
sequences of top-down operations. 
1.4 Constructive Logic Programming 
In the previous section we saw how a goal G has a successful SLD-derivation from 
P if P 1-C  G. In the light of the previous discussion, it would seem that it is 
natural to ask what role intuitionistic logic may play in this scheme. It is not hard 
to see that classical logic and intuitionistic logic coincide for Horn clauses, i.e. 
P Fc C if P F-1  G when P is a set of Horn clauses [81]. This may be easily seen 
from the proof rules which are needed to manipulate Horn clauses and goals. As 
this class of formulae is not a very large fragment of first-order logic, not many are 
needed, and all are intuitionistically valid. Certainly the law of excluded middle, 
i.e. that F V -iF is true for any formula F, is not needed, as there are no negations 
Chapter 1. Introduction 	 10 
in either goals or programs. Thus SLD-resolution may be distinguished from other 
forms of resolution in that the class of formulae on which it is defined is restrictive 
enough that only constructive consequences of the program may be derived. 
One way to interpret SLD-derivations as proofs is to think of the derivation 
as a refutation. Each step in the SLD-derivation may be considered as a valid 
deduction in classical logic, and hence the overall derivation may be interpreted 
as a proof. 
Given a program P, and a goal C = 	... A Gk ), we re-write the clauses 
in P so that they are of the form V(A V -B1 V... V -B). Now assume that C 
has a successful SLD-derivation from P. We imitate this derivation by a proof 
in first-order classical logic as follows. First we assume that -'C is true, i.e. we 
assume V(-'G1 V ... V -'Gk ). Let G3  be the selected subgoal, so that G3 0 = AO, 
where A V -'B1 V ... V B,, is a clause in the program, let -'B1 V ... V -'B, be C, 
and let -'C1 V... V -'G_1 V -'Gm V... V -Gk  be C', so that -'C = V(G' V 
By our assumption, V(C' V -'Gd ) is true, and hence so is V(G'O V -'G3 0), and from 
the program P we get that V(G,O V CO) is true. Now if G3 0 is true, then -'C3 0 
is false, and so from the truth of V(G'O V -'G0) we get V(G'O). Otherwise, G3 0 is 
false, and so as V(C3 0 V CO) is true, we have V(C0) is true. In either case, we may 
deduce V(G'O V CO) is true, which is just the next step in the derivation. Hence, 
each step matches up with a correct deduction in classical logic. 
When the end is reached, the goal is of the form V(-B) where B is an atom, 
which matches some atom A in the program such that A has no body. As A0 = BO 
for some 0, we get -BO A BO, a contradiction. Hence, our initial assumption of 
-'C = -'(C1 A... A Gk ) leads to a contradiction, and so the final step is to deduce 
that (GI A ... A Gk) is true. 
This argument is not valid intuitionistically, as both the final step (deducing C 
from the fact that -'C leads to a contradiction) and the conversion of the clauses in 
the program do not hold in intuitionistic logic. Hence the refutation explanation 
can only be valid for classical logic. 
An alternative explanation of SLD-resolution, which is intuitionistically valid, 
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is that asuccessful SLD-derivation represents a search, rather than a proof itself. 
Each step in the SLD-derivation represents a step in the overall search for a proof, 
and the search space may be defined by the notion of an SLD-tree. From a suc-
cessful search it is easy to find a proof that P F C. From the results of [81] it is 
clear that this proof is intuitionistically valid. This explanation seems to be more 
in keeping with Kowaiski's original idea of the notion of a clause being interpreted 
as specifying a number of procedure calls, which has no obvious connection to the 
refutation interpretation. 
The presence of negations in the refutation also seems to be somewhat inappro-
priate, as Horn clauses do not contain any negations. The proof search explanation 
does not need negations, and hence seems more aesthetically pleasing. Another 
criticism of the refutation explanation is that the role of the answer substitution 
is obscured, when in reality this is an important part of logic programming. As 
noted earlier, variables are used for input and output in a goal, and so the only 
way to produce output is to bind a variable in the goal, i.e. produce an answer 
substitution. It has been noted that "the purpose of a logic programming system 
is to compute bindings" [61]. Hence, it seems that the answer substitutionshould 
be interpreted as an important part of the answer, rather than the by-product of 
a search to produce yes or no. 
This is precisely the case in intuitionistic logic, as in order to prove a goal 
xG, one must exhibit a term t such that G[t/x] is true. Hence the refutation 
interpretation obscures an essential property of a logic programming system, but 
in intuitionistic logic, the answer substitution is given an important place. This 
suggests that the property which makes Horn clauses appropriate for logic pro-
gramming is not so much the existence of a resolution method for finding proofs 
as the fact that classical logic and intuitionistic logic coincide on these formulae, 
thus ensuring that only constructive conclusions may be reached. 
An interesting observation is that intuitionistic logic has a similar property for 
disjunctions; A V B is provable if A is provable or B is provable. This matches up 
precisely with what happens in Prolog, in that many implementations of Prolog 
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allow disjunctions, and determine whether there is a proof of the disjunction in 
precisely the manner specified above. 
A recurring feature in the semantics of programming languages is the execution 
of a program may result in one of three states: termination with success, termina- 
tion with failure, and non-termination. In logic programming terms, this means 
that a goal may either succeed, fail or loop. The third case corresponds to the 
existence of infinite branches in the SLD-tree. Because of this property, Kleene's 
idea of 3-valued logic [51] has often been cited as a possible way to weaken clas-
sical logic in order to give a more appropriate semantics for logic programming 
and there have been several investigations along these lines [29,30,32,54,55,56,58]. 
This may be thought of as weakening the mapping of formulae to truth values 
from a total function varying over 2-valued truth (i.e. each formula is mapped to 
either true or false) to a total function on 3-valued truth (so that every formula is 
mapped to true, false or I). In intuitionistic logic, this mapping may be thought 
of as a partial, rather than total, mapping from formulae to 2-valued truth, and 
hence is a somewhat different approach. The mapping is only partial because the 
proof system is only partial; first-order intuitionistic logic is not decidable. Hence, 
we use an implicit approach to this problem, rather than specify an explicit third 
value. Also, the three valued approach does not explicitly address the answer 
substitution property. 
For these reasons it seems that a constructive analysis of logic programming 
may be useful. Now whilst Horn clauses are sufficient for any computational pur-
pose [108], it is desirable to extend the class of formulae which may be used as a 
programming language. When considering such extensions, an analysis in terms 
of the differences between classical logic and intuitionistic logic will be useful, as 
by using larger and larger classes of formulae of first-order logic we will eventually 
reach a point at which classical logic and intuitionistic logic differ. As we be-
lieve the constructive interpretation is the more natural one, we investigate such 
extensions from an intuitionistic viewpoint. 
Such extensions have been given by Gabbay et al. [37,35,38], McCarty [65,66], 
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and Miller et al. [81,82]. All are extensions to Horn clauses, and involve using 
implications in the bodies of clauses. 
The QN-Prolog system of Gabbay and his colleagues was motivated by the 
formalisation of the British Nationality Act [104], and requires some seemingly 
unnatural restrictions on the variables involved. For example, unlike the other two 
systems, universally quantified variables may not appear in the body of clauses. 
McCarty's extension to Horn clauses is based on clauses of the form 
Pc -Q 
Pc(QR) 
where the variables of P are assumed to be universally quantified at the front 
of the clause, and the variables of Q which are not so quantified are universally 
quantified at the front of the body. It is shown how a proof system may be given 
in which the converses of the above formulae may also be used as clauses. 
The framework of Miller et al. uses a class of formulae known as hereditary 
Harrop formulae, which, apart from formulae which include negations, is more ex-
pressive than both of the other systems. For example, the following is a hereditary 
Harrop formula, but is not a legal clause in either of the other systems. 
P 	VxyVz q(x ) y,z) 
Another way in which this framework differs from the other two is the amount 
of operational detail that is specified. Both Gabbay et al. and McCarty spend 
a significant amount of time discussing and describing the ways in which the 
appropriate proof procedures may be implemented, whereas Miller et al. provide a 
more abstract operational semantics, which simplifies the presentation somewhat. 
Clearly it is important to understand how the features of a programming language 
are to be implemented, but a detailed examination of the issues involved is beyond 
our scope. As we wish to explore the connection between logic and programming 
rather than operational issues per se, we adopt the approach of Miller et al. towards 
extensions to Horn clauses. 
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Hereditary Harrop formulae may be generalised to higher-order formulae, which 
may then be used as a higher-order logic programming language, known as AProlog 
[79,81,86,87]. This language has applications to program transformations [44,45], 
theorem proving [27], and computational linguistics [80], as well as to modules [77] 
and lexical scoping [78] in which only the first-order part is needed. 
The central notion behind hereditary Harrop formulae is the idea of a uniform 
proof, which may be thought of as a proof which is essentially determined by 
the structure of the formula proved. It is shown in [81] how uniform proofs are 
sound and complete for various classes of formulae and notions of provability. In 
particular, it is known that for first-order hereditary Harrop formulae, uniform 
proofs are sound and complete with respect to intuitionistic provability [81,82]. 
There is also a model theory for a large fragment of hereditary Harrop formulae, 
which seems to be an elegant semantics for this class of programs. This model 
theory also captures the growth of programs in a natural way, generalises the 
traditional fixpoint semantics, and, being a possible world semantics, has clear 
connections to other model theoretic constructions. It is shown in [77] how the 
operational notion of derivability coincides with the model theoretic one. 
We examine this framework as a basis for logic programming, and look at 
how extensions, such as Negation as Failure [17,100], may be incorporated into 
it. In chapter 2 we review the preliminary concepts and definitions, and discuss 
various foundational issues, including the possibilities for negation and the ways to 
implement universal quantification in goals. We show how a version of Negation 
as Failure may be incorporated into hereditary Harrop formulae. 
In chapter 3 we examine the role of the completion of a program [17], which 
may be thought of as adding negative information to the program, so that we 
may derive negative information explicitly, rather than implicitly as in Negation 
as Failure. We show how the structure. of hereditary Harrop formulae make it 
possible to consider the completion as a program (i.e. a set of clauses) rather than 
just a formula of first-order logic, and that the completion correctly captures the 
computational properties of the program. 
In the following chapter we discuss how answer substitutions may be computed 
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for negated goals. The usual unification methods are not sufficient for this task, 
and so we present and prove correct an algorithm which will be useful in this 
regard. This algorithm is incremental, in the sense that new information may be 
incorporated without recomputing from scratch. 
Chapter 5 deals with model theory, and in particular how to incorporate nega-
tion into the model theory for hereditary Harrop formulae as given by Miller [77]. 
In this case the model in question is similar to a Kripke model, but with a slight 
difference. We show how the usual T construction [5,25] may be defined in the 
presence of negation, and that the procedural semantics coincides with the declar-
ative semantics given by this model. No restriction on the class of programs is 
needed for this process. 
In chapter 6 we show how the structural properties of logic programs may be 
exploited in order to derive a normal form for programs and goals. We may think 
of a normal form as a formula which is engineered to give a maximal amount of 
information with a minimal number of constructs. This normal form leads to a 
discussion of equivalence between programs and goals, and we show that a logic 
slightly stronger than intuitionistic logic is needed in order to capture the natural 
notion of equivalence in this context, i.e. that operationally equivalent programs 
are logically equivalent. 
Finally in chapter 7 we give some applications peculiar to hereditary Harrop 
formulae as opposed to Horn clauses. These include the possibilities for memoisa-
tion and a first-order notion of meta-programming, which is made possible by the 
presence of implications in the bodies of clauses. 
Chapter 2 
Hereditary Harrop Formulae and Extensions 
In this chapter we introduce the foundational issues involved in adding negation to 
the framework of first-order hereditary Harrop formulae. Section 2.1 deals with the 
definitions and basic properties of this framework as defined by Miller et al. [82], 
and Section 2.2 discusses extensions to this framework. Here we also discuss out 
motivation for interpreting universal quantifiers extensionally. Then we discuss 
the role of the Negation as Failure (NAF) rule and the Closed World Assumption 
(CWA) in a constructive setting, and introduce the notion of a completely de-
fined predicate, before presenting the formal extensions necessary to incorporate 
the above features in Section 2.3. We also show how the notion of completely 
defined predicates may then be used to define a notion of NAF for a more general 
class of goals than literals. In Section 2.4 we discuss the technicalities involved 
in our interpretation of the universal quantifier, as well as the problem of pro-
ducing answer substitutions for existentially quantified goals. We also discuss the 
possibilities for forms of negation other than NAF, and explore the relationships 
between NAF and more explicit forms. Finally we discuss the role of stratification 
in our approach to the model theory for programs which use the NAF rule. 
16 
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2.1 First-order Hereditary Harrop Formulae 
In this section we present the basic definitions and results pertaining to first-
order hereditary Harrop formulae, which may be found in [82,81,87]. Many of our 
examples are drawn from the same sources. 
The class of first-order hereditary Harrop formulae may be defined as follows: 
D:=AIVXDID1 AD2 IGDA 
C:=AVxCIxCIG1 vC2 lC1 AC2 lD DC 
A program is any set of closed D formulae, and a goal is any closed C formula. 
We often refer to D formulae as definite formulae, and G formulae as goal formulae. 
We denote by V the set of all D formulae, P the set of all programs and the set 
of all G formulae by g, As in the Horn clause case, computation is performed 
by trying to find a proof that a given goal C follows from a given program P. 
One significant difference between this approach and the traditional Horn clause 
methods is that a richer set of search primitives needs to be used. The refutation 
interpretation of SLD-resolution is not only not intuitionistically valid, it is also 
difficult to see how it may be extended to hereditary Harrop formulae. Hence the 
connection between logic and programming in this context can only be given by 
interpreting a goal formula C as both a formula of first-order logic and a series of 
instructions to be performed in a search space which is richer than that for Horn 
clauses. It is also somewhat aesthetically pleasing not to refer to negated formulae 
in order to explain the behaviour of a class of formulae which do not contain 
negations. Thus there is no analogue of SLD-refutation, but only a generalisation 
of the notion of an SLD-derivation. 
The relevant search space interpretation is given by defining a consequence 
relation 	on P x g as given below. 
PF-0C1VG2iffPF--0C1orpI--C2 
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PH0 G1 AG2 iffPH 0 G1 and PF-0 G2  
P 	xG if P G[t/x] for some ground term t 
P F-0 VxG if P H0 G[c/x] where c is a new constant 
PH0 DDCiffPU{D}H0 G 
This gives us a top-down definition of the computational process, so that given 
the goal p A 3x q(x) we proceed by finding a proof of p and a proof of 3x q(x), 
each of which we may further reduce according to the rules above. Note that 
there is no explicit reference to the details of the operational processes, such as 
unification or how to choose between alternatives in the search space. This allows 
us to consider the above definitions as a general prescription for the behaviour 
of logic programming languages, rather than as an explicit definition of a specific 
language. 
Note that there is no specification above about how to establish P F-c, A. We 
give below a definition of this in accordance with the above principles of generality. 
Let P be a set of definite formulae. We define [P] as the least set of definite 
formulae which satisfies the following conditions: 
PC [P] 
If VxD e [P] then D[t/x] [P] for all terms t 
If D1 A D2 e [P] then D1 e [P] and D2 E [P] 
We can now define F c, as the smallest relation satisfying the above conditions 
and 
P H0 A if A E [P] or there is a formula C D A e [P] such that P H0 C 
The definition of [P] indicates an important point: we are interested in validity 
with respect to a fixed set of terms, rather than validity with respect to all possible 
Chapter 2. Hereditary Harrop Formulae and Extensions 	 19 
sets of terms. We denote the set of all ground terms as U, which will be referred 
to as the Herbrand Universe. Given this set of terms, we refer to the set of all 
ground atoms as N, known as the Herbrand base. 
A proof system for these formulae may be given by the standard sequent cal-
culus of cut-free proofs for intuitionistic logic, so that P H0 G if there is a proof 
in this calculus of the sequent P -p C. Initial sequents are of the form P - A 
where A E [P]. We use the usual notational convention that the set on the left 
hand side of I- is written as a sequence of formulae. The rules for this calculus 
are the standard ones for intuitionistic logic (which may be found, amongst other 
places, in [81]). The important property of this class of formulae is that the proofs 
are uniform; that is, in a proof of P -p G, the top-level connective of C is in-
troduced in the last step of the proof. Thus a proof of P -f C1 A G2 must have 
as its immediate predecessors the sequents P -+ C1 and P -) C2. In this way 
uniform proofs capture the search space properties discussed above. 
The advantage of this class of proofs is that the search space rules are sound and 
complete with respect to uniform proofs, i.e. it is clear that P H0 C if P - C has 
a uniform proof. Moreover, uniform proofs are sound and complete with respect to 
intuitionistic proofs of sequents of the form P -f C, as is stated in the following 
theorem (Theorem 4 in [81]): 
Theorem 2.1.1 Let P be a program and C be a goal. Then 
PH I GPHQ C 
The proof may be found in [81]. The importance of this result is that we only 
need to consider uniform proofs in order to determine whether a given goal follows 
from a program. For example, consider the goal C1 A C2 . We know that if we 
can show that C1 and C2  both follow from the program, then C1 A C2 does, but 
the uniform proof property enables us to reach the stronger conclusion that if we 
do not find a proof by this method, then there is no proof of C1 A C2 from the 
program. So the proof search procedure described above for a goal C is the only 
way to find a proof of C, and it is this lack of ambiguity which allows us to give 
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a computational interpretation of formulae, and thus make a direct connection 
between mathematical logic and programming. In this way we may explain the 
computational process in terms of proof in that a successful search corresponds 
to the discovery of a uniform proof of a goal, and that a failure in the search 
corresponds to the discovery that the goal has no uniform proof. 
Uniform proofs are often referred to as 0-proofs, both here and in the litera-
ture, due to this operational interpretation of provability. 
Given the consequence relation F0, which is a representation of the desired 
properties of a logic programming system, we may ask whether this consequence 
relation is equivalent to some well-known consequence relation that has been stud-
ied previously. In addition to the theorem quoted above, the following result is 
shown in [81] (an immediate consequence of Lemma 10): 
Proposition 2.1.2 Let P be a program and G be a goal. Then 
PF I GPFM G 
where FM is the standard consequence relation of minimal logic. 
It follows immediately from this proposition and the theorem above that P F0 
G if P F1 G if P FM C. It is also pointed out in [81] that F-s, the standard 
consequence relation of first-order classical logic, is too strong to be useful in this 
context, as there are proofs in classical logic for which there are no uniform proofs. 
This is expressed in the following proposition. 
Proposition 2.1.3 Let P be a program and C be a goal. Then 
PFC CPFO G 
A counterexample to P f-C C = P F0 C is the program (p(a) Ap(b)) D q and 
the goal x(p(x) D q). In [77] it is shown that 
(p(a) A p(b)) D q F 	x(p(x) D q) 
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but it is clear that there is no uniform proof of this goal from this program, and 
so it is not the case that 
(p(a) Ap(b)) D q F-0 3x(p(x) ID q) 
A similar problem is encountered with the goal p  (p ID q), as I-. p V (p 
but it is not true that F-c, p V (p D q). Thus classical logic is too strong to capture 
the search space interpretation discussed above, which seems fundamental to the 
concept of logic programming. Perhaps the best example of this phenomenon is 
given by the classical equivalence 
G1 V (D D C2) E (D ID C1 ) V G 
As both of these formulae are equivalent in classical logic to -D V G V C2, inter- 
preting the goal C1 V (D ID G2) as a formula of first-order classical logic destroys 
the direct correspondence between proofs of the goal and the search space inter-
pretation. The search interpretation suggests that we may think of the implication 
D ID C2  as an instruction to load in the code stored in a module D, and evaluate 
the goal G2  in this larger environment, whereas C1 is to be evaluated withont this 
extra code (this idea is discussed and developed in [77]). This seems to contradict 
the above classical equivalence, which suggests that it does not matter which goal 
is evaluated in the extended environment. Hence, classical logic derives too many 
equivalences to allow the direct and natural association between proof and search 
spaces that is possible in some weaker logics, such as intuitionistic logic or minimal 
logic. In this way the search space characterisation of a logic programming sys- 
tem excludes the possibility of using 	to analyse first-order hereditary Harrop 
formulae. 
Note that first-order hereditary Harrop formulae preserve the existential prop-
erty, i.e. that if P -f xG has a uniform proof, then there is a term t such that 
P -p G[t/x] has a uniform proof. As in the Horn clause case, we will often refer 
to G[t/x] as an answer for the goal dxC. 
Note also that, just as in the Horn clause case, variables which appear in the 
head of a clause may be considered existentially quantified when the body of the 
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clause is used as a new goal. This is due to the fact that we are searching in a 
top-down fashion. For example, consider the goal Ix p(x) and the program 
q(a) 
Vs q(x) D p(x) 
We first match the goal against the second clause, and produce the next goal 
Rx q(x), which is clearly a valid step as if ax q(x) and Vs q(s) D p(x) are true, 
then asp(s) is true. Now axq(x) succeeds with the answer q(a), and so the 
original goal succeeds with the answer p(a). Hence, once the head of the clause 
has been "passed", we may consider all free variables of the body to be existentially 
quantified. 
One interesting structural property of first-order hereditary Harrop formulae 
is that we may define the D formulae as above or in the equivalent fashion 
D:=AIVXDID1AD2IGDD 
which conveys the essential symmetry between implications which occur in pro-
grams and those which occur in goals. That this is equivalent to the previous 
definition may be seen by the equivalences 
G 	(D1 AD2) (G DI) A(G D D2 ) 
G1 D(C2 DD)EJ (GI AG2)DD 
C D VxD VxG D D 
where x is not free in G. The first form of the definition shows the connection to 
Horn clauses more concretely, and allows easier formal manipulation and so it is 
generally preferred. The second form is more useful when considering connections 
between first-order hereditary Harrop formulae and full first-order logic. 
Another useful application of the second form occurs when we consider the 
class of formulae which are both D and C formulae. These are denoted as M 
formulae, and are often referred to as core formulae. They may be defined as 
follows: 
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M:=AtVxM!M1 AM2 IM1 DM2  
By the above equivalences, these are the same as the class of formulae defined 
by replacing M1 D M2 in the above definition by M D A. As these formulae 
may be used both as programs and goals, if an M formula is asked as a goal and 
succeeds, we may "store" this result by adding it to the program. Note that this 
class of formulae includes Horn clauses. We will have more to say about this class 
of formulae later. 
Another observation that may be made about the structure of first-order hered-
itary Harrop formulae is that we may think of programs as sets of clauses, where 
a clause C is any closed formula satisfying 
C:=AJVXCIGJA 
with C formulae defined as above. This allows us to consider a program as a set 
of clauses without sacrificing any expressive power, as Vx (D1 A D2) is equivalent 
to (VxD1) A (VxD2 ), and so we may push conjunctions outwards until we", arrive 
at a conjunction of clauses. We may think of this conjunction as a set of clauses, 
which is often more convenient. The definition below makes formal the notion of 
the head of a clause. 
Definition 2.1.1 Let C be a clause, A be an atom, C be a goal, and D be a 
definite formula. Then 
head(A) = A 
head(VxD) = head(D) 
head(G D A) = A 
heads(D) = {A 13 a clause C E [D] with head(C) = Al 
We may then define the set of clauses which correspond to a definite formula 
D as follows: 
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Definition 2.1.2 Let D be a definite formula. Then we define 
clausal(A) 	{A} 
clausal(D1  A D2 ) = clausal(D1) U clausal(D) 
clausal(VxD) 	= {VxD' I D' e clausal(D)} 
clausal(G D A) = {G D Al 
Let P = ID,. ... D} be a finite set of definite formulae. Then 
clausal(P) = Uclausal(D) 
Note that [D] contains all instances of all elements of clausal(D). 
As the above definition makes clear, we may think of a definite formula as a 
set of clauses, and hence we may think of a program as a set of clauses. We will 
often omit clausal(D) and clausal(P) when it is clear from the context what is 
meant. 
Given that we may think of programs as sets of clauses in this way, it is then 
clear that Horn clauses may be defined as follows: 
H:=AjVxPJIH1 AH2 QJA 
Q:= A I IXQ I Q1 A  Q2 
By moving the conjunctions outwards in definite formulae, as mentioned above, 
it is clear that a set of closed H formulae is equivalent to a set of Horn clauses. 
In fact if we allow disjunctions in the bodies of clauses, we arrive at a class of 
programs which is no more powerful than Horn clauses, as for any progam in the 
class of programs defined below, there is an equivalent Horn clause program. 
H:=AJVXJJIH1 AH2 JQDA 
Q:= AI *cQ I Q1 AQ2 IQ1VQ2 
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The equivalence of (Q1 V  Q2) D A and (Q1 D A) A (Q2 A) ensures that 
we may rewrite any program in the larger class as a Horn clause program. Thus 
there is some innate redundancy in the definition of the larger class of programs. 
We will explore such issues in chapter 6. 
2.2 Extensions 
2.2.1 Extensional Universal Quantification 
One feature of logic programming is that we usually consider the set of all closed 
terms, called the Herbrand Universe and which is here denoted as U, as a set which 
is fixed prior to the writing of a program, and hence is constant throughout the 
computation process. For simplicity, we assume that the Herbrand Universe is not 
empty. We usually think of this set of terms as being generated by a finite number 
of symbols, i.e. a signature, and, so it seems natural to associate a signature with a 
particular program. Often the signature of a program is taken to contain exactly 
the function and constant symbols which appear in the program. In our case we 
will assume that the signature must contain such symbols, but need not be limited 
to them. For example, consider the program below. 
Vs nonzero(s(s)) 
It is clear that non_zero(s'2(0)) succeeds for all n > 1, and that non-zero(0) 
fails. Clearly we wish the latter goal to fail, rather than produce a type error 
or something similar. Hence we need the external knowledge provided by the 
signature in order to have the correct "view" of the information in the program. 
This also makes it clear what to do with a goal such as non_zero(s(a)), which 
would otherwise succeed. 
We will assume that the number of symbols is in the signature is finite, so that 
the Herbrand Universe is recursively enumerable. It seems difficult to see how 
infinite signatures can be useful in this context, and so this does not seem to be a 
particularly restrictive assumption. 
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Definition 2.2.1 A signature E is a set of pairs f/n where f is a constant or 
function symbol of arity n > 0. 
Note that this definition allows the same symbol to appear more than once in 
the signature with different arities. 
The idea of restricting attention to a given set of terms seems natural from 
programming considerations. For any given predicate, there are some terms which 
will be applicable and some which will not. For example, it does not seem very 
sensible to discuss whether Mickey Mouse is a natural number, and so the natural 
number predicate should be restricted to terms constructed from 0 and the suc-
cessor function. We may use a similar idea to further decompose the signature, so 
that each predicate may use a particular subset of the signature. For example, in 
a program which contains information about products, suppliers and customers, 
there may be some predicates which refer to products and suppliers but not to 
customers, and so we may think of these predicates as using a subset of the overall 
signature. In this sense, given the Herbrand Universe U, we may derive thecorre-
sponding signature E, and for any given predicate pthere is a signature >1 ç 
such that p is only applicable to terms constructed from the symbols in >. These 
considerations will be useful in what follows, as we will not have to worry about 
Domain Closure Axioms and so forth to ensure that a given atom has a sensible 
interpretation. 
It is possible to extend the notion of signature into a rudimentary notion of 
typing. For example, an n-ary function symbol f from a signature E may use 
	
any term from 	as an argument, and the resulting term itself is an element of 
. This may be thought of as ascribing the type 	x 	x ... x 	-* 	to 
f. However, it is conceivable that a more useful notion is to ascribe the type 
X 	x . . . x 	-p 	to f, where the E are distinct signatures. We have not 
pursued this approach here, for the sake of simplicity, but as it would only require 
a change in the way terms are generated, it should not be too hard to incorporate 
into what follows. 
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We will only consider terms which may be built from the signature. This 
means that we cannot use "polymorphic" predicates such as append and member, 
for which the natural signature is {[]/O, ./21, but for which terms such as [1,2] are 
perfectly valid. This is somewhat restrictive limitation, but it greatly simplifies 
the discussion. There is no reason in principle why the following remarks should 
not apply to predicates such as append and member, but as the technical details 
involved are peripheral to our scope (and somewhat overwhelming), we will not 
pursue such issues here. 
Given that we think of the Herbrand Universe in this way, the rule given for 
deriving the success of universal quantification of goals in the definition of F0 
above is not quite adequate for our purposes. We may think of the above rule 
as requiring that there is an explicit rule stating the desired conclusion, whereas 
we wish to allow reasoning by cases. For example, let the Herbrand Universe be 
{a, f(a), f(f(a)) .... } and consider the program P below: 
p(a) 
Vx p(f(x)) 
According to the definition above, it is not the case that P F0 Vx p(x), and yet 
it is clear that for every term tin the Herbrand Universe P F0 p(t). We may think 
of this as requiring that universally quantified conclusions be independent of the 
language of the program. In our case we want the success of universally quantified 
goals to reflect the fact that we are dealing with a known Herbrand Universe, and 
so we will require something slightly different. The details are given in the next 
section; essentially we want a universally quantified goal to succeed precisely when 
all of its instances succeed. However we will still retain the "compactness" of the 
previous version, in that success of a universally quantified goal will only depend 
on the success of a finite number of instances, and hence describes a feasible search 
operation. This point is discussed in more detail in section 2.4. 
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2.2.2 Negation in a Constructive Setting 
It has already been mentioned how intuitionistic logic and classical logic may be 
expected to differ for various extensions to Horn clauses, and that intuitionistic 
logic often seems better suited to computation than classical logic. One such 
strength of intuitionistic logic may be shown by one of the most common extensions 
to Horn clauses: to allow the bodies of clauses to be conjunctions of literals, rather 
than conjunctions of atoms alone. The usual extension to the proof theory is to 
introduce the Negation as Failure (NAF) rule: for a ground atom A, we say that 
-'A succeeds precisely when A fails [17,33,49,100,105]. Now classically, A and 
-'A are symmetric in the sense that if one is false then the other is true, and 
vice-versa, and a proof that one leads to a contradiction is a proof of the other. 
This is due to the fact that in classical logic we must have that at least one of 
A and -'A is true. The NAF rule would thus suggest that this symmetry should 
be observed by the computational behaviour of the two goals A and -'A, i.e. that 
either A succeeds or A fails, and that from the failure of A we can prove -'A and 
vice-versa. However, it is not clear that defining -'A in terms of the failure of A 
preserves this symmetry, as A may loop. Thus the complementational nature of 
the NAF rule may introduce an asymmetry between A and -'A, which does not 
sit well with their symmetry in classical proof theory. 
There is an asymmetry between the two in intuitionistic logic, as there is no 
rule which identifies the truth of -'-'A with that of A. In fact, -'A is generally 
harder to prove than A, as in order to prove -'A intuitionistically, we must show 
that A can never be true. In this way we expect that -'A will generally be much 
harder to prove than A. 
Note that NAF is an implicit form of negation in that the negative consequences 
are defined as those which fail to be positive consequences. The logical justification 
for this extra-logical rule is known as the Closed World Assumption (CWA), which 
may be thought of as stating that anything which does not follow from the program 
is false. Thus the law of excluded middle holds for every predicate, and so it is 
difficult to see how the CWA may be reconciled with a constructivist philosophy. 
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Computability considerations also affect NAF, and so it really only coincides with 
the usual conception of negation in mathematical logic for the class of programs 
for which any goal either succeeds or fails, (i.e. there are no loops) and where 
the program's knowledge is complete, so that the CWA is satisfied. Such special 
cases may be found in certain deductive databases, such as a databases of student 
records which lists all the courses in which a student is enrolled. Obviously it is 
decidable whether or not a student is enrolled in a given course, and the knowledge 
in the database is complete, so that if we find that Computer Science 1 is not on 
the list of all courses in which the student is enrolled, we may conclude that the 
student is not enrolled in Computer Science 1. 
Unfortunately, not all programs satisfy both of the above conditions, i.e. are 
loop-free and omniscient, and for such programs, NAF becomes incomplete with 
respect to the consequences of the CWA, in that it does not follow that if A is 
true according to the CWA then -A is computed by the NAF rule. The main 
difficulty is that NAF may be thought of as inferring that an atom A which fails 
is false, whereas from the CWA we infer that any atom A which does not succeed 
is false. A general slogan which seems to be applicable to all formal programming 
languages is that any language of sufficient power to be interesting and useful 
will have some sort of undecidability or incompleteness property. One obvious 
example is that anything of equivalent power to Turing machines will inherit the 
undecidability of the halting problem. In order to use some notion of NAP in 
such a system, we need to give more justification than was given above in order 
to reconcile this approach with its formal basis in mathematical logic. 
It may be argued that the reason that NAP is only an approximation in such 
cases (i.e. that NAP is sound but not complete with respect to the consequences 
of the CWA) is that NAP is an inherently computable form of negation, but 
that the consequence of the CWA are inherently non-computable, as the above 
considerations indicate. Thus any computable form of negation can only be an 
approximation to the CWA, and thus cannot significantly improve on NAF. This 
is to miss the point of the argument; we are trying to incorporate negation into 
the class of "programmable" formulae, not to encode the CWA. We see the role 
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of the CWA as a justification, rather than a desirable end in itself, and so if the 
CWA does not provide an adequate justification for the NAF rule, then it does 
not necessarily follow that we must abandon NAF, but that in order to use it, we 
need to find some other logical' justification for it. 
As noted earlier, constructive truth is "inherently" three-valued, as the lack 
of the law of excluded middle means that we do not require every formula to be 
either true or false, and so in a constructive setting there are formulae which are 
neither true nor false, just as in the programming setting there are goals which 
neither succeed nor fail. This suggests that a constructive interpretation of NAF 
together with a modification of the CWA so that it is consistent with a constructive 
approach seems appropriate. 
An interesting property of intuitionistic logic compared with classical logic is 
that finer distinctions are made between programs. For example, consider the 
programs P1 and P2 where P1 is just p and P2 is (q D p) A (-'q D p). These 
two programs are equivalent in classical logic, whereas intuitionistically they are 
not. This is due to the fact that in intuitionistic logic, for the second program one 
must either derive q or derive -'q in order to derive p, which seems more in keeping 
with the operational nature of the program than the approach of classical logic, 
in which one may take a global view and deduce that p must hold on the grounds 
that it could not be otherwise. Now if we extend both programs by adding q, 
then there is no change in the behaviour of the goal p for the extension of the first 
program, but there is a significant change in the behaviour of the goal p from the 
extension of the second program, as q now succeeds rather than fails. This change 
is reflected in intuitionistic logic as P2, q I- p but P2 !/ p, whereas P2 Hc p and 
P2, q F6. p. Thus classical logic is too strong to precisely capture the nature of 
computation in this context, as there are too many classical equivalences to allow 
an unambiguous association between derivability and proof. 
'Here we use the term logical in the narrow mathematical sense. 
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One approach suggested by the above argument is that in order to recast 
the CWA, we need to remove the insistence that there are only two possibilities, 
being that a goal C must be either true or false. A way to do this is to shift 
the emphasis of the CWA from being a global notion to a local one, in the same 
way that in P2  above intuitionistic logic may be thought of as being more locally 
orientated than classical logic. This will remove the conflict between the two-
valued approach of the CWA and the three-valued nature required by NAF. An 
important consideration here is that in shifting from the global view to the local 
one, we lose our global perspective. This manifests itself in the consideration that 
there are some situations in which NAF is not really applicable. In some ways, 
NAF is an attractive way to implement negation; there are completeness results 
which state that A is true if A succeeds, i.e. that P = A 	P I- A [61], and so a 
natural dual to this principle would be that A is false if A fails, or P = -'A 	P 1/ 
A. However, there is an underlying assumption here that the definition of every 
predicate in the program is complete, so that it is sensible to consider as false 
everything that is not explicitly stated to be true. This assumption of "universal 
completeness" will hold for some programs, but there are many others for which it 
will not, and for these the NAF rule does not make much sense. For example, the 
append predicate given below is complete in the sense that there is no additional 
clause we can insert which would correctly extend the append relation; all the 
information we ever want to consider about appending lists together is given, and 
so it is correct to apply NAF. Thus we may think of the append predicate as given 
below as completely defined. 
Vx append([J,x,x) 
VxVyVzVw append(y, z, w) D append(x.y,z,x.w) 
On the other hand, not every predicate will have such a complete definition. 
For example, a predicate containing information about carcinogens we would wish 
to consider incompletely defined, as it is possible that our list of carcinogens is not 
complete. Thus whilst we wish to be able to prove -'append([], [1, 2), [3]) from the 
failure of the goal append([], [1, 2], [3]), we may be undecided whether to conclude 
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-'carcinogen(chocolate) from the failure of the goal carcinogen (chocolate). Hence 
the NAF approach is inappropriate here, as whilstIx-carcinogen(x) may be true, 
it is not necessarily true that everything not known to be a carcinogen is known 
not to be a carcinogen. In this way we may classify each definition in the program 
as completely or incompletely defined, i.e. suitable for NAF or not. Thus for any 
program P, we say that a predicate p is completely defined in P if any extension to 
the definition of p given in P is either wrong or equivalent to the original definition. 
Otherwise, p is incompletely defined in P. This idea is explored further in section 
2.3. 
Note that we cannot give a formal definition in the narrow mathematical sense. 
This is due to the fact that the property in question is inherently semantic (i.e. a 
matter of judgement); only the programmer can know whether a given predicate is 
completely defined or not, and then only on the basis of the relation between the 
formal definition (i.e. the program) and the specification of what the program is 
supposed to do, which may or may not be given formally. With a formal specifica-
tion it is possible to consider the question of whether the definition of a predicate is 
complete with respect to the formal specification or not. As issues of specification 
and formal correctness are beyond our scope, we will use the informal definition 
above for the sake of simplicity and generality, and so we require the programmer 
to indicate which predicates are completely defined in any given program, similar 
to an idea expressed in [43]. 
We need to impose some restrictions on the way that completely defined predi-
cates may depend on other completely defined predicates and incompletely defined 
predicates in order to guarantee sensible behaviour. The notion of completely de-
fined predicates will not make a great deal of sense if there is a clause q D p in 
the program where p is completely defined but q is not, as if we are able to in-
crease our knowledge about q, we would be able to increase our knowledge about 
p. Thus we need to restrict the definition of completely defined predicates so that 
the only place that incompletely defined predicates can appear in the definition 
of a completely defined predicate is in the assumption part of an implication in 
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the body of a clause. This property will be useful later on, and is formalised in 
section 2.3. 
Note that the presence of completely defined predicates will have an effect on 
the way that implications in goals are treated. As it will not make sense to add to 
the definition of a completely defined predicate, we will not be able to execute goals 
which require the addition to the program of a clause whose head is a completely 
defined predicate. This point is discussed more fully in section 2.3. 
For these reasons we distinguish between completely defined predicates, i.e. 
those for which we may apply NAF, and incompletely defined predicates, for which 
some other form of negation will be necessary. This gives us our form of localisation 
of the CWA, in that only when a predicate p is completely defined will we be able 
to identify the failure of p(t) with the truth of -p(t). Thus we may think of the 
notion of completely or incompletely defined predicates as an indication of whether 
the CWA is true or not for smaller localised worlds, rather than viewing the CWA 
as a global condition on the entire program. 
Another useful property of the distinction between completely and incom-
pletely defined predicates will allow us to consider different forms of negation 
within the same framework. For completely defined predicates, it is clear that 
NAF is appropriate. For incompletely defined predicates, we need some other 
rule. This may be thought of as specifying what we may deduce from a failure 
to prove a goal. If the goal is an atom p(t) where p is completely defined, then 
the NAF rule says that we may deduce -p(t) from the failure of p(t), as we know 
that we can never have p(t) being true. In this way we may think of NAF as a 
form of consistency test, in that if p(t) fails, then it is not inconsistent to assume 
-ip(t), i.e. -'p(t) is consistent with the program, but not necessarily true. It is 
the fact that the predicate is completely defined which leads us to the stronger 
conclusion that -p(t) is true. In other cases, i.e. for goals other than completely 
defined atoms, some other action may be appropriate. For example, for incom-
pletely defined predicates, we might look for an explicit statement that --ip(t) is 
true, or some indication that the assumption of p(t) leads to an inconsistency. 
One such form of computation is the Negation as Inconsistency (NA I) principle 
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introduced by Gabbay and Sergot [39], which is an explicit form of negation in 
that formulae such as -p(t) form part of the program. Thus whilst our information 
may not be complete, we may know a particular piece of negative information. For 
example, although the list of carcinogens may be incomplete, it may be known that 
bananas are not carcinogenic, and so we would wish to state -'carcinogen(bananas). 
We may thus build up our knowledge of incompletely defined predicates in both 
a positive and a negative fashion. The NAI rule allows us to determine the truth 
of -'A by showing that A leads to an inconsistency. A thorough discussion of this 
idea is given in [39]; here we note that such a rule is appropriate for incompletely 
defined predicates. 
2.3 Technicalities 
In this section we define the necessary extensions to the earlier framework in order 
to incorporate negation. 
The definitions of D and C formulae given in [82] and in section 2.1 hare as 
follows: 
D:= A I VxD I D1 A D2  I GA 
G:= A IVxG J RxG  J C1 A C2 IC1 VG2 JDD C 
The addition of negated atoms to goals requires that we extend the definition 
of a C formula to include the case -'A. The definition of the G formulae which 
reflects this is given below. 
Definition 2.3.1 A definite formula D and a goal formula C are defined via: 
D:=AIVXDIDIAJJ2!GDA 
G:= A IAIVXCIXCIGIAC2IGiVC2IDDC 
We denote by V the set of all D formulae, and the set of all C formulae by g. 
Such an extension requires that programs consist of more than just a set of closed 
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definite clauses, as we need to know which predicates are completely defined. In 
fact, we will include a pair of disjoint sets of predicates names as part of the 
program, where the first set of names are the predicates which are incompletely 
defined, and the second are the completely defined predicates. This allows us to 
make some significant technical simplifications. Whilst we insist that the two sets 
be disjoint, it is not necessary that the two sets cover all predicate names, as there 
may be some predicates whose status is somewhat unclear (i.e. it is possible that 
the definition is complete, but we do not know that it is complete). Thus the 
first set of names may be thought of as those predicates for which we know our 
information is incomplete, and hence it is reasonable to extend the definition of 
such predicates during execution of the program, but not to apply the NAF rule 
to them. On the other hand, the completely defined predicates may use the NAF 
rule, but their definitions may not be extended. 
This leads us to the definition of a program which appears below. 
Definition 2.3.2 Given an atom A = p(t1,. . . ta), we define name(A) = p, and 
for any formula F, names(F) = {name(A) IA appears in F}. 
We say an atom A appears positively (negatively) in a formula F as follows: 
. A appears positively in A 
A appears positively (negatively) in F1 V F2 if A appears positively (negatively) in 
either F1 or F2  
A appears positively (negatively) in F1 A F2 if A appears positively (negatively) in 
either F1 or F2  
A appears positively (negatively) in IxF if A appears positively (negatively) in F 
A appears positively (negatively) in VxF if A appears positively (negatively) in F 
A appears positively (negatively) in F1 D F2 zff A appears positively (negatively) 
in F2 or A appears negatively (positively) in F1 
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A appears positively (negatively) in -iF if A appears positively (negatively) in F 
The above definition is used to determine the "parity" of an atom A in regard 
to implications. For example, p(a) occurs positively in p(a) A q(b), but negatively 
in p(a) D q(b). 
Definition 2.3.3 A derivation state is a pair (D, N) where D is a set of definite 
formulae and N is a pair (N1 , N2) where Ni c names(H) and N1 fl N = 0, and 
which satisfies: 
For all atoms A and B such that name(A) E N2, C D A is a closed formula in 
[D], and B occurs in G, then 
If B occurs positively in G, then name(B) e N2. 
If B occurs negatively in C, then name(B) E N1. 
If N = (N1, N2), we say ass(N) = N1, den(N) = AT2. 
A program is a derivation state (D, N) in which D is a set of closed definite 
formulae. 
We denote the set of all programs by P. When N is the pair (names(D), 0), 
we often write the program as just D. As mentioned above, we may think of D as 
either a set of closed definite formulae or as a set of clauses. 
The restrictions on the occurrences of atoms in the bodies of the clauses of 
completely defined predicates ensure that completely defined predicates may only 
depend on the success of other completely defined predicates and the assumption 
of incompletely defined predicates. For example, given the clause 
(r D q) D p 
then if den(N) contains p, then it must contain q and ass(N) must contain r. 
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Clearly this property of programs will be maintained throughout execution 
provided that additions to the program only extend incompletely defined predi-
cates. 
We also need to extend the notion of operational provability. We will do so by 
introducing two relations F8 and F1, where the former is used to indicate success 
and hence will be similar to F0 , and the latter is used to indicate failure. There 
will be some interplay between the two relations, as we wish to identify P F3 -'A 
with P F1  A when name(A) is a completely defined predicate, i.e. for completely 
defined predicates we identify negation (P F-8 -IA) with failure (P H f A). 
As mentioned above, we are interested in validity with respect to a given set 
of ground terms U. In the presence of the Negation as Failure rule, this raises 
some compactness problems. For example, it seems natural to state that the goal 
xp(x) fails if p(t) fails for each t e U. However, this can lead to some technical 
complications, and is somewhat at variance with what happens in Prolog. Consider 
the program 
Vxp(x)p(s(x)) 
(xp(x)) D  
where the Herbrand Universe is {O, s(0), s(s(0)) .. .. }. According to the above rule, 
q fails. However, a Prolog system will not return an answer for the goal q. The 
problem is that we need more than w steps in order to show that q fails. Whilst 
this in itself is not an insurmountable problem, it seems more appropriate (and 
more elegant) to alter the definition of failure so that q neither fails nor succeeds. 
Hence we will need an extra condition, in that not only must we have that every 
ground instance p(t) of p(x) fails, but also that they do so compactly, i.e. that 
there is a finite set of instances which fail, and the failure of this finite set of 
instances implies the failure of all ground instances. For this reason we will need 
to consider arbitrary terms, and not just ground terms, in the definition of failure 
for existentially quantified goals. A formal definition is given below. 
We will assume that the number of symbols in the Herbrand universe is finite, 
and so we may associate a signature with U. This signature will be denoted as E. 
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We also assume the existence of a countably infinite set of variables disjoint 
from the set of constants and function symbols of all signatures. 
Definition 2.3.4 Let E be a signature containing at least one constant symbol. 
Terms are defined as follows: 
• 	A variable or a constant in E is a term 
If  is an n-ary function symbol in E and t1,. . . t are terms, then f(t1,. . .t) is 
a term. 
Nothing else is a term. 
The Herbrand universe U is the set of all ground terms which may be formed 
from the symbols in E. 
We denote by T the set of all terms which may be formed from the symbols in 
E. 
Note that U is the set of all ground terms, whereas T is the set of all terms. We 
think of each of the variables appearing in aterm in T as ranging over elements 
of U, so that we think of IT as a more sophisticated representation of the same set 
of terms. Thus the non-ground terms in IT do not have any deep meaning; they 
merely act as place holders. 
As mentioned above, we wish to define the failure of existentially quantified 
goals (and also the success of universally quantified goals) by way of a finite set 
of "representative" instances, rather than by way of all ground instances (which 
is generally infinite). In order so to do, below we introduce the notion of a repre- 
sentation. 
Definition 2.3.5 A covering set of U is a set of terms T such that t E U if t is 
a ground instance of a term t' e T. 
A minimal covering set is a covering set of which no proper subset is a covering 
set. 
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A representation of U is a finite minimal covering set of U. 
We refer to the set of all representations of U as R(U). 
We may now state that 3xG goal fails if there is a representation R such that 
G[t/x] fails for all t e R. This essentially guarantees a continuity property, in that 
xG only fails when there is a finite set of instances of C that fails. Consider again 
the above example. As any representation must contain a term of the form 3' ( y ) 
for some n, for 3xp(x) to fail we must have that p(y) fails. However it seems that 
any reasonable definition of failure would not allow p(y) to fail in this instance, 
as it "matches" a clause in the program which generates the same goal. Hence as 
p(y) does not fail (even though every ground instance of it does), xp(x) does not 
fail. 
We will define the success of universally quantified goals in a similar way, i.e. 
that VxG succeeds if there is a representation R such that G[t/x] succeeds for 
all t E R. Note that as a term in a representation may contain variables; we 
will have to consider the possibility that variables may occur in atoms, andhence 
take this into account in the definition of success and failure for atoms. As we 
desire the failure of G[t/x] for all t E R to be at least as strong a condition as the 
failure of G[t/x] for all t e U, it seems natural to expect that the former property 
implies the latter. Similarly it seems natural to expect that if G[t/x] succeeds 
for all t c R then C[t/x] succeeds for all t E U. Thus the success or failure of 
the instances of an atom shall be our guiding intuition in the relevant definitions 
of success and failure, and so it seems natural to adopt the policy that an atom 
succeeds if every instance of it. succeeds, and an atom fails if every instance of 
it fails. However this is not quite sufficient for our purposes. Ultimately, we are 
interested in the validity of sentences, i.e. whether a given set of closed definite 
formulae implies a given closed goal formula. Free variables and the like are merely 
tools used in the derivation process. Hence we are not interested in the validity of 
formulae containing free variables per se, but only in using the success or failure 
of such formulae to determine the validity of sentences. Thus we know that any 
free variable in a derivation must be introduced by a quantifier, which allows us 
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to simplify the definition of success for an atom. For example, let E be {a/O, f/1} 




As p(a) and p(f(y))  succeed, we have that Vx p(x) succeeds. On the other hand, it 
is less clear what we should expect for p(z). It is clear that every (proper) instance 
of p(z) succeeds (i.e. that p(a) and p(f(y))  succeed for any y), which suggests that 
p(z) should succeed. However this means that the definition of success for an atom 
may be somewhat complicated, as we may have to "split" p(z) into a number of 
instances. This also means that for a goal such as Vx p(x) there are two "layers" 
of universal quantification - one being the explicit quantifier and the other being 
the implicit quantification given by the occurrence of free variables in terms such 
as p(f(y)).  Hence we shall define the success of an atom as above and in [77], i.e. 
in terms of the atom itself, rather than its instances. Thus in the above example, 
Vx p(x) succeeds, but p(z) does not. It should be noted that if an atom succeeds 
according to the definition of F-0 in Section 2.1, then all its instances succeed. In 
this way the definition of success and failure for atoms may appear to be somewhat 
asymmetric, but as we are ultimately interested onfy in closed formulae, this will 
not be of great concern. 
Note that the definition of F-0 for VxG may be thought of as utilizing only 
the representation {y} of U. Thus our definition of success for VxG seems a 
natural extension of I-a when considering validity with respect to a given Herbrand 
Universe. 
An important point to note is that the definition of F-0 in Section 2.1 is induc-
tive. Hence it is tempting to define P F-3 -A via P F- f A and vice-versa. However 
it is not clear that this will lead to the desired definition of F-5 and F-1. Note that 
according to the rules for F-0 in Section 2.1, p D p F-0 p if p D p F-0 p, and so the 
minimality requirement is necessary, i.e. that H0 be the least relation satisfying 
the above rules. Now if we were to define P F-5 -A as P F-1  A and then impose a 
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similar minimality requirement, it is not clear that the resulting relations are well-
defined. For these reasons it seems better to give an iterative (i.e. non-inductive) 
definition of the relations I 3 and H1  which is obviously well-defined, and then show 
that the relations satisfy the appropriate inductive properties. 
As our notions of success and failure are dependent on instances, it will be 
convenient to use the instances of a program P rather than the program itself in 
some circumstances. To this end we define below a mapping (), which is similar 
to the mapping [] above. The former is more convenient for stating some later 
results, as well as somewhat more intuitive. Essentially the difference is that (D) 
consists purely of instances, whereas [D] contains D itself. 
The definitions of I-, and F- follow. For the reasons mentioned above, these 
are not defined (only) over P x G, but over the pairs ((D, N), C), where (D, N) 
is a derivation state and C is a goal formula. Note that neither D nor C need be 
closed here. We will refer to such pairs as derivation pairs. 
Definition 2.3.6 Let D be a definite formula. We define (D) by cases as follows: 
(A) 	={A} 
(VxD) 	= U (D[t/x]) 
WT 
(D1 AD2) =(D1)u(D2) 
(GA) ={CA} 
Let D' be a set of definite formulae. Then we define 
(D') = UDEDI(D) 
We denote by A cx B the statement that A is an instance of B. 
Definition 2.3.7 Let ((D,N),C) be a derivation pair. We define the relations 
F-k and F- on derivation pairs for any k > 0 by cases on G as follows: 
(D,N)H°AiffAe(D) 
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(D, N) F-0  A iffVB E (D), B ç  A and VG B e (D), B A 
• (D, N) F- 	A iff(D,N) Fk A or 3G D Ac (D) such that (D, N) F_k C 
• (D, N) H' A if either (D,N) H A orVB e (D), B A and VC D Be (D) 
such that B X A, (D, N) Fk C 
(D, N) H' -iA if (D, N) F- A and name(A) e den(N) 
• (D, N) F' -A zff(D,N) F A 
(D,N)FkGiVG2 if (D,N) F" G1 or(D,N)F-"G2  
(D, N) [_k C1 V C2 if (D, N) F- G1 and (D, N) F G2 
• (D, N) F- C1 AG2 if (D,N) F C1 and (D,N) H C2  
(D,N)F G1 AG2 if (D,N) F-  C1 or(D,N)FG2  
(D, N) f-k RxG if (D, N) I- C[t/xJ for some t e U 
(D, N) F- xC if R e k(U) such that (D, N) F- C{t/x} for all t € R where the 
variables in R do not appear free in D or C 
(D, N) Fk VxG if R 7(U) such that (D, N) F G[t/x] for all t R where the 
variables in R do not appear free in D or C 
(D, N) kk VxC if (D, N) F C[t/x] for some t e U 
(D, N) Fk 	C if (D U {D'}, N) F- C and names (heads (D')) c ass(N) 
(D, N) pk D' D G if (D U {D'}, N) G and names (heads (D')) 9 ass(N) 
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Note the case for negation, which ensures that the NAF rule is only applied to 
completely defined predicates of P, i.e. those whose names appear in den(N). We 
do not insist on the same restriction for the failure of -IA as it seems reasonable 
for -A to fail whenever A succeeds, regardless of whether name(A) is a completely 
defined predicate or not. As negation is only applied to literals, all this does is 
allow more things to fail than would be the case otherwise. For example, given 
the program P = (p, ({p}, 0)), we have that P 1-, p, and so it seems reasonable 
that we have that P F-1 -'p,  even though p is not completely defined. Thus the 
success of an atom implies the failure of its negation, but the failure of an atom 
doesn't necessarily imply the success of its negation. 
Note also that the implication rule has to be slightly modified so that only 
predicates in ass(N) may be extended. There may be less restrictive ways of 
dealing with this problem; this way ensures that only assumptions known to be 
consistent with the program are allowed to be made, and that a goal of the form 
D D G for which D is an extension of the definition of a predicate not in ass(N) 
is computationally indeterminate. Without this restriction, computation of the 
goal append([J, [], [1, 2,3j) D G from the standard append program (i.e. the two 
standard clauses with append being completely defined) involves a program which 
extends the definition of append, and so it is not obvious what the computational 
behaviour should be. This is a form of the consistency problem: which goals 
should be provable from an inconsistent program? This question is taken up in 
a later section; here we note that the present way of dealing with the problem is 
"safe", in that inconsistencies are avoided. 
It should also be noted that this form of the implication rule is not a con- 
servative extension of the implication rule for F-0 , in that it is not the case that 
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(p D p, (0, {p})) H3  p D p, due to the fact that p is completely defined, and hence 
the antecedent of the goal cannot be added to the program. However, it should be 
clear that for a program P = (D, N) and a goal C in which all predicates which 
occur negatively in G are in ass(N) that D H 0 C implies that P H3 C. Hence 
ass(N) may be used to identify formulae for which F-3 conservatively extends H,. 
In particular, if G is a goal in which all negatively occurring predicates are in 
ass(N) and positive occurrences of a universal quantifier are not allowed in goals, 
it should be clear that D H0 C if P 	C. We shall see how this device is useful 
in chapter 5. Clearly a conservative extension is desirable and would simplify the 
definitions of H and H f , but raises some difficult problems for the model theory. 
Since it seems problematic for the model theory to cope with extensions to com-
pletely defined predicates, we place this restriction here to avoid considering cases 
which are semantically meaningless. We may think of this restriction (i.e. that 
predicates occurring in a negative position in a goal must appear in ass(N) for the 
goal to succeed or fail) as insisting that additions to the program must be known 
to be consistent with the program, just as we insist that to use NAF we must 
know that the predicate involved cannot be consistently extended. In this way 
this restriction, whilst somewhat undesirable, does seem to be in keeping with our 
approach. 
Note that there are programs and goals for which neither P H3 C nor P H f G. 
For example, if P = (p D p, (0,0)) and C = p, then it is clear that P V. p and 
The above definitions of F- and H may be used to derive a proof system by 
interpreting the left hand side of each if as the derived sequent and the right 
hand side as the previous sequent or sequents. We may think of proofs in this 
system as trees whose nodes are sequents, where each sub-tree is classified as 
either a "success" sub-tree or a "fail" sub-tree, and so this is a generalisation of 
the concept of an SLDNF-tree [61]. 
A formal definition is given below. 
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Definition 2.3.8 Let (F, C) be a derivation pair where P = (D, N). 
Let match(A) = {G i B E (D) I B cxz Al. 
An 0-derivation is a tree built using the following rules: 
P + G 
where G A E (D) P —*±A 
VBE(D),B9~A VGBe match(A)P —G 
P-4- A 
. -++ 
A where name(A) E den(N) 
P C1 P __4+ G2 
P -+ C1 A C2 
P — G 
P -++ C1 V C2 
i = 1,2 
P -* G[t/x] 
for some t E U 
P -++ 33 
PA 






P —'a C[t/x] Vt E 
R for some R E R(U) P -+- xG 
P 	+ G[t/x] Vt e R 	 1? - G[t/x] 
for some R E R(U) 	 for some t E U P —*+VxG 	 P—*VxG 
P,D -* C 
	
P,D --4- C 
P 	+ D G P—+- DjG 
where the cases P - VxG and P —c 3xG have the side condition that no 
variable in R occurs free in P or G and the last two rules have the side condition 
that names(heads(D)) c ass(N). 
A sequent P - C is called a positive sequent, and a sequent P —c C is 
called a negative sequent. 
A positive sequent JJ 	+ G is initial if C is an atom A and A e (D). A 
negative sequent P -p Cis initial if C is an atom A and we have VB e (D), 
B~kA and VCDBE(D), B9kA. 
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An 0-proof is an 0-derivation whose root is positive and .whose leaves are 
initial. 
An 0-denial is an 0-derivation whose root is negative and whose leaves are 
initial. 
We may think of an 0-proof or 0-denial as exploiting the iterative nature of 
the definition of F, and F-f* This will allow us to use 0-proofs and 0-denials to 
derive results about the relations F-, and I- j more easily. 
The following proposition shows how F, and F- may be thought of in a more 
inductive style which is closely related to the definition of F0 in Section 2.1. 
Proposition 2.3.1 Let (D, N) be a derivation state. Then 
(D, N) F, A iffA E (D) or 3G D A E (D) such that (D, N) F-, G 
(D, N) F, -'A if (D, N) F A and name(A) E den(N) 
(D, N) F, G1 V C2 if (D, N) F, C1 or (D, N) F, C2 
(D, N) F, C1 AG2 if (D, N) F, C1 and (D, N) F, C2 
• (D, N) F, *cG if (D, N) F, G[t/x] for some t E  
(D, N) F, VxG if 3R E R(U) such that (D, N) F, G[t/x] for all t E R where no 
variable in R appears free in D or G 
(D, N) F, D' j C if (D U {D'}, N) F, G and names (heads (]1Y)) c ass(N) 
(D, N) F A if \/B E (D) B 9~ A and VG D B E (D) such that B cx A, 
(D, N) F1 G 
(D, N) F1 -'A if (D, N) F-, A 
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(D, N) H1  G1 V C2 zff (D, N) I- G1 and (D, N) H C2  
(D, N) 1-1  C1 AG2 if (D, N) H1  G1 orKD,N)  H G2 
(D, N) F- 3xG if 2R e R(U) such that (D, N) H f C[t/x] for all t e R where no 
variable in R appears free in D or G 
(D, N) Hj  VxG if (D, N) H1  G[t/x] for some t E U 
(D, N) H1  D' 3 C if (D U {D'}, N) H f G and names (heads (D')) c ass(N) 
Proof: Obvious. 
U 
It is not hard to see that the two notions of derivability coincide, as stated in 
the proposition below. 
Proposition 2.3.2 Let (P, G) be a derivation pair where P = (D, N). Then 
P H3 G zff P -* C is provable. 
P H f G if P -f G is provable. 
Proof: As the rules are derived directly from the definitions of H3 and H f , the proof 
is immediate. 	 UI 
It is also easy to see that the success (failure) of a goal implies the success 
(failure) of each of its ground instances. This is formally stated in following propo-
sition. 
Proposition 2.3.3 Let (P, G) be a derivation pair where P = (D, N). Then 
I. P H3  G = P{t/x} H3 C[t/x] for any t e U 
2. P H1  G = P[t/x] H1  C[t/x] for any t e U 
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Proof: We proceed by induction on the depth of the relevant 0-derivation. 
In the base case, G is an atom A. 
As the sequent is initial, A c (D), and hence A[t/x] E (D[t/x]) for any 
t, i.e. P[t/x] F- 9 A[t/x] for any t e U. 
As the sequent is initial, VB E (D) B ç A and VG D B e (D), 
B 9~ A, and hence VB E (D[t/x]) B A[t/x] and VC D B e (D[t/x]), 
B ç A[t/x] for any t, i.e. P[t/x] F- Aft/x] for any t e U. 
Hence the induction hypothesis is that the proposition holds when the rele- 
vant 0-derivation is of no more than a given depth. There are six cases: 
A: 	1. If the base case does not hold, then we have 3G D A e (D) such 
that P F-3 G, and hence G[t/xI D A[t/xJ E (D[t/x]), and by the 
hypothesis P[t/x] I- G[t/x], and so P[t/x] F-3 A[t/x]. 
2. If the base case does not hold, then we have VB E (D) B A and 
VG D B e (D) such that B cx A, P 	C, and by the hypothesis, 
P{t/x} F- f G[t/x] for any t E U. Hence VG' D B' E (D[t/x]) such 
that B' cx A[t/x] we have P{t/x] 	C', and as above VB E (D[t/x]) 
B 9k A[t/x], and so P{t/x] F-1 A[t/x] for any t e U. 
-'A: 1. P F-3 -'A if P F-1 A and name(A) e den(N), and by the hypothesis 
this implies that P[t/x] F-i. A[t/x] and name(A) E den(N) for any 
t E U, i.e. P[t/xJ I- -'A[t/x]. 
2. P F-i -IA if P F 9 A, and by the hypothesis this implies that 
P[t/x] F- A[t/x] for any t e U, i.e. P[t/x] I- -'A[t/x]. 
G1 V C2: 1. P F-3 C1 V C2 if P F-3 C1 or P F-3 C2, and by the hypothesis, 
P[t/x] F-3 G j [t/x] or P[t/x] F-3 C2[t/x1 for any t 	U, and so 
P[t/x] H 3 C1 [t/x} V G2[t/x], i.e. P[t/xj F-3 (C1 V G2)[t/x] for any 
tel,l. 
2. P F-1 C1 V C2 if P F- C1 and P F-1 C2, and by the hypothesis, 
P[t/x] F-1 C1[t/x} and P[t/x] F-1 G2 [t/x] for any t E U, and so 
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P[t/x] F- G1[t/x} V G2[t/x}, i.e. P[t/x] F- (C1 V G2 )[t/x] for any 
tEll. 
C1 A C2: 1. P F- 3 G1 A C2 if P F-3 G1 and P F-3 C2, and by the hypothesis, 
P[t/x} F-3 G1[t/x] and P[t/x} F-3 G2[t/x] for any t E U, and so 
P[t/x] F- 3 C1 [t/x] A G2[t/x], i.e. P[t/x] F-3 (C1 A G2 )[t/x] for any 
EU. 
2. P F-f G1 A C2 if P F-f G1 or P F- f G2, and by the hypothesis, 
P[t/x] F-1  G1 [t/x] or P[t/x] F-3 G2[t/xJ for any t e U, and so 
P[t/x] F-1  G1 [t/x] A G2 [t/x], i.e. P[t/x] F- (C1 A C2)[t/x] for any 
EU. 
yG: 	1. P H 5 3yG if P F-3 G[t'/y] for some t' E U and by the hypothesis, 
P[t/x] F-3 G{t'/y][t/x] for any t E U, and so P[t/x} F-3 yG[t/x] for 
any t E U. 
2. P F-1  yG if 3R E R(U) such that P F-1  G[t'/y] for all t' E R and 
by the hypothesis, P[t/x] F-1  G[t'/y][t/x] for any t e U, and as no 
variables in t' can contain x, we have P F- f yG[t/x] for any t E U. 
VyG: 1. P 1-3 VyG if 2R E R(U) such that P F-f  G[t'/y] for all t' ER and 
by the hypothesis, P[t/x] F-3 G[t'/y][t/x] for any t E U, and as no 
variables in t' can contain x, we have P[t/xJ F-3 VyC[t/xj for any 
EU. 
2. P F-1  VyG if P F-1  G{t'/y} for some t' E U and by the hypothesis, 
P[t/x] F-f  G[t'/y}[t/x] for any t E U, and so P[t/x] F-f VyGft/x} for 
any t E U. 
D' D C': 1. (D, N) F-3 D' D C' if names(heads(D')) C ass(N) and (D U 
{D'}, N) F-5 C', and so by the hypothesis we have ((DU{D'})[t/x} , N) F-5  
G'[t/x] for any t E U. Hence we have that (D[t/x], N) F-3 D'[t/x] 
G[t/x], i.e. (D[t/x], N) F-3 (D' C')[t/x] for any t E U. 
2. (D,N) F-1  D' D G' if names(heads(D')) ç ass(N) and (D U 
{D'}, N) F-1  C', and so by the hypothesis we have K(DU{D'})[t/x] , N) F-
G'[t/x] for any t E U. Hence we have that (D[t/x], N) F-1  D'[t/x] 
C[t/x], i.e. (D[t/x], N) F-1  (D' D G')ft/xJ for any t E U. 
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A possibly surprising result is that there is a weak dual to Proposition 2.3.3, 
in that for DHHF programs, if a representative set of instances of a goal fails, then 
so do all sets of representative instances, including the goal itself. This result is 
proved below. 
Proposition 2.3.4 Let (P, G) be a DHHF derivation pair where P = (1), N). Let 
R E 7?(U) be such that the variables in R do not contain any variables which occur 
free or bound in P or G, and t' e T be such that no variable in t' occurs bound in 
P or G. Then 
P[t/x] I-, G[t/x] for all t c R = P[t'/x] I- G[t'/x] 
Proof: We proceed by induction on the depth of the 0-derivation of P[t/x] I_ 
Let R = ft, ....  
In the base case, C is an atom A. 
As P[t1/x] F A[t1/x] for each i, we have VB E (D[t/x]), B çk A[t1/x] and 
VG D B e (D[t2/x]), B ç A[t/x] for each i. Let B e (D[t'/x]), and so B = 
B'[t'/x] for some B', i.e. B'[t'/x] E (D[t'/x]), and so B'[t/x] E (D[t1/x]). If 
B'[t'/x] cx A[i'/x], then B'[t1/x] cx A[t1/x] for any i, which is a contradiction, 
and so B'[t'/x] çk A[t'/x]. Now let C D B E (D[t'/x]), and so C D B = 
G'[t'/x] D B'[t'/x] for some O' D B', i.e. C'[t'/x] D B'[t'/x] e (D[t'/x]), 
and so C'[t/x] D B'[t/x] E (D[t1/x]). If B'[t'/x] cx A[t'/x], then B'[t1/x] cc 
A[t1/x] for any i, which is a contradiction, and so B'[t'/x] 	A[t'/x]. Hence 
VB e (D[t'/xJ), B 9k Aft'/x], and VG D B E (D[t'/x]), B A[t'/x}, and so 
P[t'/x] H1  C[t'/x]. 
Hence we assume that the proposition is true for all 0-derivations of no more 
than a given depth. There are six cases: 
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A: If the base case does not hold, then P[t1 /x] F-1  A[t1/x] if VB E (D[t1 /x]) 
B 	A[t/x} and VG D B e (D[t/x]) such that B cc A[t/x], P[t1/x] H f 
C. As above, if B E (D[t'/x]), we cannot have B x A[t'/x], and so 
we have that B çk A[t'/x] VB E (D[t'/x]). Let C D B E (D[t'/xJ), 
and as above C D B = G'[t'/x] D B'[t'/x] for some C' D B', i.e. 
C'[t'/x] D B'[t'/x] E (D[t'/x]). If B'[t'/x] cc A[t'/x], then G'[t/x] D 
B'[t1/xJ e (D[t 2 /x]), and B'[t1/xJ cx A[t/x] for all i. Hence we have that 
P{t/x} l- G'[t1/x] for all i, and by the hypothesis we have P[t'/x] 1-1  
G'[t'/x]. Hence VB E (D[t'/x]) B ç A[t'/x] and VC D B e (D[t'/x]) 
such that B cx A[t'/x], P[t'/x] F-1 G, i.e. P[t'/x] F- f A[t'/x]. 
C1 V C2: P{t/x] Ij (G1 V G2)[t/x} if P[t/x] F-1 G1[t/x] and P[t/x] F- G2[t/x], 
and so by the hypothesis P[i'/x] F-1 G1 [t'/x] and P[t'/x] F-f  G[t'/x], 
i.e. P[t'/x] 	(C1 V G2 ){t'/x]. 
C1 A C2: P[t/xj F-f  (C1 A G2)[t/x] if P[t/x] F-1  G1[t/x] or P[t/x] F-f  G2[t/xJ, 
and so by the hypothesis P[t'/x] F-f  G1[t'/xJ or P[t'/x] F-1  G2[t'/x}, i.e. 
P[t'/x] F-1  (C1 A G2)[t'/xJ. 
yG: P[t/x} F-1  yG[t/x] if 3Y E 1(U) such that P[t/x] F-f  G[t/x}[t"/y] for 
all t E R, and so as t,,  does not contain x and t does not contain y, 
by the hypothesis P[t'/x] F-1  G[t'/y][t'/x] for all t" E R, i.e. P[t'/x] F- 
yG[t'/x]. 
VyG: P[t/xj F-1  VyG[t/x] if P[t/x] F- 1  G[t/x][t"/y] for some t" E U, and as t 
does not contain y, by the hypothesis P[t'/x] F- f G[t"/y][t'/x] for some 
t" e U, i.e. P[t'/x] F-1  VyG{t'/x}. 
D' D C: (D{t/x},N) F- f (D' D G)[t/xJ if names(D') c ass(N) and ((D U 
{D'})[t/x], N) H f C[t/x] and so by the hypothesis ((DU{D'})[t'/x] , N) F- f 
C[t'/x], i.e. (D[t'/x],N) F- f (D' D C)[t'/x]. 
Note that a corresponding result does not hold for F-3; consider the program 
below. 
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p(a) 
Vx p(f(x)) 
Now {a, f(y)} is a representation, and p(a) and p(f(y)) both succeed, but p(y) 
does not succeed. This result cannot be extended to DHHF_ formulae either, as 
for the above program, -'p(y) does not fail, although -'p(a) and -'p(f(y)) both do. 
The significance of this point will be seen in Section 6.1. 
The intuitive reading of P F3 C and P i-1 C may be given as "C succeeds" 
and "C fails" respectively. The validity of this interpretation is shown by the 
proposition below. 
Proposition 2.3.5 Let (P, G) be a derivation pair where P = (D, N). Then 
PF3 G=P 1 C 
PFfG=PVS G 
Proof: We proceed by simultaneous induction on the depth of the 0-proof and 
0-denial for P F-3 G and P F1 C. 
In the base case, the sequent is initial, and hence C is just an atom A. 
As p 	A is initial, we have that A E (D), and so as A oc A, it is 
not the case that VB E (D) B 9E, A, and by Proposition 2.3.1 it is not 
the case that P F1 A. 
As P -+ A is initial, we have that VB € (D), B 9~ A and VC D 
BE (D), Bç* A, and so as A oc A we must have A V (D) and 
/G D A E (D), and so by Proposition 2.3.1 it is not the case that 
PH 3 A. 
Hence the induction hypothesis is that the proposition holds for all derivation 
states whose 0-proof or 0-denial is no more than a given depth. 
There are seven cases: 
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A: 	I. P I-, A = C D A E (D) such that P F-5 C, and by the hypothesis 
it is not the case that P F7 C. Hence, it is not the case that 
VB E (D) B9~A and VC D B E (D) such that B oc A we have 
P F-f C, and by Proposition 2.3.1 it is not the case that P F-1 A. 
2. PF-f AzVBE(D),B9~A and VGDBE(D) such that B oc A 
we have P F-1 G. Now as A oc A, we must have that A V (D). 
Also, by the hypothesis it is impossible that 3G D A e (D) such 
that P 1- 5 C, and so it is impossible that P F-5 A. 
-'A: 1. P F-3 -A = name(A) e den(N) and P F-1 A, and by the hypothesis 
it is impossible that P F-5 A, and so it is impossible that P F-1 -'A. 
2. P F-1 -'A = P F-5 A, and by the hypothesis it is impossible that 
P F-1 A, and so it is impossible that P F-5 -'A. 
C1 V C2: 1. P F-3 C1 V C2 if P F-3 C1 or P F-3 G2 and by the hypothesis, this 
implies that either it is not the case that P F-1 G1 or it is not the 
case that P F-1 C2, i.e. it is not the case that P F-1 C1 and P F-1 C21 
and so it is not true that P F-1 C1 V G2- 
2. P F-1 C1 V C2 if P F-1 C1 and P F-1 C2 and by the hypothesis, this 
implies that it is not the case that PF-5 C1 and it is not the case 
that P F-3 C2, i.e. it is not thecase that either P F-5 C1 or P F-5 C2, 
and so it is not true that P F-5 C1 V C2. 
C1 A C2: I. P F-3 G1 A C2 if P F-5 C1 and P F-3 C2 and by the hypothesis, this 
implies that it is not the case that P F-1 G1 and it is not the case 
that P F-1 C2, i.e. it is not the case that either P F-1 C1 or P F-1 C2, 
and so it is not true that P F-1 C1 A G2- 
2. P F-1 C1 A G2 if P F-1 C1 or P F-1 C2 and by the hypothesis, this 
implies that either it is not the case that P F-5 C1 or it is not the 
case that P F-5 C2, i.e. it is not the case that P F-5 C1 and P F-5 C2, 
and so it is not true that P F-5 C1 A C2. 
dxC: 1. P F-3 RxG if P F-3 G[t/x] for some t E U, and by the hypothesis, 
this implies that it is not the case that P F-f C[t/x]. Now if 3R E 
1(U) such that P F-1 G[t'/x] for all t' E R, then by Proposition 
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2.3.3 P H1  G[t/x] for all t e U, as no variables of R appear free in 
P. Hence it is impossible that BR E R(U) such that P H1  G[t/x] 
for all t' e R, i.e. it is not true that P Hf BxG. 
2. P Hf BxG if BR E R(U) such that P H1  G[t/x] for all t E R, and 
by Proposition 2.3.3, P H1  G[t/x] for all t E U, as no variables of R 
appear free in P. By the hypothesis this implies that it is not the 
case that P H3 G[t/x] for any t € U, and so it is impossible that 
P H3 G[t/x] for some t e U, i.e. it is not true that P H3 BxG. 
VxG: 1. P H8 VxG if BR E R(U) such that P H3 G[t/x] for all t E R, and 
by Proposition 2.3.3, P H3 G[t/x] for all t E U, as no variables of R 
appear free in P. By the hypothesis this implies that it is not the 
case that P H1  G[t/x] for any t e U, and so it is impossible that 
P H1  G[t/x} for some t E U, i.e. it is not true that P Hf VxG. 
2. P H f VxG if P F-1  G[t/x] for some t e U, and by the hypothesis, 
this implies that it is not the case that P H3 G[t/x] for some t € U. 
Now if BR E fl(U) such that P H3 G[t'/x] for all t' e R, then by 
Proposition 2.3.3 P 1-3 G[t/x] for all t E U, as no variable's of R 
appear free in P. Hence it is impossible that BR e 7(U) such that 
P H3 G[t/x] for all t' E R, i.e. it is not true that P H3 VxG. 
D' 	G': 	1. (D, N) H3 D' D C' if names(heads((D')) c ass(N) and (D U 
{D'}, N) 	1-3 C', and by the hypothesis, this implies that it is 
not the casethat (D U {D'}, N) H1  C', and so it is not true that 
(D, N) H1  D' D G'. 
2. (D,N) H1  D' D C' if names(heads((D')) c ass(N) and (D U 
{D'}, N) H1  G', and by the hypothesis, this implies that it is not the 
case that (D U {D'}, N) H3 C', and so it is not true that (D, N) H3  
D'DG'. 
FM 
Thus the above definitions are consistent. Note that a similar result will hold 
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for the case when universal quantification is interpreted intensionally (i.e. using 
the new constant rule). 
This result suggests that it is consistent to define a more general form of 
negation. If we let C be a goal in which all predicates which occur in positive 
positions are in den(N) and 11 those in negative positions are in ass(N), then we 
may define an extension of the relations 1-8 and H f as follows: 
PH 3 -'GiffPF f G 
PF-'GiffPF3 G 
From the above result we see that P F-1  G implies that P F-3 G does not hold, 
and so P F-3 -'C is a consistent conclusion. A similar argument holds for the other 
case, and so this indicates how we may implement negation for a wider class of 
formulae than just atoms. This theme is taken up in section 3.2. 
2.4 Discussion 
2.4.1 Terms and Universal Quantification 
A distinctive feature of the definition of F-3 compared to that of F0 is that the 
rule for universally quantified goals is defined in terms of representations, of which 
there may be infinitely many. However, we know that if an atom succeeds, then 
every instance of i, succeeds, and so a successful search for a proof of a universally 
quantified goal will only require a finite number of instances to be tested. For 
example, if E is {a/O, f/1}, consider the program below. 
p(a) 
Vx p(f(x)) 
It is clear that p(a) and p(f(y)) succeed, and so Vx p(x) succeeds. Clearly it 
is not necessary to consider a representation such as la, f(a),f(f(x))}. On the 
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other hand, an implementation will not need to consider inductive methods. For 
example, consider the program 
p(a) 
Vx p(x) D p(f(x)) 
In this case p(t) succeeds for every ground term t, but every non-ground term 
neither succeeds nor fails, and so there is no representation R such that p(t) 
succeeds for all t E R. Hence it is unnecessary for us to consider inductive methods 
of proof. 
There are some cases in which an inductive method of proof would indeed be 
useful, however. For example, given the program 
Vx less(O,s(x)) 
VxVy less(x,y) D less(s(x),s(y)) 
it seems reasonable to conclude that Vx less(x, s(x)) is true, but as the definition 
of less is recursive, we need an inductive method of proof in order to reach this 
conclusion. One such way would be to replace the quantified variable with a new 
constant, and "expand" the constant where necessary, using our knowledge of the 
Herbrand Universe. For example, the success of the above goal would be found by 
the following derivation. 
P L Vx less(x, s(x)) 
P H 3 less (c,s(c)) 
P 	less(O, s(0)) A Vs less(x, s(x)) D less(s(x), s(s(x))) 
P 	less(c,s(c)) D less(s(c),s(s(c))) 
less(c, s(c)), P l- less(s(c) , s(s(c))) 
less(c, s(c)), P I- less(c, s(c)) 
and so we get that P H 3 Vx less(x, s( x)). 
The key step is the replacement of less(c, s(c)) by 
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less(O, s(0)) A Vx less(x, s(x)) D less(s(x), s(s(x))) 
Clearly it is not hard to specify an induction scheme for goals such as Vx p(x) 
where the signature of p is {a1/0, .. . a/O, f, /1, . . . f/1}. The problem is more 
complicated when considering a general goal VxG, and signatures which contain 
functions of a number of different arities. One way to proceed is to substitute a 
new constant for each universally quantified variable in the goal, and then deal 
with each of the new constants as they are encountered when the atomic parts 
of the goal are reached. In this way we "delay" the decision of what to do for 
each variable until we are forced to decide, similar to the way that the choice of 
substitution for existentially quantified variables may be delayed by the use of 
unification. The techniques of Bundy et al. [12,13] may be useful in this context. 
Such an inductive method will presumably be somewhat intricate and compu-
tationally expensive, and so we do not pursue it here. It should be noted that 
whilst our approach makes use of a known set of terms, it does so in a way that is 
compact, as noted above, and so no inductive properties are needed. 
An observation which is relevant to this discussion is that we may thinlçof our 
method of success for universal quantification as similar to that of an intermedi- 
ate logic. One such logic is the logic of constant domains [34,21]. This logic is 
characterised by the property that in order to establish VxF it is not necessary 
to establish that VxF must always hold, no matter what extra assumptions are 
made, but only to show that F[t/x] is true for all terms t. A proof theoretic char-
acterisation is given by adding the following inference rule to those of intuitionistic 
logic: 
Vx (0 V (x)) D (0 V Vx O(x)) 
where x is not free in q. 
Such an inference rule is precisely what we would expect from the considera-
tions discussed above, as both sides of the implication become 0 V I'(c) when we 
replace the universal quantifier with a new constant. In our case we go one step 
further, in that not only is the domain constant, but it is known. 
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Hence our interpretation of the universal quantifier is a natural one when the 
Herbrand Universe is fixed in advance. This theme is taken up in section 6.5. 
One example for which the intensional interpretation (i.e. the "new constant" 
version) is perhaps more appropriate is in an example due to Miller [73]. If we 
wish to deduce a rule from the constitution of the USA such as the one below 
Vx president(x) D US-citizen(x) 
then the intensional interpretation is perhaps more appropriate than the exten-
sional one. The reason is that it is not now known who all the U.S. Presidents 
will be, although we do know all the U.S. Presidents up to date. Hence, there is 
a difference between the extensional interpretation (i.e. all presidents up to the 
present have had this property) and the intensional interpretation (i.e. there is 
a rule in the constitution which states that the U.S. President must be a U.S. 
citizen). The difference is more striking for the goal 
Vx president(x) D white-male(x) 
This is true for all U.S. Presidents so far, but there is no corresponding rule in 
the U.S. constitution. 
One way to develop a unified framework for these two possibilities is to consider 
some signatures as closed and some as open. For example, the signature of all 
Catholic monarchs of Great Britain would be considered closed, as the Act of 
Settlement of 1701 ensures that no Catholic may occupy the throne. On the other 
hand, the signature of U.S. Presidents (or that of all British monarchs) would 
be considered open, as there are still future Presidents (and monarchs) whose 
identity is unknown. Hence for closed signatures, the extensional interpretation 
is appropriate, whereas for open signatures, the intensional one is probably more 
appropriate. In the latter case a modal interpretation is probably better still, so 
that we can distinguish between what must be true (for example, the U.S. citizen 
rule) from what happens to be true now, but need not be so in the future (e.g. 
the white male rule). Such notions of necessity and possibility coincide when the 
signature is closed. 
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As mentioned above, we only consider the case where the terms of the Herbrand 
Universe are generated only from the symbols in the signature. In order to allow 
for polymorphic predicates, we need to relax this restriction by specifying in more 
detail how the relevant terms may be built. For example, the arguments to append 
must be lists, but the elements of the list may be of any kind whatsoever. This 
may be thought of as adopting a type system for programs and goals, so that each 
term must have a type. The adoption of a type system, such as those of [111,85, 
90,84], would provide the framework in which we may use induction over a much 
wider class of programs; however the issues involved will be essentially the same 
as those discussed above. 
2.4.2 Answer Substitutions 
A well-known limitation of the NAF rule is that it is only defined for ground 
atoms. A naive approach to extending it to include non-ground atoms is for -p(x) 
to succeed if p(x) fails. This approach is implemented in many Prolog systems, 
but may lead to counterintuitive behaviour. For example, given the program 
p(a) 
q J p(b) 
the goal -p(x) fails as p(x) succeeds. However, it is clear that -ip(b) succeeds 
because p(b) fails. 
One way to interpret this approach is to consider -'p(x) to be universally quan-
tified, so that the goal is actually Vx-p(x), which is equivalent (both intuitionis-
tically and classically) to -3x p(x). This may be seen as a direct counterpart to 
the goal 3xp(x) in that Vx-p(x) succeeds precisely when 3xp(x) fails. 
This is not the only possible extension of NAF to non-ground atoms (although 
it is clearly easy to implement). An obvious alternative is to consider the quan-
tification as 3x-p(x), so that -'p(x) succeeds if there is an instance of p(x) which 
fails. In this case, for the program above, we expect the answer substitution x - b 
to be returned for the goal3x-p(x). Note that the previous case does not require 
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an answer substitution as it involves a universally quantified formula. This case 
has a more subtle symmetry with 3xp(x) in that 3xp(x) succeeds if there is an 
instance p(t) of p(x) which succeeds, whereas3x-p(x) succeeds if there is an 
instance p(t) of p(x) which fails. 
This interpretation of NAF requires a more powerful way to generate answer 
substitutions than the unification methods employed in SLD-resolution. The stan-
dard method by which answer substitutions are generated is by unifying an atomic 
goal with the head of a clause in the program, applying the resulting substitution 
to the body, and then applying the answer substitution for this instance of the 
body to the variables of the original goal. Clearly we cannot generate any answer 
substitutions for negated goals in this way, as the answer substitutions are only 
generated for successful goals. Thus a more general method which searches for in-
stances of p(x) which fail rather than for instances of p(x) which succeed is needed 
in order to use formulae such as Bx-ip(x) as goals. 
A limited implementation of this idea is present in some Prolog systems, such as 
Mu-Prolog [88], which uses a delay mechanism for non-ground negated goals. This 
technique delays the processing of the goal -'p(x) until some other goal pi'oduces 
a substitution under which x becomes a ground term. For example, given the goal •  
x(-,p(x) A q(x)), the processing of -p(x) is delayed until after the processing of 
q(x), and if this succeeds with the answer substitution being x - t where t is a 
ground term, then the NAF rule is directly applied by checking that p(t) fails. In 
this way answer substitutions can only be generated by non-negated goals, and 
these are then filtered by the negated goals. Naturally a ground substitution may 
not occur, in which case no more processing of negated goals may occur. When 
such an impasse is reached, the goal is said to flounder [63]. As there are many 
goals which flounder, such as3x-p(x), it is clear that this technique can be nothing 
more than approximation to the desired process. 
In chapter 4 we give an algorithm for constructing answer substitutions for 
non-ground negated goals. The existence of such an algorithm allows us to define 
the notion of success for any existentially quantified goal in a uniform way, i.e. that 
xG succeeds if there is a term t E U such that G[t/x] succeeds. In this way we 
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may think of this algorithm as a justification for this definition. One interesting 
possible connection between such an algorithm and an inductive algorithm for 
universally quantified goals may be that if the induction mechanism used for the 
universal quantification will always produce a counterexample when the goal fails, 
then we may implement the generation of answer substitutions for ax-'p(x) by 
searching for a proof of Vxp(x). If this search is successful, then3x-p(x) fails. 
If the search fails, producing a counterexample p(t), then x <-- t is an answer 
substitution for ax-p(x). In this way any such induction mechanism may be 
useful in this context as well. This point is discussed more fully in section 4.5. 
2.4.3 Incomplete Definitions and Inconsistency 
The fact that NAF is an implicit form of negation means that we only need to 
extend goals to include negated atoms to capture it, as programs do not need to 
state explicitly which formulae are false. In contrast, any form of negation for 
incompletely defined predicates will need to explicitly state negative information, 
and so one way of incorporating such a form of negation is to allow negatedatoms 
to play the same role as atoms, so that we, build up programs and goals from 




G 	L IVxG IxC  I G1 A C2 IG1 V C2 ID 
Here we use L to stand for a literal. Note that the formula C 	iA is a 
definite formula. In this way we may think of the extension as allowing our basic 
conclusions to consist of both positive and negative pieces of information (literals), 
rather than positive information alone (atoms). Hence we may use clauses such as 
Vx —carcinogen (x) C unfertilised(x) A unprocessed(s) 
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meaning that anything which has been grown without fertiliser and has not been 
processed is not a carcinogen. 
Note also that this merely extends the conclusions that may be drawn to include 
negative information, as well as positive information. Hence this extension adds 
some extra colour to the class of first-order hereditary Harrop formulae, but does 
not change their fundamental computational properties, as we only allow negation 
to be applied to atoms. 
We need to extend the definition of (D), which is done in the obvious way, i.e. 
that (-IA) = {—A}. 
Another needed extension is to the definitions of 1-. and Ij  to cope with 
this extended class of programs and goals. For example, we want F-3 to have the 
property that 
(D, N) F-3 -'A if -'A E (D) or 3G D -'A E (D) such that (D, N) F-3 G or 
(D, N) A and name(A) E den(N) 
This ensures that the NAF rule is only applied to completely defined predicates of 
P, i.e. those whose names appear in den(N), Iand that negation for incompletely 
defined predicates is computed in a similar manner to that for positive literals. 
An important question which arises for such programs is the question of con-
sistency. For example, it is obvious that the program -A A A is inconsistent. We 
may define consistency as follows: 
Definition 2.4.1 A program P is consistent if there is no atom A such that P F3  
A A —'A. Otherwise P is inconsistent. 
As discussed in [77], the question of what is to be done with inconsistent 
programs depends on the context in which the inconsistency occurs. in some 
cases, the approach of full intuitionistic logic may be appropriate, i.e. that if a 
contradiction is found, then all goals are provable. Various mathematical examples 
suggest themselves, such as if we find that both even(0) and -'even(0), then we 
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would think it reasonable to disregard all the knowledge contained in the program, 
and so deduce that every goal is provable. On the other hand, knowledge bases 
and the like often have to deal with inconsistent information in a less mathematical 
way. For example, in a parent-children database, we may have a relation named 
mother. If we find that both mother(Mary, Jane) and mother(Mary, Jane) are 
true, then we have an obvious inconsistency, but it seems difficult to see how 
this information should effect the truth of mother(Gladys, Fred) or father(Alan, 
Jenny). In this way the inconsistency would be dealt with locally, and without 
forcing all other formulae, such as carcinogen (chocolate) A-'carcinogen(chocolate), 
to be true. Thus the inconsistency may be thought of as being inherently local, in 
that the number of formulae affected by the contradiction is comparatively small. 
In a more mathematical setting, it may be considered that the interdependence is 
much greater, and so it is more reasonable to expect that most, if not all, formulae 
become trivially true. In [77] it was shown that 	may be trivially extended to 
capture the intuitionistic notion of inconsistency. We merely note that there is a 
similar notion to that of completely and incompletely defined predicates, in that 
we may assume that the default solution is to use the minimal version, and that 
in special cases which warrant it, we may use the stronger intuitionistic version. 
We may then adopt a similar solution by allowing the programmer to specify a 
dependency relation between predicates, so that if a contradiction is found in one 
predicate, then we can immediately tell which predicates may also contain suspect 
information and which are independent of the contradiction. 
Such problems with inconsistency can also arise from consistent programs. For 
example, we would expect the behaviour of 
-AAAH8 G 
to be the same as that of 
- 'AHAjG 
and so anything which applies to the first case should also apply to the second. 
Note that this problem does not arise when negation could only appear in C 
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formulae. In this case it may be arbitrarily difficult to determine whether we may 
"safely" assume A, as checking the consistency of P extended by A will involve 
determining whether P H8 -'A is true or not. 
A similar problem is encountered if we allow formulae of the form -'A where 
name(A) e den(N) as definite formulae in order to memoise successful goals of 
the form V(-'A). This involves adding the successful goals to the program, so that 
other goals may use the memoised ones as a shortcut, rather than recomputing 
known results. The class of programs so obtained is consistent, as for -A to 
succeed we must have that A fails. However, the operational provability relation 
given above does not allow completely defined predicates to be extended. The 
precise nature of this difficulty is discussed in section 7.1; for now we note that a 
method for dealing with inconsistent programs will be useful for this task as well. 
Thus a minimal approach to inconsistency may be a way of allowing more forms 
of negation than NAF. 
2.4.4 Computational Aspects 
One question that comes to mind when dealing with negation in a constructive 
context is the relation between rules such as NAF and the intuitionistic interpre-
tation of -'A as A D I. In [77] it was shown how we may implement this form of 
negation by allowing I as a distinguished atom, so that I may be the head of a 
clause. We may then compute (D, N) I-s A D I via (D U {A}, N) H8 I. Thus this 
form of negation seems natural for incompletely defined predicates. Now in order 
to implement negation in a uniform way, as well as to directly justify NAF in terms 
of intuitionistic logic, we may wish to implement negation for completely defined 
predicates in the same way. This will involve the addition of negative information 
to the program in order to make this identification, as otherwise there is no way 
to derive a contradiction from the program extended with the assumption A. The 
standard way to add such information is by the completion of the program. The 
details of this process are discussed in chapter 3, but for now we may think of 
this process as adding negative information to the program in such a way that if 
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P F-3 -IA, then from the completion of the program we may derive A D I. In this 
way we can see the completion of a program as making NAF explicit, in that there 
is a given theory in which A D I is true if A fails. 
One problem with deriving A via A D I is that the latter requires that 
a completely defined predicate be extended, and the rules for H as described 
above prevent this. However it seems natural to make an exception in this case, 
as we are trying to use the negative information in the completion to show that 
the assumption of a given atom leads to an inconsistency. One way around this 
problem is to exclude N from consideration, so that we consider the completion 
of a program P = (D, N) as just a set of clauses P', which we may think of as a 
shorthand for (P', (names(1-I), 0)). 
This will lead to problems with goals of the form D i C where G is not J.. and 
the head of D is a completely defined predicate, in that such goals may succeed 
from the completion but do not succeed from the original program. It may be 
argued that this is reasonable; we think of the completion as an explicit statement 
of what is known, and as a result, it is inappropriate to use implicit forms of 
information. This also means that it will not be true that p D I F 3 p D G 
where C is any goal, and hence this method cannot be expected to be complete 
for intuitionistic logic. This in itself is not a great problem, as we are seeking to 
represent the implicit inferences made from the program in an explicit form, and 
not to implement a given logical system. As mentioned above, the intuitionistic 
approach to inconsistency is probably not the most appropriate one in this context 
anyway, and so it seems that this approach is defensible. However, we prefer to 
make an exception to the rule for implication, so that goals of the form A D I 
are always computed via (D, N) F3 A D I if (D U {A},N) F3 I, but all other 
implications must use the rule given in section 2.3. This will make it easier to state 
and prove results, as well as reinforcing the perception that the completion is used 
to capture the operational properties of the program, rather than a semantic device 
per se. In this way the completion will only alter the computation of negated 
atoms, and not any other goals, which seems more appropriate than altering an 
established and understood method. 
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Now if we imagine trying to write the completion as a set of clauses, rather 
than a meta-level formula in the manner of Clark [17], then we will need to be able 
to state negative conclusions. The natural way to do so is to write a clause of the 
form C D -'A as (GA A) D I, from which it is easy to see that A D I succeeds if C 
succeeds. In this way the completion allows us to implement negation in a uniform 
and explicit way, provided we can make the A D I mechanism work. In such an 
implementation there is little distinction between completely and incompletely 
defined predicates, as all the information is given explicitly. 
One problem with this way of implementing negation is that we may prove 
undesired results. For example, the clause p D -p would be written as (pAp) D I, 
which is obviously the same as p D I, i.e. -'p, which may not be what was intended. 
As we shall see, the choice of logic is crucial for issues such as these. 
Another problem is that we may get loops where they are not expected. For 
example, consider the program -'p D -'q and the goal -'q. We would expect 
this goal to fail, as it is perfectly consistent to add q to the program. Clearly 
(p D I) D (q i I) is equivalent to ((p D I) A q) D I. We then get the following 
(infinite) derivation sequence 
((pDI)Aq)DIF3 qjI 
q,((pDI)Aq) D IF 3 I 
q,((pDJ)Aq) D IF-S (PD I)Aq 
q,((pDI)Aq)DIF-3 pjI 
p,q,((pDI)Aq) D IF5 I 
p,q,((pDI)Aq)D IF-3(pD I)Aq 
p,q,((PD_L)Aq)D IF I 
The problem is that we are always able to match I with the clause 
((p D i) A q) D I 
and so we loop. However, it is clear that we are, in a sense, matching the goal -'p 
with the "head" -'q, and so it is the ambiguity behind the use of I that is the 
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problem. In this way the translation of (p D I) D (q D I) to ((p D I) A q) D I 
loses some important computational information, i.e. that it is -'q which is the 
real "head" of the clause. If we were only to match the goal p D I with itself, 
rather than with q D I as above, then it is possible to avoid this looping process. 
This seems desirable, as the assumption of q does not make the above program 
inconsistent. This may be thought of as binding the I more closely to q than 
to the other atom, and so we need to be aware of the context in which we are 
searching for a contradiction. Hence it may be more enlightening to write such 
clauses as C D (A D I) with the head of the clause considered as -IA, so that we 
may consider a literal -'B = B D I to match the head of this clause if A matches 
B. This may be thought of as a delaying process; for purposes of unification we 
consider a negative literal to be in its "closed" or compact form -IA, but after this, 
the deduction component uses the "open" form A D I. 
However, this technique will not work on arbitrary programs. The problem is 
that there may be other ways to prove I. from the program, especially when it is 
extended by an assumption. For example, consider the program below. 
q A (p D -'q) 
It is clear that if p is assumed, then we have a contradiction, and so we desire 
p D I to succeed. However, if we use the strategy described above, p D I will fail, 
as there is no clause head which matches either p or -'p. The more general rule 
will indeed find that p D I succeeds, as shown by the derivation sequence below. 
q,(pAq) IF-3 pD I 
p,q,(pAq) D 	I 
p,q,(pAq) D IH 5 pAq 
Thus the simplified procedure will only work if we know that the only way for 
-'A to succeed is for A to be an instance of an atom B such that there is a clause 
head (B I). We shall see in section 3.2 that our version of the completion is such 
a program. We may think of any class of programs which satisfies this property 
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as one in which we use the closed form of a negative literal for deduction as well 
as unification. A consequence of this is that the two clauses -'A and A D -A are 
now no longer operationally equivalent. This may been seen by the fact that the 
first clause (-IA) is just a negative fact, and so -'A L -IA, as the computation 
terminates with success after the unification step, whereas A D -A l/ -IA, as 
the next goal produced is A, which does not match anything, and so fails. This 
corresponds to the approach taken to inconsistency in minimal logic, which may be 
thought of as intuitionistic logic without the rule that any formula may be derived 
from a contradiction. Hence, the difference between intuitionistic and minimal 
deduction in this context may be characterised by the strength of the binding 
of A D I, and that any such class of programs will use a minimal rather than 
intuitionistic approach to inconsistency. 
In this way the computational nature of A D I seems to indicate that the 
full intuitionistic approach to inconsistency is less natural in this context than the 
minimal one. We take up this theme in section 5.6. 
2.4.5 Stratification 
For model-theoretic reasons, it is common to restrict the use of negation in the 
bodies of clauses. One such restriction is to insist that programs be stratified [4,54, 
55,62], i.e. that it be possible to divide the predicates of the program into layers so 
that each predicate p may depend positively on predicates in its own layer or lower 
down, but may only depend negatively on predicates in lower layers. This means 
that negated predicates may only be used by other predicates once the negated 
predicates are fully defined. 
For example, program P1 is stratified, but programs P2 and P3 are not. 
P1 	 P2 	 P3  
even(0) 	 even(0) 	 even(0) 
even(x) D even(s2(x)) 	odd(x) D even(s(x)) 	-'even(x) D even(s(x)) 
even(x) D -iodd(x) 	-'even(x) D odd(x) 
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The restriction to stratified programs allows the model theory of such programs 
to be given in a manner known as the iterated fixpoint semantics [4]. This is done 
by dividing the program up into the strata suggested by the above definition, so 
that we know that if p depends on -'q, then q is defined in a lower stratum than p. 
We may then apply the standard fixpoint semantics to the lowest stratum, as it 
can contain no negations, and then use this interpretation to construct a similar 
fixpoint for the two lowest strata by noticing that any negated atom -'q is such 
that q is defined in the lowest stratum, and so we may determine the truth of -'q 
from the model of the lowest stratum. Otherwise we may proceed as normal, thus 
getting a model for the second lowest stratum, as well as for the lowest. We then 
continue this process for all remaining strata. 
One problem with this approach is that there are non-stratified programs which 
seem useful, and so this restriction is stronger than we would like. Whilst P2 and 
P3  above are not stratified, their operational behaviour is known; for example 
it is clear that the goal even(s2(0)) succeeds for both programs (assuming that 
negation is computed via the NAF rule). We may think of stratified programs 
as defining a well-ordered hierarchy of predicates. There is a similar hierarchy 
defined over ground atoms by both P2 and P3, and so it seems that a refinement 
of the idea of stratification will lead to a weaker restriction. A weaker form of 
stratification based on this idea has been proposed by Przymusinski [94,95], in 
which the only restriction is that a ground atom A may not depend upon its 
negation, and so programs such as -'p D p are not allowed. The reasons for having 
any restriction at all are semantic rather than operational; for the program -'p D p 
it is obvious that both the goals p and -'p loop, and so the computational nature of 
this program is known, although it is not very enlightening. The programs which 
obey this weaker restriction are known as locally stratified. Similar weaker forms 
of stratification have also been studied [32,41,14,93]. 
Whilst this is a reasonable restriction, in that the programs outside this class 
do not seem very useful, we feel that no restriction should be placed on the class 
of programs. This is because all programs have some clear, if perhaps eccentric, 
operational behaviour, and so this should be captured in the semantics of such 
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programs, rather than ignored. A constructive approach can help in this regard, 
as is it natural for formulae to exist which are neither true nor false, and so we may 
consider programs such as -'p D p as both operationally and model-theoretically 
indeterminate, in that p neither succeeds nor fails, and so p should be neither true 
nor false. This cannot be done in classical logic, as we must have that p is either 
true or false, and so we can only capture such operational behaviour in a three-
valued logic or something similar, rather than the direct approach which is possible 
in intuitionistic logic. Perhaps there is little philosophical difference between the 
alternatives of defining troublesome programs out of existence or allowing them 
to exist but ignoring them, but it seems important from a computer scientist's 
point of view that all programs be given an interpretation. Naturally there are 
some programs for which there is no sensible interpretation, but it seems preferable 
that programs of little practical use be given a corresponding interpretation, rather 
than being ignored. 
One interesting example of this was given by Przymusinska and Przymusinski 
[93], in which the authors show how the program P1 below, which is not locally 
stratified, may be converted to program P2, which is locally stratified, and pre-
serves the operational properties of P1 . 
P1  
p(1, 2) 
p(l,2) A -ig(2) 3 q(1) 
p(l, 1) A -ig(1) 3 q(1) 
p(2,2) A -'q(2) j q(2) 
p(2,1)A -'q(l) D q(2) 
P2 
p(1, 2) 
p(l,'2) A -'q(2) 3 q(1) 
The reason that these two programs are operationally equivalent is that as 
p(l, 1), p(2, 2) and p(2, 1) all fail, nothing can ever succeed from the last three 
clauses, and so they cannot make any contribution to the set of goals which suc-
ceed. However, it is the presence of these three clauses which prevents P1 from 
being locally stratified. This suggests that it is really the operational behaviour 
of the program that should "drive" the model theory, in that two programs which 
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are equivalent operationally should have the same model. We will see in chapter 
5 how this concept may be used to derive a model theory which is valid for all 
programs, so that no restriction needs to be placed on the class of programs. 
A similar problem exists with the completion of programs. Clark's completion 
was restricted to Horn clause programs, so that no negations could appear in the 
bodies of clause. This restriction has the property of ensuring that the comple-
tion is never inconsistent, as there can never be a program P such that comp(P) 
contains the formula A -* -IA. However, the weaker restrictions discussed above, 
such as local stratification, may also be used to ensure the consistency of the com-
pletion [14,103]. Now even though the completion is to be used for operational 
reasons rather than model theory, it seems one useful approach is to define the 
completion for locally stratified programs only. As the clause -'A D A may be 
interpreted under NAF as meaning A succeeds if A fails, it is difficult to see how 
such clauses can convey any information relevant to the computation of the nega-
tion of completely defined predicates, as there is no clear definition of derivability 
from such a clause. Hence it seems reasonable to exclude such clauses from any 
completion process in which we wish to allow negations to appear in the body of 
clauses. 
This is related to the earlier discussion on the difference between NAF and the 
(global) CWA. As the goal A loops forever for the program -IA A, the CWA 
would imply -'A, as A does not succeed, whereas NAF does not infer -'A as A 
does not fail. Hence if we view the completion as making explicit the operational 
behaviour of the program, we do not lose very much by restricting the class of 
programs in this way. 
2.5 Notation 
Here we list the various classes of formulae which will be used in later chapters. As 
can be seen from the definitions below, the main difference between all the classes 
is the formulae which may be used as goals. In most cases we wish to consider 
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the addition of negation in goals, and so we will give first the "positive only" 
form, followed by the more general one. Generally the largest class of programs, 
i.e. first-order hereditary Harrop formulae, is the most desirable for programming, 
but we often use a slightly smaller class, in which universal quantifiers are not 
allowed in goals, for technical convenience. This smaller class may be normalised, 
in that there is a smaller class of formulae which have the same expressive power, 
and so we need to study at least three languages other than Horn clauses. These 
are introduced below. 
In all cases, only closed D formulae may be used in programs, and only closed 
C formulae may be used as goals. 
Horn clauses may be defined as follows: 
Definition 2.5.1 DHorn  and CHorn formulae have the following form 
D:=AIVxDID1 AD2 ICJA 
C := A I C1 A C2 I  3xG 
DHorn_ and G fforn_ formulae have the following form 
D:=AIVXDJD1 AD2 ICDA 
C:=Al -'AIC1 AC2 IxC 
As discussed in [77] and section 2.1, this class of formulae is no more power-
ful than the usual definition of Horn clauses. As also noted in [77] and section 
2.1, Horn clause goals may include disjuncts without increasing the power of the 
language, and hence Horn clauses may be equivalently defined as follows. 
Definition 2.5.2 DHornV and GHOrnV formulae have the following form 
D:=AIVXDI ]J1AD2ICDA 
G:= A IG1 A C2 1G1 v C2 IxC 
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DHOrnV _ and CHor ,,V _ formulae have the following form 
D:=AVxDID1 AD2 IGDA 
G:=AJ-'AjG1  AG2 IGi VG2 JxG 
A more general (and more powerful) class of formulae is first-order hereditary 
Harrop formulae. 
Definition 2.5.3 DHHF and GHHF  formulae have the following form 
D:=AIVXDID1 AD2 IGDA 
G:= A IG1 A C2  I G1 VG2 IxG IVxG ID 
DHHF_ and GHHF_ formulae have the following form 
D:=AIVXDID1AD2IGJA 
G:=Al - AlGlAG2IGivG2j 2xCJVxGIDDC 
For technical reasons, we will often wish to omit universally quantified goals 
from consideration, and hence use the following class of formulae, which we will 
refer to as module formulae. 
Definition 2.5.4 Dmod and Gmod formulae have the following form 
D:=A!VXDID1AJJ2IGJA 
G:= A IG1 A C2 1C1 v C2 lxC I DDC 
Dmod_ and Gmod_ formulae have the following form 
D:= A IVxD IDI A D2 J CA 
G:=Af - AICiAG2ICivC2IxClDJC 
As discussed in section 6.1, we will have cause to consider the following lan- 
guages as well. 
Chapter 2. Hereditary Harrop Formulae and Extensions 	 74 
Definition 2.5.5 Dobject  and Gobj ecj formulae have the following form 
D:AIVxDJD1 AD2 JCDA 
G:=AIG1 AC2 IDDC 
Doôject _ and Gobject _ formulae have the following form 
D:=AIVXDID1 AD2 IGJA 
G:=AI -'AIG1 AG2 DDG 
Definition 2.5.6 Dmta and Gmcta formulae have the following form 
D:=A( -1A(VxDfDi AD2 JGJAIGJ-A 
G, VG2  I2xG IVxG ID 
Note that we may equivalently define Dmeta and Gmeta formulae as 
L:=A I -iA 
D:=L!VxD!D1AD2IGJL 
G:=LIG1 AG2 1G1 VG2 J2xGIVxGID D G 
It should be clear that the definition of D formulae does not change very much 
in from case to case, and so we may think of the various alternatives above as 
variations on a standard theme. Some possible variations are given below: 
D:= A IVxD J DA D2 IG D D 
D:=Ajk/XD(D1 AD2 IGJA 
D:=AI - AIVxDlDi AD2 ICDA 
D:=Aj-AIVxDIDiAD2lGJAIGJ,A 
(Jhapter Z. kiereditary 1-iarrop fbrmuIae and Extensions 
We have seen how the first variation is no more powerful than the second, and 
hence we usually use the second. However, whenever we do wish to use the first 
variation, we refer to it as the extended form, and the second variation as the 
clausal form. For example, the extended form of Do b3ect  and Co b ect formulae are 
given below. 
D:= A IVxD ID1 AD2 IC 
G:=AI-'AIG1 AG2 IDJG 
The third and fourth variations are used to construct explicit negative infor-
mation as well as positive information, and hence may lead to an inconsistency, 
which means that they must be used with care. Thus the most common of these 
variations will be the second one, when negation is not considered, or the third 
one, when negation is considered. 
In all of the above languages, it is interesting to consider which formulae are 
both programs and goals. Such formulae will be referred to as core formulae, and 
labelled as M formulae. For example, MHorn consists of conjunctions of closed (or 
ground) atoms. Clearly hereditary Harrop formulae will have the most interesting 
core, which may be given as follows: 
M:=AIVXMIJVI1 AM2 IMJA 
The core of the module formulae is similar, except that no universal quantifiers 
may occur, and so Mmod is the set of all ground Dobi programs, which may be given 
as follows: 
M:=AIM1 AM2 IMJA 
Core formulae are of interest as they represent the formulae which may be both 
asserted (programs) and tested for truth (goals). Hence, a core formulae, once it 
has been proved to be true, may be added to the program, i.e. memoised. We will 
have more to say about memoisation in chapter 7. 
Chapter 3 
Completions and Negation as Failure 
In this chapter we examine the relationship between the Closed World Assumption 
(CWA) and the Negation as Failure (NAF) rule. A common method of attack is 
to consider the completion of a program [17], which may be thought of as adding 
negative information to the program in such a manner that an atom fails if its 
negation is derivable from the completion of the program. We give a form of 
the completion which is more explicit than that of Clark [17], as well as being 
adapted to first-order hereditary Harrop formulae. This requires that we filace a 
restriction on the class of programs, so that the completion is never inconsistent. 
With this restriction, we show that the completion behaves as expected, in that the 
computational properties of the program and its completion correspond precisely. 
3.1 Completions and Provability 
As discussed above, NAF is an implicit form of negation, which may be seen from 
the definition of P F- -'A. Now as intuitionistic negation identifies -'A and A D I, 
we may ask whether such an interpretation can be given in this case, i.e. is there a 
formula P' such that P F- -' A if F' F-1  A D I? One way to achieve this is through 
the completion of the program, first proposed by Clark [17]. We may think of this 
as adding extra information to the program, so that for any atom A for which 
name(A) E N, we have that P H 8 -'A if P', A H 3 I, where P' is an extension of 
76 
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P. Note that the classes of programs defined above (i.e. sets of closed D formulae) 
can never be inconsistent, and so there is no way that P U {A} can prove I. 
However, we envisage the larger program P as adding negative information to P, 
and hence enabling the assumption of A to lead to an inconsistency. 
We may think of the larger program as a theory in which -A holds if A D I 
holds, and so the two may be considered interchangeable. In our case we will often 
wish to think of -'A as a shorthand for A D I, and so whilst our formal results 
will use the latter version, we shall see how the former version is sometimes more 
intuitive. Hence, we will often use -IA rather than A D I in discussion. 
We may add such negative information to the program by allowing I as a 
distinguished atom, as is done in [77]. In Clark's case, the extra information was 
also added implicitly, by making the "if" 's of the program into "if and only if" 's. 
Clark's completion is given in the definition below. 
Definition 3.1.1 Let P be a Horn clause program. For each predicate p, of arity 
n, which is defined by k clauses 
p(t111 t12,...t1 ) C B1  
p(t 1, 42, . . . t) c Bk 
where Bi  is a conjunction of atoms (or body), the completion comp(P) of P is 
given by 
Vxl... 	p(x1.... x,) +4(E1 A B1)v ... V (Ek A Bk ) 
where E1 is x1 = t 1 A... A x = t, 1 <i <k, (E1 A B) stands for the existential 
closure of E•AB1 for all variables of EZ ABI other than x1,. . . , x,,, and the variables 
{ x 1 ,. . . x} are new variables, i.e. they do not appear anywhere in the k clauses 
above. 
Note the importance of the equations, which may be thought of as encapsulat-
ing the unification process. 
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In addition, Clark's scheme involves adding the following formula for each 
predicate p which appears in the body of some clause in the program but not as 
the head of any clause: 
Vx1, .. . x-ip(x 1,.. .x) 
This is just the case when a predicate has no clauses defining it in the program, 
and so for all terms t1 . . . t we have that p(t1,.. . t) is false. 
For a Horn clause program P, we refer to the Clark completion as comp(P). 
Note that this completion is defined for Horn clause programs, so that no negation 
appears in the body of the clauses in the program. This means that comp(P) is 
only meaningful when negation is only allowed in queries, rather than in both the 
body of a clause and in a query. As remarked in section 24.51  this ensures that 
the completion is consistent, but there are less restrictive assumptions which also 
ensure the consistency of the completion. For this reason we will assume that 
programs are locally stratified, and it is probable that any restriction which leads 
to the consistency of the completion will suffice. 
From our point of view, it will only make sense to define the completion for 
predicates which are completely defined, as the completion gives an explicit rep-
resentation of information which is left implicit in the program. Thus in the com-
pletion of a program P = (D,N), we restrict our attention to predicates whose 
names appear in den(N). 
One important thing to note is that the completion is really carried out as a 
meta-level process rather than as an object level transformation. The equations 
and the +-+ ensure that comp(P) is not a Horn clause program, and so cannot be 
used directly for the computation of the negation of completely defined predicates. 
We will be able to use the completion directly for computation, rather than just 
as a semantic device, if we can write the completion in the form of an extension 
to the program, rather than as a meta-level formula. The particular form we have 
in mind is one that adds clauses whose heads are negative literals. For example, 
consider the even predicate defined below. 
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even(0) 
Vxeven(x) D even(s2(x)) 
The Clark completion comp(P) is 
Vxeven(x) x = 0 V 3y x = s2(y) Aeven(y) 
From this we may infer the additional information that 
Vx—even(x) +-* x OAVy x 54 s2(y)V(x = s2(y)A -ieven(y)) 
Hence, a more explicit form of the completion may be given as 
even(0) 
Yx even(x) D even(s2(x)) 
-'even(s(0)) 
Vx -even(x) D -'even(s2(x)) 
Note that if we replace -'even by odd, this process has added the usual definition 
of the odd predicate to the usual definition of the even predicate, which is just 
what would be expected. 
It is this latter form that we will define as our completion PC,  which is then 
an extension to the program. This seems a more natural way to view the added 
information. 
As there are negations in the head of these formulae as written above, we will 
need to find some way of writing such formulae as definite formulae. One possibility 
is to allow negated atoms to be heads of clauses, and thus extend the class of 
programs. This extension raises some technical issues with regard to inconsistency, 
as discussed above. Another possibility is to allow I as a distinguished atom, and 
compute P' 	-'A via C,  A I- S I. Using this technique the last two clauses of the 
completion C  of the even predicate defined above may be written as 
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even(s(0)) D I 
Vx ((even(x) D I) A even(s 2(x))) D I 
Note that the formula below, which is equivalent to the second clause, is not a 
clause in the usual sense, as the "head" of the clause is not an atom. 
Vx (even(x) I) D (even(s2(x) DI) 
The operational features of this approach were discussed in an earlier section. 
It is not hard to see that this approach to the completion will allow us to use 
the technique discussed in the previous chapter in which even(s 2(X)) D I would 
be considered the head of the clause. The derivation of -even(s 3(0))  from this 
program is given below. 
PC F. even(s3(0)) DI. 
even(s 3(o)), PC F- I. 
even(s 3(o)),  Pc F3 	2 2x (even(s (x)) A (even(x) I)) 
even(s3(0)), PC  F3 even(s(0)) D I 
even(.s(0)),even(s3  (0)),Pc F31 
even(s(0)), even(s 3(0)), P F3 even(s(0)) 
This derivation hinges on the fact that we made three "right" choices along 
the way: firstly that the first time that we encounter I we match I against (the 
second version of) the fourth clause in PC, next that we match even(s' (x)) against 
the assumption even(s 3(0)) rather than the original clauses of the program, and 
finally that we use the third clause in pc  to match against the second occurrence 
of I. These seemingly arbitrary choices may be understood by considering that in 
order to derive a negated atom -IA, we must use information added to the program 
by the completion. Hence we can only derive -A if there is an instance of a clause 
in the completion corresponding to this formula. In this way we may think of the 
clause 
Vx((even(x) D I) A even(s2(x))) I 
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as equivalent to the "clause" 
Vx (even(x) D 1) D (even(s2(x)) DI) 
so that we can think of even(82(x)) D I, or -'even(s2(x)) as the "head" of the 
clause. Thus in the above derivation, the goal even(s3(0)) D I matches the fourth 
clause in pC  but not the third, and so there is only one possible choice, rather than 
two. The goal even(s(0)) D .1. works in a similar manner, this time matching the 
third clause but not the fourth. 
The choice of which clause to match even(32(x)) with may also be explained 
by this concept of the head of a clause. Consider the program given below. 
DA(GD(AJI)) 
The clause G D (A L) represents a part of the completion of some smaller 
program, in particular a clause dealing with the definition of A. Now for a goal 
B D I where BO = AO, we have the following derivation sequence 
P,GD(AI)H 3 B± 
B,P,GD(AI)F-3 ± 
B,P,G D (A D 1) 1-., A A G 
B,P,G D (A _L) F-., GO 
The last step in the above derivation may be derived directly from the first 
step by matching B D I with A D I, provided that B is not needed in the 
computation. We will show later that this is indeed the case for a large class 
of programs. Now if B and A do not unify, then the derivation above would be 
different, as we need to find some other way for A to succeed. However, we know 
that the completion has the property that if A and B do not unify, then this clause 
cannot tell us anything about the negation of B, and so some other clause will 
be needed for B j I to succeed. In other words, either B and A are unifiable or 
this clause cannot tell us anything about the negation of B. Hence, the technique 
of matching against the extended clause head is a correct short-cut, in that no 
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correct derivations of B D I are missed out. A formal proof of this property is 
given in section 3.3. 
This enables us to write the above completion of the even predicate in the 
original form, i.e. 
even(0) 
Vx even(x) D even(32(x)) 
-ieven(s (0)) 
Vx-'even(x) D -leven(s2(x)) 
with the above convention about the equivalence of -iA and A D I and the concept 
of the extended clause head understood. This may be thought of as a compromise 
between the logician's idea of negation, i.e. A D I and the programmer's idea of 
negation, i.e. A fails. 
Note that this technique may be thought of as ensuring that in deriving A 
I, the assumption of A must be used in the computation. This is justified by 
the perception that we define the completion in such a way that we know it is 
consistent, and so P' V3 .1, and so for PC,  A F-3 I to hold, we must have that 
the assumption is used in the derivation. It is this property that allows us to 
use the more specialised computation rule; we are not trying to find whether the 
program is in any way inconsistent, which is the natural interpretation of P H. I; 
we are merely checking whether a given extension to a consistent program makes it 
inconsistent. Thus we can consider this case as a specialised form of a consistency 
check. 
LA 
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3.2 The Completion Process 
It is interesting to note that although the CWA is defined on a program, Clark's 
completion is defined for a predicate, and the completion of the program is given 
by the conjunction of the completions of each predicate. In this section we give a 
similar completion procedure for a first-order hereditary Harrop formula program, 
and our completion will have the added advantage of being defined in an executable 
language, and so it directly specifies a computational method for NAF. This is 
done by adding the extra information as clauses, rather than converting clauses 
into stronger statements, as is done in [17]. 
The basic idea is the observation that if G D A is the only clause whose head 
matches A and name(A) is a completely defined predicate, then we know that if C 
fails, then A fails, and as name(A) is a completely defined predicate, we have -IA. 
Hence, we identify the failure of A with the negation of A, and so the negation 
of A with the failure of G. Recall that a completely defined predicate can only 
depend on completely defined predicates, and so this identifies the negatin of A 
with the negation of G. The main problem is then to express the negation of C 
in our form of clauses. 
For example, consider the program below, where p, q and r are completely 
defined, and s and t are not. 
Vx (y-'q(y) A r(y)) D p(x) 
Vx s(x) D t(x) 
We wish the completion of this program to be 
Vx (y-'q(y) A r(y)) j p(x) 
Vx s(x) 3 t(x) 
Vx (Vyq(y) V -r(y)) 3 -'p(x) 
Vx -q(x) 
Vx -'r(x) 
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Note that the third clause in the completion requires the use of a universal 
quantifier in the body, and that the completion is a set of DHHF formulae. 
We may write the definition of a completely defined predicate p in the following 
manner: 
Let the clauses of p be the universal closure of 
Atli, t12,. . .t) c G1 
p(tkl,tk2,...tkfl ) c Gk 
where Gi  is a goal. We use the same idea as above for the encapsulation of 
unification by expressing the clauses in the equivalent fofm 
Vxl ... x p(x1 ,.. .x) c (E1 A C1 ) V... V R(Ek A Gk) 
where Ei is x1 = t1 A ... A Xn = t, 3(Ei A C1 ) is the existential closure of all 
free variables of E1 A Gi other than {x1.... x}, 1 < i < k, and the x are new 
variables, and so they do not appear in any C2 . 
Now as p is a completely defined predicate, we may then conclude that 
Vxi ... x -'p(x1, ... x) c -'[(E1 AC1)V... Va(EkAGO] 
We then proceed to transform the body into a C formula, so that the above 
formula becomes a clause defining -'p. The above observation that a completely 
defined predicate can only depend on completely defined predicates will be useful 
in the following transformation process. We wish to push the - inwards, and when 
this connective is only applied to atoms, wemay consider the clauses so given as 
executable, giving us the desired explicit form of the completion. In classical 
logic, the justification of this process is immediate due to the larger number of 
equivalences between formulae than in intuitionistic logic, but in our case we need 
to do more work to justify it. In order to do this, we introduce below the operator 
fails, which takes a goal and returns another goal such that fails(G) succeeds if 
the original goal G fails. This is akin to the transformation process of Barbuti et 
al. [7], and may be thought of as a way of expressing -G as a goal. 
Chapter 3. Completions and Negation as Failure 	 85 
Definition 3.2.1 Let C be a GHHF_ goal formula. We say C is negatable if all 
predicates which occur positively in C are completely defined, and all predicates 
which occur negatively in G are incompletely defined. 
It should be clear that if G D A E (D) and name(A) is completely defined, 
then G is a negatable goal formula. This is due to the way that completely defined 
predicates may depend on other predicates, and so all the bodies of the clauses of 
the program in which we will be interested will be negatable goal formulae. 
The reason that negatable goals are interesting is that we may identify the 
failure of a negatable goal with the truth of its negation. This may be thought of 
as an extension of the way that we infer -'A from the failure of A when name(A) is 
a completely defined predicate. The reason that all the negatively occurring pred-
icates must be incompletely defined is that we must be able to add the necessary 
assumptions to the program in order to show that the goal fails, and hence that 
its negation succeeds. The operator fails may now be defined as follows: 
Definition 3.2.2 Let C be a negatable goal formula. 
We define another GHHF_ goal formula fails(G) as follows: 
fails(A) = -'A 
fails(-iA) = A 
fails(G1 V G2 ) = fails(G1 ) A fails(G2 ) 
fails(G1 A C2 ) = fails(G1 ) V fails(G2 ) 
fils(D j C) = D j fails(C) 
fai1s(xG) = Vx fails(C) 
fails(VxC) = 3x fails(C) 
It is obvious that for any negatable GHHF goal G, fails(C) is also a GHHF. 
goal. As we are dealing only with completely defined predicates, we know that the 
failure of A and the success of -'A are equivalent, as are the success of A and the 
failure of -'A. For the other goal formulae, the definition of fails(C) is very similar 
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to that of H1; we know that if C1 V C2 fails then we must have that C1 fails and 
C2 fails, and vice-versa, and so on. 
We may think of this transformation as exploiting the properties of failure and 
success. For example, the goal p A q fails if either p fails or q fails, and under 
Negation as Failure, this is the same as either -'p succeeds or -iq  succeeds, i.e. 
-'p V -'q succeeds. 
Note also that fails(fails(G)) = G. Below we show that the expected behaviour 
of fails(G) indeed occurs. 
Lemma 3.2.1 Let (F, G) be a derivation pair where P = (D, N) and C is negat-
able. Then 
P 	C 	P H1  fails(G) 
Proof: We proceed by induction on the depth of the relevant 0-derivation. The 
base case occurs when G is a literal, i.e. either A or -'A, where A is an-atom. 
By Proposition 2.3.1, we have that 
PH8 APHJ -'A 
PHS -'APH f A 
and so it is clear that the base case holds. 
Hence the induction hypothesis is that the statement holds for all 0-derivations 
of no more than a given depth. There are seven cases: 
A, -'A: As above, it is clear that these two cases follow immediately from Propo-
sition 2.3.1. 
C1 V C2: P H3 C1 V C2 if P H3 C1 or P H3 C2 and by the hypothesis this 
is equivalent to P H1  fails(C1) or P H1  fails(C2 ), which in turn is 
equivalent to P H1  fails(G1 ) A fails(02 ), i.e. P H1  fails(G1 V C2). 
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G1 A C2: P F 9 C1 A C2 iff P L C1 and P H8 C2 and by the hypothesis this 
is equivalent to P I-j fails(C1) and P H f fails(C2 ), which in turn is 
equivalent to P H1  fails(C1 ) Vfails(C2 ), i.e. P H1  fails(G1 A C2 ). 
axC: P F-s 3xG if P F-s G[t/x] for some t E U and by the hypothesis this 
is equivalent to P F1  fails(G[t/x]) for some t E U, which in turn is 
equivalent to P F1  Vx fails(G), i.e. P F- f fails(xG). 
VxC: P F3 VxG if 3R E R(U) such that P 1-8 C[t/x] for all t E R and by the 
hypothesis this is equivalent to P H f fails(C[t/x]) for all t e R, which 
in turn is equivalent to P 	x fails(G), i.e. P F1  fails(VxC). 
D' D C: (D, N) F8 D' 	G if names(heads(D')) fl den(N) = 0 and (D U 
{D'}, N) F-3  G and by the hypothesis this is equivalent to names(heads(D'))fl 
den(N) = 0 and (D U {D'}, N) I-i fails(G), which in turn is equivalent 
to (D, N) F1  D' fails(G), i.e. (D, N) Hf fails(D' D G). 
rol 
The dual result to the above is an immediate corollary, which gives us the 
proposition below. 
Proposition 3.2.2 Let (P, C) be a derivation pair where G is negatable. Then 
P F3 G P H f fails(C) 
P F1  C <=> P H3 fails(C) 
Proof: 
This was proved in lemma 3.2.1 above. 
Let C' = fails(G), and so fails(G') = C. By lemma 3.2.1, P 1- 3 C' 
P 1-1  fails(G'), which is just P 1- fails(C) 	P F C. 
I. 
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As mentioned in section 2.3, we may interpret this result as defining a notion 
of NAF for a larger class of formulae than just atoms. If P H 3 -'C iff P F- C, then 
from the above proposition we have that P l- -C if P L fails(C), and so we 
can think of fails(G) as a way of writing -iG as a goal. In this way once we have 
implemented -A as a goal, we may derive a more widespread notion of NAF, i.e. 
one that is applicable to any negatable goal, not just to atoms. 
We need another transformation before we can define our completion, so that 
each occurrence of -A is replaced by A D I. This is done by the transformation 
below. 
Definition 3.2.3 Let D be a DHHF_ definite formula and C be a CHHF_ goal 
formula. 
We define contr(G) and contrd(D) as follows: 
contr(A) = A 
contr(-iA) = AD I 
contr(G1 V C2 ) = contr(G1 ) V contr(C2 ) 
contr(G1 A C2 ) = contr(G1 ) A contr(G2 ) 
contr(xC) = 3x contr(G) 
contr(VxG) = /x contr(G) 
contr(D D C) = contrd(D) D contr(G) 
contrd(A) 	= A 
contrd(D1 A D2) = contr(D1 ) A contr(D2 ) 
contrd(VxD) 	= Vx contr(D) 
contrd(G D A) = contr(G) D A 
Note that neither contrd(D) nor contr(G) can contain any occurrence of -IA. 
We use these two constructs to construct the completion as follows: if A is an 
instance p(i,. . . s) of p(x 1 ,. . . x), then from the program we have that 
k 
AcV(E1AG) 
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where Ei is s = t 1 A ... A .s, = t. 
Now if name(A) is a completely defined predicate, we may then deduce that 
-'A holds if the body of the clause fails, i.e. 
-'Ac -'V(EIAG) 
Now as all predicates in all the G• must be completely defined, we get 
k 
-'A C A V(-'E1 V fai1s(G)) 
It is obvious that (E A G) fails if E fails or C fails, and so as E is just a set of 
equations and we may think of equality over terms as being completely defined, 
we get that -'(E A G) 	-iE V -'C. A similar argument may by given by the 
intuitionistic equivalence of E A G and E A (E D C), and so -'(E A C) is the 
same as -i(E A (E D C)), and so we get -iE V -'(E D G) which in turn is just 
-'E V (E D -iG). This equivalence will hold even if C contains an incompletely 
defined predicate, as the equations may be thought of as expressing "p(x 1 ,. . . x) 
unifies with p(t 1 ,. . . t)", and as first-order unification is decidable, we know that 
the Ei  obey the law of excluded middle, so that either E1 is true or E2 is false, and 
we can easily determine which via unification. 
As noted above, this process will not work for a program such as 
as we first derive 
-'p D  p 
P D -'p 
which is then transformed to 
(pAp) D I 
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Thus from the completion we get that p D I, which should not happen as in 
the original program both p and -'p loop. This is the reason that we need to 
restrict our attention to locally stratified programs. This is not necessarily the 
only restriction that will work, but it is a convenient one. 
In our case, we need to consider the possibility that the program will grow 
during execution, in that goals may contain implications. Hence, we need not 
only that the original program is locally stratified, but also that all extensions of 
the program which occur during execution are also locally stratified. This leads 
us to the definitions below. 
Definition 3.2.4 Let P = (D, N) be a derivation state. 
We define the P-reliant relation on literals as follows: 
A is P-reliant on L if 3G D A E (D) such that L appears in G 
-'A is P-reliant on L if A is P-reliant on L 
We define the P-dependent relation on literals as follows: 
A is P-dependent on L if A is P-reliant on L or there is an L' such that A is 
P-reliant on L' and L' is P-dependent on L 
-'A is P-dependent on L if A is P-dependent on L 
We say A is P-self-dependent if A is P-dependent on A. 
It is easily seen that the P-dependent relation is the transitive closure of the 
P-reliant relation. Thus in the program below we have that p is P-dependent on 
p but not on -'p, and that q is P-dependent on -'r and .s. 
p D p 
D q 
sjr 
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These relations are useful in order to formally define the property of local 
stratification, which is done below. 
Definition 3.2.5 Let (F, G) be a derivation pair. 
P is locally stratified if there is no atom A such that A is P-dependent on -A. 
P and G are a locally stratified derivation pair if every derivation state which 
occurs in the computation of G is locally stratified. 
Thus the program given above is locally stratified, whereas the program con-
sisting of the clause -'p D p is clearly not locally stratified. 
Note that if P = (D, N) is locally stratified, then so is (D U {A}, N), so that 
the addition of an atom to a locally stratified program results in a locally stratified 
program, i.e. the assumption of an atom preserves local stratification. 
We need the notion of a locally stratified derivation pair P and G rather 
than just a locally stratified program because the program may increase during 
execution, and so we need to ensure that all programs which occur during excution 
preserve local stratification. 
We are now in a position to give a formal definition of our completion. 
Definition 3.2.6 Let P = (D, N) be a locally stratified derivation state. For each 
predicate letter p appearing in P, we define p+  and p as follows: 
Let the clauses defining p be the universal closure of 
Atli, t12,. . .t) c C1  
p(tkl ,tk2,.. .tkfl ) c Gk 
We denote by p the clause 
Ic 
Vx1  ... xp(x1, ... x) CV(EAcontr(C)) 
Chapter 3. Completions and Negation as Failure 	 92 
where E j is x, 	t 1 A ... A x = t, 3(Ei A G.) is the existential closure of all 
free variables of E1 A C1, 1 < i < k, and xi,... x, are new variables which do not 
appear in any C2 . 
If p E den(N), then p is the clause 
k 
Vs1 . . . x, I C p(x,... x,) A AV(-iE1 V contr(fails(G1 ))) 
If p 0 den(N), then p is empty. 
If there is no clause in P whose head's name is p, then p is empty. If p 
den(N), then p is also empty. Otherwise, p is the clause 
Vx11 . . . Xn J_ C p(x,... x) 
The completion of a predicate p is {p,p}. 
The completion PC  of P is (DC,  N), where DC  is the union of the completions 
Of each predicate appearing in P. 
We will write often DC as D U D to emphasise the nature of our definition 
of the completion, i.e. the original clauses of the program (in a slightly modified 
form) together with a set of extra clauses containing the negative information. 
Note also that pC contains the clause 
for all completely defined predicates which occur in the body of some clause in 
the program, but for which there is no clause head whose name is p. This is the 
same as in Clark's case. 
The only thing that prevents us from using the above two clauses directly to 
compute negated atoms (as distinct from the usually semantic use of comp(P) ) is 
the inequations. We show how we may incorporate these by giving an algorithm 
to solve such inequations as explicitly as possible (i.e. producing an explicit answer 
whenever possible) in the next chapter. 
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It should be noted that solving the equations and inequations may be done 
independently of the idealised interpreter, as the equations and inequations are 
relations between terms rather than predicates. Hence, we may call the equa-
tion/inequation solver at any point in a derivation, and so we shall write P - E 
to denote that the set E of equations and inequations has a solution. This will 
come in handy when mixing equations, inequations and goals. 
Apart from the inequations, the clauses above are definite formulae according 
to our definiion, and so we may think of this form of the completion as some sort 
of meta-program for the computation of literals. The reason that we consider it a 
meta-level program is that we consider the programmer as writing the "positive" 
clauses for the completely defined predicates, and the "negative" clauses as being 
implicitly understood due to the fact that p is completely defined. Thus this 
executable form of the completion makes explicit the complement of the definitions 
written by the programmer. 
In the next section we show the expected results about the completion, i.e. that 
the completion of a locally stratified program behaves as expected, and precisely 
captures the NAF rule for the program. 
3.3 	Properties of the Completion 
An interesting property to note is that if P is locally stratified and C D A E (D), 
then we know that A is not P-dependent on -'A, which means that no instance of 
any atom which appears in C is P-dependent on -'A. Hence, if P' is the program 
{fails(G) D A I C D A e clausal(P)I, then no instance of any atom which appears 
in fails(C) is P'-dependent on A, and so if the clause 
I C A A contr(fails(G)) 
appears in P' , then 
(DC U {A}, N) F8  contr(fails((C)) if 
(DC, N) F8 contr(fails(C)) 
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This is the property mentioned in section 2.4.4, i.e. that for a large class of 
programs, when searching for a proof of A D I, we only need A to determine which 
clause to use, and not as an assumption. For example, consider the completion 
(below) of the program p D q, where p and q are completely defined: 
p D q 
((p D I) A q) D I 
PD  
It is clear that to find a proof of q D I it is sufficient to determine whether 
p D I from the completion of the program, rather than from the completion 
extended by the assumption of q. 
This property is formalised in the lemma below. We write the substitution 
[x1 	si,. .. Xn - s,] as [x1 +- s.] 1. 
Lemma 3.3.1 Let P = (D, N) be a locally stratified derivation state, and p(s1.... s) 
be an atom such that there is a clause 
k 
Vxl,...xfl ICp(xi, ... xn)AAV(-1EiV• contr (fails  (Gt))) 
in DC.  Then 
k 
(DC U {p(si,.. . s,)}, N) I-, AV(-E1 V contr (fails (G1))[x2 - s.]) 
Ij 
k 
(DC,N) 	AV(-E1 V contr(fa1ls(G2 ))[x 2 - 
Proof: The = direction is clear. 
For the other direction, consider an 0-proof of P -p A for some atom A. 
It is clear that A is P-dependent on any other atom which appears as a 
consequent in this proof. Hence, if A is not P-dependent on A', then A' does 
not appear as a consequent in any 0-proof of P -b A. 
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k 
Assume that (DC  U {p(si,• . . s,)}, N) L 	V contr(fai1s(G))[x 
Now as P is locally stratified, we know that fai1s(G)[x1 	s] 	is 
not fails(P)-dependent on P(si,. . . .s,), where fails(P) = {fails(C) I C c P}. 
Hence, p(i,... s7 ) does not appear as a consequent in any uniform proof of 
DC 	contr(fai1s(G1))[x - s1 ] 1, and so we may omit p(.s1 ,. . . s,) from 
k 
the antecedent of every sequent in the proof, and so (DC,  N) F3  AV(-'Ej V 
contr(fai1s(G))[x1 - 
701 
Next we show a useful lemma about PC 
Lemma 3.3.2 Let (P, G) be a locally stratified derivation pair where P = (D, N). 
Then it is not the case that 
PC F3 contr(G) A contr(fails(G)). 
Note that this is a weaker statement than 
PC F contr(G) A contr(fails(G)). 
This stronger statement is not true, as it requires that either contr(G) or 
contr(fails(G)) fails for any C and any program P, and thus for no loops to occur. 
However, the weaker statement above is sufficient for our purposes, as whilst it 
does not guarantee that contr(G) A contr(fails(G)) always fails, it does guarantee 
that it never succeeds. 
Proof: As D' D G is a goal formula for any definite formula D' and goal formula 
C, the above is equivalent to showing that is it impossible that 
(DC U DIC,  N) F3  contr(G) A contr(fails(G)). 
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for any definite formula D' and any goal formula G. This is due to the fact 
that if (D, N) }- D' D C, then we must have that D' does not extend any 
completely defined predicates of D, and so Dc = D/+.  
We proceed by induction on the depth of the 0-derivation 
The base case occurs when the purported proof has the smallest depth, in 
which case C must be an atom A, and the problem reduces to showing that 
it is impossible that 
(DcUD/c,N) 1-5 AA(A DI) 
This is true if both the following are true: 
(Dc UDC,N)  I- A 
(Dc UD,N)  H 3 A D I 
Let A be p(s1 ,. . . s,j. As the overall 0-proof is of the smallest possible 
height, for the first case to be true we must have that A E (D U D'), so 
there is a clause 
k 
Vx1 ... x p(x1.... x,) C V 3(Ei A contr(Gj) 
in D U D' such that E[x 1 - 	is true and C is empty for some 
1 <j < k. 
For the second case, we must have that 
(Dc uDcu{p(si .... sn)},N) H31 
and so we must have 
(DC U D/C  U {p(s1.... s)}, N) F-3  
k 
X m q(x1 .... -m)  A AV(-'E V contr(fails(C1))) 
for some predicate q. 
Now as (DC U DEC,  N) F-3 p(s,. .. sn ), this is equivalent to 
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k 
(DC U DEC,  N) H ...... Xm q(x1,. Xm ) AAV(—Ei V contr(fails(G))) 
In this case the 0-proof will be shortest if the answer for the first conjunct is 
q(t1,. . . t) where q(t1,. . t) E (D U D'). This means that 	- t} 1  
is true for some j and that C3 is empty. But as 
(DC U DfC,  N) F3 AV(-,Ei V contr(fails(G1))) 
we have that both E3[x - t.] 1 and —iE[x1 - t1 ] 1, which is a contradic-
tion. 
Hence, the base case holds. 
So the inductive hypothesis is that there is no 0-proof of height less than n 
such that 
(DC U DIC,  N) I- contr(C) A contr(fails(G)). 
The cases for C - A and G = -A coincide, and so there are six cases to 
consider: 
A: Let A be p(s,. . . .$). For there to be an 0-proof in this case, we must 
have that both the following hold: 
(DC U DIC,  N) F-3 A 
(Dc uDIC,N)  F3 A DI 
In the first case, we must have that RG D A e (D U D') such that 
(Dc  UDIC , N)F S C 
In the second case, we must have that 
(DC U DIC  U {p(s j.... s)}, N) F-3 I 
and so we must have 
(DC U D' U {p(s,. . . s,)}, N) F-3  
k 
Xm q(x1,.. . x) A AV(- E2 V contr(fails(G1))) 
Chapter 3. Completions and Negation as Failure 	 98 
for some predicate q. 
As above, as (DC U DEC,  N) I- A, this is equivalent to 
k 
(DC U Dec, N) F-3 x1,. . . X q(x 1,. .. X) AAV(-Ei V cont r (falls (C1))) 
Let the answer for the first conjunct be q(t j ,. . . t3. As above, if 
q(t 1,.. t) E (D+ U  D+) then the second conjunct cannot have an 
0-proof. Otherwise, we have that 3G D q(t 1,. . . t) E (D U D') such 
that 
(Dc uDIC,N)  F-8 G 
Now as q(t1.... t) matches a clause in the program, we must have that 
Ej [Xi - t] tm 1 is true for some 1 <j < k and that 
(DC U DIC,  N) F 3 contr(C) 
But we must also have that the second conjunct succeeds, and so 
(DC U  D/C,  N) F 3 contr(fails(G2 )) 
which contradicts the induction hypothesis. 
Hence, there is no 0-proof of length n such that 
(DCuDFC,N) 1- AA(A D I) 
C1 V C2: Note that contr(G1 V G2)=  contr(G1) V contr(G2), and that 
contr(fails(G1 V C2)) 
= contr(fails(G1 ) Afails(C2 )) 
= contr(fails(G1)) A contr(fails(C2 )) 
and so 
contr(C1 V C2) A contr(fails(G1 V C2)) 
(contr(C1 ) A contr(fails(G1)) A contr(fails(C2 ))) V 
(contr(G2 ) A contr(fails(C1 )) A contr(fails(G2))) 
Hence, 
(DC U  DEC,  N) F 3 contr(C1 V C2) A contr(fails(C1 V C2)) 
Chapter 3. Completions and Negation as Failure 	 99 
implies that 
(DC U DIC,  N) F contr(G1) A contr(fai1s(G)) 
for some i = 1, 2, which contradicts the induction hypothesis. 
C1 A C2: Note that contr(G1 A G2) = contr(G1 ) A contr(G2), and that 
contr(fails(G1 A C2 )) 
= contr(fails(G1) V fails(C2 )) 
= contr(fails(G1)) V contr(fails(C2)) 
and so 
contr(G1 A C2) A contr(fails(G1 A G2)) 
(contr(G1) A contr(C2) A contr(fails(G1)) V 
(contr(G1) A contr(C2) A contr (fails (C2)) 
Hence, 
(DC U DIC,  N) F3 contr(G1 A C2) A contr(fails(G1 A C2)) 
implies that 
(DC U DIC,  N) F3 contr(G) A contr(fails(G1 )) 
for some i = 1, 2, which contradicts the induction hypothesis. 
xG: Note that 
contr(xC) A contr(fails(xG)) 
= 3x contr(G) A contr(Vx fails(G)) 
= 3x contr(G) A Yx contr(fails(G)) 
Hence, 
(DC U DIC,  N) I- contr(xG) A contr (fails (xG)) 
if 
(DC u DIC,  N) F3 3x contr(G) A Vx contr(fails(C)) 
which implies that 
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(DC U D, N) H8 contr(C[t/x]) A contr(fails(G[t/x])) 
for some t E U, which contradicts the induction hypothesis. 
VxG: Note that 
contr(VxG) A contr(fails(VxG)) 
Vx contr(G) A contr(x fails(G)) 
= Vx contr(G) A 3x contr(fails(G)) 
Hence, 
(DC U DIC,  N) I- contr(VxG) A contr(fails(VxG)) 
if 
(DC U D1', N) H5 Vx contr(G) A 3x contr(fails(G)) 
which implies that 
(DC U DIC,  N) H3 contr(G[t/x]) A contr (fails (G[t/x])) 
for some t E U, which contradicts the induction hypothesis. 
D" D G: Note that 
contr(D" D C) A contr(fails(D" D G)) 
= (contrd(D") D contr(G)) A (contrd(D") D contr(fails(G))) 
contrd(D") D (contr(G) A contr(fails(G))) 
Hence, 
(DC U DIC,  N) H8 contr(ij 	C) A contr(fails(D" D G)) 
if 
(DC U DIC,  N) H8 contrd(D") D (contr(G) A contr(fails(G))) 
which implies that 
(DC U DIC  U DC,  N) H 5 contr(G) A contr(fails(G)) 
which contradicts the induction hypothesis. 
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Thus by induction, we get the result. 
OR 
This in itself is not a particularly important result, but it is useful to prove 
further results, such as the corollary below. 
Corollary 3.3.3 Let P = (D, N) be a locally stratified derivation state. Then it 
is not the case that 
pC Fj 
Proof: For this to occur, we must have that there is a clause 
k 
I C 	xi . . . x, p(x1,. . .x,) A AV(-iEj V contr(fails(Gj)) 
in D such that 
k 
(DC) N) F 3 3x,.. .. x, p(x1, . . . x,) A AV(-E1 V contr (fails (G1))) 
Let the answer for the first conjunct be p(i,... sn). Thus we must have that 
k 
(DC, N) I- (A v(-Ei V contr(fails(G)))[x1 - 
Now for p(s1,... s,) to succeed we must have that 
	
(DC,N) 	 i F3 (contr(G)[x1 - s•i.n ) 2 2 = 1 
for some J. Then we have that 
(DC, N) F3 contr(G') A contr (falls (G')) 
for the goal G' = 	+— 	which contradicts lemma 3.3.2. 
Next we give a formal proof of the fact that the "short-cut" rule referred to 
above is indeed correct. 
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Proposition 3.3.4 Let P = (D, N) be a locally stratified derivation state, and 
P(1,.. . s,) be an atom such that there is a clause 
Ic 
I C 311,. . . x p(x j ,. . . x,) AAV(-iEj V contr(fails(G2 ))) 
in P.  Then 
k 
(DCU{p(s1,...$)},N) F-3 ± if (D', N) H3 AV(-lEj Vcontr(fails(Gj))[xi - 
k 
If (DC  U {p(s1,. . . s)}, N) H f I. then (DC,  N) H f  AV(-iE1 V contr(fai1s(G))[x1  f- 
sj 
k 
If(D,N) I-f  AV(-iEVcontr(fails(G))[x - s] 1) then (DCU{p(si,. . .$)}, N) I/, 
Proof: 
1. The = direction is clear. For the other direction, consider 
(DC U {p(s1,. . . s,)}, N) H3 
k 
x, q(x,.. . x,) A AV('E1 V contr (fails (G))) 
i=1 
where p 	q. If (DC  U {p(s1,. . .$)},N) I 5 q(t1,. . .t), then Ej [xi 
t.j. 	or some j  and t t=1 
(DC U {p(s1,. . . s,)}, N) H3 R((E A contr(G))[x - 
But we must also have that 
(DC  U {p(si,.. . s,)}, N) H V((-'E3 V contr(fails(G3 )))[x2 - t.] 
rn
_ 1 ) 
This is impossible by lemma 3.3.2, and so we must have p = q and 
ii = m. Now if we have 
(DC U {p(s1,. . . s)}, N) H3 p(t 1 ,. . . tj 
where si j4 t 2 , then, as above, there is a goal C' such that 
(DC U {p(s1,. . . s)}, N) H3 contr(G') A contr(fails(C')) 
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Hence, we must have si = t2 for all 1 <i < n, and so 
(DC U {p(s1,.. . s)}, N) H3  AV(E1 V contr(fai1s(G))[x 	s1 ] 1 ) 
Now as P is locally stratified, we have that fai1s(G)[x , sJ 	is 
independent of p(i,. . . s,3, and by lemma 3.3.1, we have that 
k 





(DC, N) F-1  AV(-E V contr(fails(G1 ))[x1 - sJ) 
By a similar argument to 1 above, we know that it cannot be the case 
that 
(Dc u{p(s1,...$)},N) F-3 
k 
x q(x,. . . x,) A AV(-E1 V contr (fails (G3)) 
unless we have 
k 
,Ti 	\ (DC, N) H3 	 x A V(-E1 V contr(fai1s(G))[ 2 -s i I 
i=1 
This is a contradiction by proposition 2.3.5, and so we cannot have that 
(DCu{p(s1,...$)},N) F-3 I 
We may think of the above proposition as the formal justification of the "short 
cut" described above, in that when searching for an 0-proof of 
(DC U {p(s1,.. . s)}, N) H3 I 
it is only necessary to consider the clause 
k 
Ic x1 , . . .xp(x1 , . . .x)A AV(- E1 V contr(fails(GJ)) 
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rather than all clauses in D, as all that can happen by ignoring the other clauses 
is that some loops are avoided. 
The reason that we use 3 above, rather than the converse to 2, which is stronger, 
is that there may be a clause in D which leads to a loop, even though the 
relevant clause for p(i,... s)D I does not. For example, let P be the program 
(D,{p,q,r}) where D is 
-'q D p 
r D r 




(r A (r D I)) D I 
qDJ 
It is clear that 
(Dc U{p},N)  1-1  q A p 
but that an attempt to find an 0-proof such that 
(DC U {p},N) H r A (r I) 
leads to a loop. Hence, (DC U {p}, N) V f I, but (DC U {p}, N) F-1  q Ap. This 
means that H1  is not quite strong enough for our purposes, and so we need a 
slightly stronger relation in order to avoid some unnecessary loops. 
Hence we define the relations H3 and 'fc  which are to be used on the corn-
pletion of derivation states. 
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Definition 3.3.1 Let (F, G) be a locally stratified derivation pair where P = 
(D, N). We define the relations F,Ff  C c pc >< gc, where 	is the set of all 
possible completions of derivation states, and cc  is the set of all goal formulae in 
"contradiction" form (i.e. contr(G)), as the smallest relations which satisfy 
F-3 =F 
I- c Ffc 
8. Pc  F-f  C p(s1 	3) D I zff 
k 
PC  H (AV(-E1 V contr(fails(G1 )))[x 	sj) 
where there is a clause 
k 
I C 	x1,. . . x p(x1,... x) AAV(-Ei V contr(fails(G3)) 
It is clear that PC H C if PC 
	
C, and by proposition 3.3.4 we get pc 
p(s1,...$)L if 
PC  H 	V contr(fai1s(G1))[x 	s] 
It is also clear that PC F-1  C implies PC H G, but the crnverse does not hold. 
As noted above, it is possible that (DC  U {p}, N) may lead to a loop when trying 
to prove I without the short-cut rule, and so it is not the case that pc  1/ p D I, 
but that PC H1 p D I. 
We are now in a position to prove the central result, i.e. that the completion 
has the expected operational behaviour. 
Proposition 3.3.5 Let P = (D, iV), C be locally stratified derivation pair. Then 
I. P H C PC F- contr(C) 
2. P I- C PC 	contr(C) 
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Proof: We proceed by induction on the height of the 0-derivation for C. 
Clearly 1 and 2 above are equivalent to the corresponding statements when 
replaced by D U {D'}. This is due to the fact that for any goal formula C, 
D' D G is also a goal formula and that if we have (D, N) 1- D' D G or we 
have (D, N) F1  D' D C', then we must have that D' does not extend any 
completely defined predicate of D, and so Dc = D/+ 
In the base case G is an atom A. 
A: Let Abe p(s1,...$). 
As the 0-proof is of the smallest possible height, we have P F5  
A ' A e (D U {D'}), which is clearly equivalent to pc F A. 
2. Similarly, P 1-1  A 	VB E (D U {D'}) B ç A and VG D B E 
(D U {D'}) B A, and so p(s1 ,.. . s,) does not match any clause 
k 	 k 
head p(t11,.. . t), which is equivalent to ,t\V(-'E), i.e. -V(E) 
where Ei = 	t 1 A ... A3, = tin, and so 
pc 
Ffc A. 
Hence the inductive hypothesis is that 1 and 2 hold for all D and D' and for 
all goals C whose 0-derivation is less than a given depth. There are seven 
cases: 
A: Let Abep(.s1,...$). 
P. F-3 A if 3G D A e (D U {D'}) such that P F3 C, i.e. P F5  
A G3 ){x *- s] 1), and by the hypothesis this is equivalent 
to PC F 	((E, A contr(G3))[x - s1 ] 1), which in turn is just 
Pc F A. 
P F1  A if VB E (D) B ç A and \/G D B E (D U {D'}) such that 
B cx A we have P F-f  G, i.e. P F-f ((E1 A C1)[x - s]) for 
all 1 <i < n, and by the hypothesis this is equivalent to PC 1-1  
3((E1 A contr(G1))[x1 - s2 ] 1), which in turn is just P' F A. 
'A: Let A be P(,,. . . s,). 
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P H3 -'A if name(A) E den(N) and P H A, which is equivalent to 
VB E (DU {D'}) B A and VG D B E (DU {D'}) such that B oc A, 
we have PH1  G, i.e. P H1  ((EAG1)[x1 - s2]) for all 1 < i 
This in turn is equivalent to P H3 V(-iE1 V fails(G)[x - 
by proposition 3.2.1, and by the hypothesis this is equivalent to 
PC H3 V(-'E1Vcontr(fails(G2))[xi f— sj.i ) for all 1 < i < n, which 
is just PC  H3 p(s1,. . . .$) D I. 
P H1  -'A if P H3 A, which is equivalent to 3G D A e (D U {D'}) 
such that P F. G, i.e. P 1-3 ((E3 A G)[x - s] 1 ) for some 1 
j :5 k. This in turn is equivalent to P H1  V((E, V fails(G,)[x - 
by proposition 3.2.1, and by the hypothesis this is equivalent 
to pc Hf  C V((-'E3 V fails (contr(G,)))[xi i— s]1), which is just 
PC H j p(s1,...$) D1. 
C1 V C2: I. P F 3 G1 V C2 if P H3 C1 or P I-s C2, and by the hypothesis this is 
equivalent to PC H.,C  contr(G1) or PC H3 contr(G2), which in turn 
is just PC  F-3c contr(C1) V contr(G2), i.e. PC F-,c contr(G1 V G2)- 
2. PH1  C1 VC2 if PH1  C1 and PH1  C2, and by the hypothesis this 
is equivalent to PC F-fC contr(G1) and PC F- fc contr(G2), which in 
turn is just PC  1-1  contr(G1) Vcontr(G2), i.e. pc Hf  C contr(G1 VG2 ). 
C1 A C2: 1. P H3 C1 A G2 if P H3 G1 and P H3 C2, and by the hypothesis this 
is equivalent to pc 	contr(G1) and PC H3 contr(G2 ), which in 
turn is just PC H3 contr(G1 )Acontr(G2 ), i.e. PC  [-,,c contr(G1 AG2). 
2. P Hf C1 A G2 if P H1  G1 or P H1  C2, and by the hypothesis this is 
equivalent to pc 	contr(G1 ) or pc H1  C contr(G2 ), which in turn 
is just PC H1 C contr(G1 ) A contr(G2 ), i.e. 
pc 
H1 c contr(G1 A C2). 
dxC: I. P H3 3xG if P H3 G[t/x] for some t E U, and by the hypothesis 
this is equivalent to PC H3 contr(G[t/x]), which in turn is just 
PC 1-3 3x contr(G), i.e. PC F- .,c contr(xG). 
2. P H1 IxG if 3R E R(U) such that P H1  G[t/x] for all t 
and by the hypothesis this is equivalent to PC  Hfc contr(G[t/x]) 
iiap.i o. toInp1eIduwi ana regaion as ran ure 	 I Jö 
for all t E R, which in turn is just P' H1  x contr(G), i.e. PC Ffc 
contr(xC). 
VxG: 1. P I-s VxG if IR E R(U) such that P H, G[t/x] for all t E I?, and by 
the hypothesis this is equivalent to PC  H contr(G[t/x]) for all t E 
R, which in turn is just PC H Vx contr(G), i.e. PC  F- contr(VxG). 
2. P 1-1  VxG iff P F-1  G[t/x] for some t E U, and by the hypothesis 
this is equivalent to PC }-j contr(G[t/x]), which in turn is just 
PC F-f c Yx contr(G), i.e. PC  F-1  contr(VxG). 
D" D G: 1. (D U {D'}, N) F- D" D G if names(hads(D")) C ass(N) and 
(D U {D'} U {D"}) F-3 C and by the hypothesis this is equivalent 
to (DC  U {D"}, N) H contr(G), i.e. PC H D"D contr(G), and as 
names(heads(D")) c ass(N), contrd(D") = D", and so this is just 
PC F 	
, 
3 contr(D D C). 
2. (D U {D'},N) }- D" D C if names(heads(D")) 9 ass(N) and 
(D U {D'} U {D"}) 1-1  G and by the hypothesis this is equivalent 
to (DC  U {D"}, N) Ff C contr(G), i.e. PC V3 D" D contr(G) and as 
names(heads(D")) C ass(N), contrd(D") = D", and so thisis just 
C  H1 C  contr(D" D C). 
In this way we see that our completion preserves the computational behaviour 
of the program, and gives an explicit form of negation, rather than the implicit 
way NAF is defined. Our completion also has the advantage of being executable, 
in the sense that it is a first-order hereditary Harrop formula program, and so, 
provided we can find some way of solving the inequations, we may compute directly 
from the completion, rather than only use it as a semantic device. This is due 
to the fact that we may view the completion as a program for which A fails if, 
A D I succeeds (where A is completely defined). This property may also be seen 
as a way of reconciling NAF with the interpretation of negation in intuitionistic 
logic, in that an implicit form of negation (NAF) is given an explicit form (PC). 
It is this explicit representation of an implicit definition which requires that the 
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class of programs be restricted. We shall see in chapter 5 how we may give a 
form of semantics to programs which contain negations for which no restriction on 
the class of programs is necessary. This suggests that we should perhaps use the 
completion as some kind of guide to the success and failure of goals, rather than 
a semantic device per se, and use some kind of model which does not use such an 
explicit construction for the semantics. 
Chapter 4 
Answer Substitutions for Negated Goals 
In this chapter we consider the problem of finding answer substitutions for exis-
tentially quantified negated goals. This requires an extension to the usual process, 
as we need more than just unification. We give an algorithm which is suitable 
for this purpose, which is incremental, and hence able to make use of new infor-
mation without starting again from scratch. We also show the correctness of the 
algorithm, and discuss some possible extensions of it. 
4.1 Motivations 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, we wish to find answer substitutions for 
existentially quantified negated goals. In order to generate the required answer 
substitutions, we need to do more work than is typically done by the resolution 
process. For example, consider the program 
p(a) 
q(b) D p(b) 
q(a) 
and the goal x-ip(x). The goal 3xp(x) succeeds with the answer substitution 
being x - a. A direct application of the NAF rule will then give us that as p(x) 
succeeds, -p(x) fails. Now whilst Vx-ip(x) is false, -'p(b) follows from the CWA, 
110 
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and so one correct answer substitution for the goal 3x—p(x) is x - b. Thus our 
process needs to find failures rather than successes, which generally takes more 
effort, as we may need to consider every clause in the program whose head matches 
p(x), rather than looking for a matching clause whose body succeeds, which we 
may find at the first attempt to match the goal with a clause in the program. 
It also is possible that there are more answer substitutions for the above goal. 
For example, if there is another constant c in the language, then -p(c) is true, 
and so x - C is another correct answer substitution. Hence, we may need to 
consider more information than is given in the program in order to generate answer 
substitutions. This is a consequence of the fact that NAF is an implicit form of 
negation, i.e. that we define what is false by the complement of what is true, and 
so if p(e) is false, then we do not add -'p(c) to the program, but merely leave it out. 
Thus the signature used may include constant and function symbols which do not 
appear anywhere in the program. This is not a problem for SLD-resolution, as it 
only generates answer substitutions by unification, and so all symbols used in such 
answer substitutions must appear somewhere in the program. For this reason, we 
assume that each predicate has a signature, in the manner discussed earlier, so 
that we can tell what language may be used to construct answer substitutions. 
In this way the problem reduces to an exhaustiveness check in the sense that 
given a goal G, we wish to find, if possible, all instances of C which fail. This 
is the direct complement of the SLD-resolution process, as we may think of that 
as finding all instances of C which succeed. The signature is used to determine 
exactly what all the instances of C are. In what follows we assume that the goal 
is just an atom A, as we only allow negation to be applied to atoms, and that we 
wish to find instances of A which fail, i.e. we wish to find the instances of A which 
are not in the set of successful instances of A. 
Now if we are given the completion of the program, as described above, then 
our task is made easier, as we already have a computational description of the 
goals which fail. The only difficulty is the solution of inequations. This may be 
addressed by looking at it as an instance of the relative corn plernent problem, which 
may be stated as: given a term t and a set T of instances of t, find all instances of 
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t which are not instances of any term in T. As the formula x1  0 t1  V...  V x, 
is equivalent to the set of all instances of p(x1, . . . , x,) which are not instances 
of p(t 1,. . . t), we may use an algorithm for the relative complement problem to 
solve the inequations. 
The relative complement problem was addressed by Lassez and Marriott [59], 
and it was shown that an explicit finite representation of the relative complement 
may not exist. However, a criterion was given for determining when it is possible 
to give a finite representation of the relative complement, as well as an algorithm 
for finding the finite representation when it does exist. A parallel algorithm for 
this problem was given in [57]. 
This algorithm is not quite suitable for our purposes. In [59] the emphasis 
was on finding a representation of the entire relative complement; here we are 
interested in finding correct answer substitutions. Thus we may only need to 
produce one substitution, although subsequent failures in the search process may 
mean we need to backtrack over —p(x) and so search for another correct answer 
substitution. Our search for a correct answer substitution may not need to examine 
all of the relative complement, and so even if there is no finite representation, we 
may still be able to find what we want. Rarely will we need to enumerate all of 
the relative complement, and so we approach the problem in a slightly different 
way than was done in [59]. 
Another property important for inequation solving algorithms for logic pro-
gramming is that the algorithm be incremental, in that if the set of constraints 
increases, we wish to be able to use previous answers to solve the new problem, 
rather than recompute from scratch. In our case this means that if the relative 
complement of a given term t with respect to a set of terms T is computed, then 
we wish to be able to use this answer to reduce the amount of work needed to find 
the relative complement oft with respect to TUt', where t' is another instance of t. 
This will make our algorithm useful for wider applications, such as an inequation 
solver for a constraint logic programming language [48]. 
Even if the completion of the program is not available to us (for example, the 
principle of information hiding may mean that we do not have access to the code 
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for a certain program, but only to the answers it generates) we will still be able 
to use the incremental algorithm to generate answer substitutions by computing 
the relative complement of A with respect to the set of successful instances of A. 
The set of most general instances of A which succeed may be infinite, and this set 
will be generated incrementally, i.e. one such instance will be found, then another, 
and so on. If the set is infinite then the process will not terminate, and so we 
cannot merely sit and wait for this set to be produced. An incremental algorithm 
will allow us to produce successive approximations to the relative complement, so 
that if the enumeration of the successful instances of A terminates, then the most 
recent approximation becomes exact. 
An important observation is that in order to find an answer substitution we 
may need to consider a significant part of an infinite set of terms, as the relative 
complement of the success set may not be finitely representable, even if the set 
of successful instances of A is finitely representable. However, the desired answer 
may occur in a finitely representable subset of the relative complement, and so 
whilst the lack of a finite representation is a nuisance, it may suit our purpose to 
attempt the enumeration of an infinite representation. 
- 	For example, given the program 
even(0) 
Vxeven(x) D even(s2(x)) 
the set of successful instances is {even(s'(0)) I n is even }. It seems natural given 
the goal3x—even(x) to produce the answer substitution x - s(0), and then if 
another is required, x - s(0) etc. These substitutions may be "used" by other 
goals. Naturally, there is still some room for the delaying technique of Mu-Prolog, 
in that we may wish to compute answer substitutions from other goals and then 
check them using NAF. However, this technique can only be supplementary to the 
process described herein. 
In this way our algorithm is incremental and attempts to enumerate possible 
answers even when it is known that there is no explicit finite representation of the 
instances of A which fail. 
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There remains a problem of finite representation even when the success set 
is finite, or we have the completion of the program. As noted above, there may 
not be a finite set of answer substitutions which is complete, i.e. includes all 
correct answers. The reason that there may not be a finite representation of such 
instances is due to the possibility that different variables in A may be mapped 
in the success set to terms containing the same variable. For example, given the 
program Vzp(z, z), the goal xy-'p(x, y) and the signature {a/O, f/1}, then whilst 
the set of successful instances of p(x, y) is just {p(z, z)}, the relative complement 
of p(x, y) with respect to p(z, z) is 
{p(a, f()), p(f(), a), p(f(a), f(f())), p(f(f(...)), f(a)) . . .} 
where - is used to denote an arbitrary term. 
The problem is that we have to go deeper and deeper into the term in order to 
finitely specify the complement. A formalisation of this idea is given in [59]. The 
instances which cause this behaviour are called restricted in [59]. 
As noted above, we are interested in finding an answer substitution and hence 
one particular term of this set, one of these rather than a finite representation 
of all of them. However, due to the fact that we may need to backtrack over 
this substitution, we wish our algorithm to produce as many of these instances as 
desired. The way this is done is to enumerate all such terms of depth d, then all 
of depth d + 1, and so forth until the desired term is found, thus enumerating the 
relative complement of a term with respect to a restricted instance in a stratified 
way. 
In the light of this result, it is possible to argue that explicit substitutions are 
not desirable, and that some form of implicit representation of the answers should 
be used. The most prominent example of such a representation is constraints 
[48]. This is not quite the point at issue; whilst constraints do capture all possible 
answers in a finite representation, we may still want to look at some explicit an-
swers. Indeed, for the formula3x—p(x) to be intuitionistically provable we need 
to provide a witness, i.e. an explicit answer. As mentioned above, we do not nec-
essarily want all answers, as we are after a particular correct answer substitution 
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for existentially quantified goals, and so whilst we desire each substitution to be 
maximally general' (so that it is not an instance of some other correct answer 
substitution), we do not necessarily need to find all most general correct answer 
substitutions for the goal. Also, any constraint mechanism will still need some 
criterion and algorithm for giving an explicit answer where possible. For example, 
given the inequationsx 0 and x s(s(y)) we would expect to get the answer 
x = s(0). The algorithm below shows how this may be smoothly integrated with a 
general method of finding finitely representable subsets of a relative complement, 
which will be required by a constraint solver. Hence, any representation, be it 
substitutions or constraints, will need to address the issues raised above. 
Some other approaches to this problem have concentrated on representation 
of the solutions [15,16,53,110,96] or on a transformation approach [7,6]. We feel 
that whilst these are relevant issues, there is still a need to provide a method to 
generate explicit answers wIere possible, and for this method not to depend on 
restrictions to the class of programs. 
For example, given the program 
Vx lc(0,s(x)) 
VxVy le(x, y) D le(s(x), s(y)) 
and the goal x-ile(x, s(0)), an answer of x 	0 A x 54 s(0) is certainly correct, 
but conveys less information than the answer substitution x - S2 (y). In this 
way an answer of the form x t to a query may not be as informative as an 
explicit example of a term i'  such that ' t. Also, it seems that such a method 
of generating explicit answers should not depend upon structural properties of the 
program, but purely in terms of what succeeds and fails. Thus all that is important 
is to give an algorithm that produces answer substitutions for non-ground negated 
atoms. 
'We wish to return the substitution x - s(y), rather than x f-  s(0), x - s2(0) 
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In this way our philosophy is similar to that of Maluszyriski and Näslund [68], in 
that we need only consider the operational behaviour of the program. However, as 
will be seen, we do not use an explicit constraint, but rather stratify the production 
of the answers until all the required answers have been found. 
4.2 Definitions 
We assume that there are a countable number of distinct new variables available. 
We denote variables by v, w, x, y, z,..., constants by a, b,..., and function symbols 
by f, g.....As in Prolog, we use - to denote distinct variables whose names are of 
no interest. Hence, f(x, y) and f(, -) denote the same term. We say that a term t 
is a function term if t is neither a variable nor a constant, so that t = f(t1,. . . t,) 
with n > 0. 
As noted in [59], we often think of a term as a finite representation of the set 
of all its instances, so that a term t may represent either the syntactic term t or {t 
o 10 is a substitution}. This may be thought of as some sort of implicit universal 
quantification of the variables appearing in t. It will always be clear from the 
context whether we mean the term itself or the set of its instances. 
We use the notation t/T to denote the set of all instances of t which do not 
have any instance in common with any term in T, where T is a set of terms. Thus 
i/T represents an implicit generalisation in the terminology of [59]. We will often 
refer to t/T as a relative complement problem. When T is just a singleton set {t'} 
we write t/t'. We also use the obvious generalisation T1/T2 to denote the set of all 
instances of any term in T1 which do not have any instance in common with any 
term in T2. Hence t E T1/T2 means that I is an instance of some term in T1 , and t 
is not an instance of any term in T2. We use term(t/T) to denote t and rest(t/T) 
to denote T, and for convenience we define term(t) = t, and rest(t) = 0. 
It is obvious that if I and I' do not unify then t/t' = {t}. 
As we are dealing with an implicit form of negation, we need a notion of 
signature to explain precisely which terms are under consideration. 
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Definition 4.2.1 Let E be a signature. For any f/n e E we denote by (f/n) 
the term f(x1,. . . xi,), where the ; are distinct new variables. 
We denote by > the set of all ground terms which may be constructed from 
E. Thus if E is the signature of all function and constant symbols used in the 
program, >1 is the Herbrand Universe U. When the value of n is obvious from 
the context (e.g. for a constant) we will often write f/n as just f. We denote 
{(f/n) 	f/n e E} by 	. For a term t which is not a variable, we denote by 
symbol(t) the outermost symbol of t. For example, symbol(f(a, g(b))) = f. 
As pointed out in [59], the relative complement of f(t) with respect to some 
set of instances T is always impossible to represent explicitly when there are an 
infinite number of symbols in the signature, and is trivial to compute when 
contains only constants, and so the only interesting case is when E is finite and 
contains constants and a function symbol of non-zero arity (thus ensuring, in the 
absence of typing, that the Herbrand Universe is infinite). For this reason the 
algorithm given below assumes that E is finite. It may be possible to somehow 
extend the algorithm below to cope with infinite signatures, but it is difficult to 
see how such an extension would be useful. 
We use the definition of a restricted instance from [59], given below. We denote 
by vars(t) the set of all variables which appear in t. 
Definition 4.2.2 An instance tO oft is a restricted instance oft if any variable 
appears more than once in the sequence v10,. . .v,O where vars(t) = {v1,. . 
Otherwise tO is an unrestricted instance of t. 
Note that a restricted instance t' of t imposes more dependencies between the 
variables of t than does t itself. For example, f(z, z, z) is a restricted instance of 
f(x, y, y), but f(a, g(z), g(z)) is an unrestricted instance of f(x, y, y). 
The predicate restricted(t, t') is true if t' is a restricted instance of t. Similarly, 
the predicate unify(t, t') is true if t and t' are unifiable. Note that t and t' have 
a common instance if t and t' unify, and that if 0 is the most general unifier of t 
and t' then the most general instance mgi(t, t') is given by tO = t'O. 
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If t' is a restricted (unrestricted) instance of t, then t/t' is a restricted (unre-
stricted) relative complement. 
We will find it convenient to use the following extended form of substitution. 
Definition 4.2.3 Given two terms t' and t", we define the substitution t' 4-- t" by 
If t' is a variable then t[t' - t"] is t with all occurrences of t' replaced simultane-
ously by t" 
If t' is a constant then t[t' *- t"] = t 
If t' is a function term and t' and t" are not unifiable then t[t' +- t"] = t 
If t' is a function term and t' and t" are unifiable with t' = f(t1 . . . t,) and t" = 
f(s1,... s,) then t[t' - t"] is the simultaneous application of the substitutions 
[t14—s1} ... [t4—s] tot 
For example, g(f(x, x), y)[f(a, x) 4_-f(y, b)J = g(f(b, b), y). 
This may be thought of as using the two terms to induce a substitution so that 
t' imitates t" whilst remaining an instance of t'. This imitation can be exact when 
t' is a variable, but is less so when t' is a function term. We will see how this is 
used later. 
We denote the empty list by [], and concatenation by A.B, so that A.B is a 
list with head A and tail B. We use head(List) and tail(List) to denote the usual 
list destructor functions, so that head(A.B) = A, tail(A.B) = B. 
We denote by refresh(t) the same term t except that each variable occurrence 
in t is replaced by a new distinct variable, i.e. refresh(f(x, x)) = f(y, z). 
Definition 4.2.4 If t and refresh(t') are unifiable, then we define ref (t, t') as {s}, 
where s is the most general instance oft and refresh(t). Otherwise, ref (t,t') is the 
empty set. 
We also define 
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ref (t, T) = U ref (t, t') 
VET 
ref (S, T) = U ref (s, T) 
sES 
We will often refer to ref (t, t') as just s, rather than the set whose only element 
is S. 
Note that t/rcf (t, t') is an unrestricted relative complement. This is due to the 
fact that the variables in refresh(t') are only made identical in ref (t, t') in the way 
that the variables in refresh(t) are made identical in mgi(t, refresh(t)). Thus no 
new dependencies are introduced, and hence ref (t, t') is an unrestricted instance 
of t. 
This allows use to break the problem down somewhat. For example, for the 
relative complement f(x, y)/f(g(z), g(z)) with E = {a/O, g/1}, we wish to produce 
{f(a, .), f(..., a), f(g(x),g(y))/f(g(z),g(z))} 
Note that 
ref (f(x,y),f(g(z),g(z))= f(g(x),g(y)) 
and so 
f(x, y)/ref(f(x, y), f(g(z), g(z))) = If (a, .), f(, a)} 
and that 
f(x, y)/f(g(z), g(z)) = f(x, y)/f(g(x'), g(y')) U f(g(x'), g(y'))/f(g(z), g(z)) 
It is this reduction which allows us to stratify the production of the relative 
complement t/t' when t' is a restricted instance of t. This idea is formalised in 
lemma 4.3.6. 
For an atom A, we denote by .succeeds(A) the set {AO J A succeeds with answer 
substitution O}. This may be an infinite set, as in the case of the program given 
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above for the even predicate. We denote by match(A) the set of all atoms which 
are the head of some clause in the program and unify with A.. 
The following definition will be useful when we consider restricted instances. 
Definition 4.2.5 Let I be a term over the signature E. If I is non-ground, then 
strata(t) = { i[x2 +- t] 	I tj E E'J, where vars(t) = {x1,. . . x}. Otherwise, 
strata(t) = M. 
The reason for the name strata is that if I is non-ground (i.e. contains a variable) 
then each term in strata(t) has depth one greater than that of I, as each variable 
is replaced by a term from E+.  Thus we penetrate one level deeper into the term 
I, and so strata(t) contains all instances of I of no more than a given depth, and so 
we can stratify the instances of I in this way. This allows us to give some answer 
substitutions when it is impossible to enumerate all of them, as discussed below. 
4.3 Preliminaries 
Before we present the algorithm itself, we show some useful lemmas. 
The first is an easy result about the relative complement. 
Lemma 4.3.1 Let I and I' be two terms. Then either t/t' = {i} or t and t' are 
unifiable with I/i' = i/mgi(t,t'). 
Proof: If t and t' are not unifiable, then t and I' have no instances in common, and 
so there is no instance of t which is an instance of I', i.e. i/t' = {t}. 
Otherwise, t and I' are unifiable, and hence have a most general common 
instance, mgi(i, I'). As mgi(t, t') is an instance of t', we have that t/t' ç 
I/rn gi(t, t'). Now let I" E I/mgi (I, t'). Then I" is an instance of I, but t" is 
not an instance of mgi(t, t'), and as any common instance of t and t' is an 
instance of mgi(t, I'), we must have t" is not an instance of t', i.e. I" E i/I'. 
Thus I/i' = t/mgi(t,t'). 
Chapter 4. Answer Substitutions for Negated Goals 	 121 . 
The next lemma, although trivial to prove, is important for computational 
purposes. 
Lemma 4.3.2 Let T1 and T2 be sets of terms, and let t be a term. Then 
t/(T1 U T2) =(t/T1)/T2 = (t/T2)/T1. 
This ensures that we can compute t/T via a loop like 
Inst := t; 
for each t' E T do 
Inst 	Inst/t' 
This also ensures that our algorithm will be incremental, as once we have 
t/{t17 . . .,t,}, we know that t/{t1,. .. 7t,t+11 =(t/{4,. . 
Another result which will be useful later is the following one, also trivial to 
prove. 
Lemma 4.3.3 Let t, t j and t2 be terms. Then 
{t1,t2 }/t = (t1/t) U (t2/t). 
A less trivial result is the following one, which gives a structural result for 
unrestricted instances, which means that we may use a localised procedure to 
calculate an unrestricted relative complement. 
Lemma 4.3.4 Let t' be an unrestricted instance oft, where t = f(t1,. . . t) and 
t'=f(s1,...$). Then for any l<k<n we have 
= {t[tk 	t") I t E tk/Sk} U t[tk S' SkJ/t'. 
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Proof: We proceed by first showing that for any 1 < k < n, {t[tk - t"J I t" E 
tk/Sk} ut[tk 4- S/]/t' ç t/t', and then the reverse inclusion. 
C: If u e t[tk <-- .Sk]!t, then u is an instance of I and not an instance of I', 
and so u e t/t'. 
If u e {t[tk ~-- t"] I t" E tk!sk}, then it is obvious that u is an instance 
of t. Let Uk be the kth argument of u. Now for some t" E tkl.Sk we have 
U = t[tk - t"]. Thus Uk is not an instance of 3k, which means that u is 
not an instance of I', i.e. u E lit'. 
: Let u e t/t', and let the ith argument of u be u. As u is an instance 
of t, we have tO = u for some substitution 0. Thus we have tkO = Uk 
for any 1 < k < n, and that if 0k is the restriction of 0 to the variables 
which appear in tk, then 0k = [tk 4-- Uk], and so u = tO is an instance of 
tOk = t [tk 4— Uk]. 
Now if Uk is not an instance of 3k then as Uk must be an instance of tk 
(as u is an instance oft), we have that Uk tk/Sk, and so u {t[tk 4-
t"] I t" E tk/Sk}. 
If u, is an instance of 5k, then as t' is an unrestricted instance of t, we 
know that the variables of t' which appear in si are only introduced to 
I' by the substitution [I - s}, and so u is an instance of t[tk - ak]. 
Ii 
To see why this result is important computationally, consider the case when we 
wish to find the unrestricted relative complement t/s, where t = f(t 1,. . . t) and 
s = f(s1,.. . s,). The above result allows us to search locally, so that we first look 
for instances of t1 which are not instances of s, and having found such a term t', 
we then produce the term t[t1 - t'] as an answer to the original problem. Once all 
such terms t' have been found, we have then found all of the relative complement 
such that t1 0 s, and so we apply the substitution [t - s1] to t before proceeding 
to do the same for t2 and S2 and so on. 
Now let us examine the possible cases for t j and s. 
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If ti is a constant c, then there are no instances of 1, other than c, and so we 
can get no information from this case (note that s- must then be c, as s is 
an instance of t). 
If si is a variable, then we have a similar case, as ti must also be a variable, 
and so again no information may be deduced. 
If t1 is a variable and .s1 is not a variable, we may produce an answer t[t1 f-
ft ], for each f/n E K such that f .symbol(s). Hence, it remains only to 
consider the relative complement symbol(s1)+/s, which is the same as the 
case when both ti and si are function terms, which is dealt with below. 
If t2 is a function term, then so is s, and symbol(t) = symbol(s). This case 
corresponds exactly to the original case of t/s, and so we use the algorithm 
recursively at this point. Note that as s is an unrestricted instance of t, 
.s, is an unrestricted instance of t, as if there are no repeated variables in 
v10,. . . v,O where vars(t) = {v1,. . . v,} and 0 is the mgu oft and s, then there 
can be no repeated variables in v0,. . . v'O where vars(t) = {v,.. . v}. 
Thus the restricted condition may be thought of as global; if the initial 
problem is unrestricted, then so are any sub-problems generated from it. 
Thus for the unrestricted problem we may use this localised procedure to find 
relative complement. The reason that s must be an unrestricted instance for this 
procedure to work is that we know that there are no extra dependencies between 
the variables of s when compared with those of t, and so the structure of the two 
terms is similar. For example, let E be {a/O,g/1} and consider the two relative 
complements f(x,x)/f(g(z),g(z)) and f(x,y)/f(g(z),g(z)). Note that the first 
case involves an unrestricted instance and the second a restricted instance. 
For the first case, we find all instances of x which are not instances of g(z), 
which is just a, giving the partial answer {f(a, a)}, and then having found all 
instances of x which differ from g(z) the problem may be easily reduced to to 
f(g(z),g(z))/f(g(z),g(z)) = 0 and we are done. Thus the similarity of structure 
between f(x, x) and f(g(z), g(z)) ensures that the localisation produces the right 
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answer, as the problem reduces to finding all instances of x which are not instances 
of g(z). 
In the second case, the localised procedure alone is not sufficient. Firstly, (ig-
noring the unrestrictedness requirement), we again find all instances of x which 
are not instances of g(z), i.e. a, and so we get the partial answer {f(a,y)}. 
The procedure above suggests that we then proceed to the relative complement 
f(g(z),y)/f(g(z),g(z)), and so look for instances of y which are not instances 
of g(z), i.e. a, giving another partial answer If (a, y), f(g(z), a)}. We have now 
reached the end, as we are left with f(g(z),g(z))/f(g(z),g(z)). However, we do 
not have f(x,y)/f(g(z),g(z)) = {f(a,y),f(g(z),a)}, as f(g(a),g(g(a))) is an in-
stance of f(x,y) which is not an instance of f(g(z),g(z)), and so f(g(a),g(g(a))) e 
f(x, y)/f(g(z),g(z)), but it is not an instance of either f(a, y) or f(g(z), a). Hence, 
this simple procedure will only work for unrestricted instances, although it may 
be used as a method of generating some but not all of the relative complement of 
a restricted instance, as the answers returned will be correct but not complete. 
The problem is that a restricted instance produces more dependencies between 
variables than exist in the original term. In the above example, the most general 
unifier of the two terms binds x and y to terms containing a shared variable, and 
so there is a global connection between the two, which is ignored by the localised 
procedure. As hinted above, we may use the localised procedure to produce partial 
answers for the restricted case, but we need to do more work in order to produce 
all possible answers. This idea is formalised in the following lemmas, which give 
structural results which are important for computational purposes. 
Lemma 4.3.5 Let t' be an instance oft. Then 
refit, t') is not the empty set 
.s is an unrestricted instance oft, where {s} = ref (t,t') 
t' is a instance of s, where {s} = ref (t,t') 
Proof: 
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It is clear that t' is an instance of refresh(t'), and as t' is an instance of 
t, t and refresh(t') have a common instance, and so mgi (t , refresh(t, t')) 
exists, i.e. reJI:t,  t') is not the empty set. 
Let rejt, t') = {s}. As s = mgi(t, refresh(t')), s must be an instance 
of t. As there are no repeated variables in refresh(t'), the most general 
unifier 0 of refresh(t') and t can only bind the variables of t to terms 
containing different variables, and hence there are no repeated vari-
ables in v10,.. . vO where vars(t) = {vi , . . . v,}, i.e. s is an unrestricted 
instance of t. 
As t' is an instance of refresh(t') and of t, t' is an instance of s. 
Lemma 4.3.6 Let t' be an instance oft. Then 
t/t' = t/ref (t, t') U ref (t, t')/t'. 
Proof: 	From lemma 4.3.5 it follows that ref (t, t') is not the empty set. Let 
ref(t,t') be {s}. 
2: If t" e t/ref(t,t'), then t" is an instance of t but not of s, and from 
lemma 4.3.5 we have that t' is an instance of .s, and so t" is not an 
instance of t'. 
If t" E ref (t, t')/t', then t" is an instance of s but not of t', and from 
lemma 4.3.5 we have that s is an instance of t, and so t" is an instance 
of t. 
In either case we have that t" t/t'. 
C: Assume t" E t/t', and so t" is an instance of t but not of t'. If t" is an 
instance of s, then t" E ref (t, t')/t'. Otherwise, t" is not an instance of 
s, and hence t" e t/ref(t,t'). 
In either case we have t" E t/ref (t, t') U ref (t, t') It'. 
0 
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A generalisation of this result is given below. 
Lemma 4.3.7 Let {t1 ,.. .t} be a set of instances oft. Then 
t/{t1 ,. . . t,} = i/ref (t, It,,... t}) U ref(t, It,,... t})/{t1 ,. . . t,} 
Proof: We proceed by induction on n. The base case follows immediately from 
lemma 4.3.6. Hence, we assume that the lemma holds for all values less than 
a given size. We will write ref (t, {t, . . . t}) as rk. Now 
t/{t1,. . . t,} = (t/{11 ,. . . t_1 })/t by lemma 4.3.2 
= ((i/r....1 Ur_1/{t1  ... . t 1 })/t, by the hypothesis 
= (t/t)/r_1 U r_1 /{t1 . . . t} by lemmas 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 
= ((t/ref (I, t) U ref(t, i)/t)/r_1 U r,_/ {ti . . . t} by lemma 4.3.6 
= t/r Uref(t,t)/{t,r_1 } Ur_1/{t1  ... . t} by lemma 4.3.2 
The result will then follow if we can show that 
ref 	 = 
ref (t,t)/{t1 ,...i} Ur_1/{t1  .... t} 
as the latter is just 
r/{t1  .... t} 
from lemma 4.3.3. 
Now from lemma 4.3.5, ti is an instance of s where {s} = ref(t, t.), and so 
ref(t, t)/{t, r_1 } c ref(t, t)/{t1 ,. . . t} 
which establishes one direction of the desired equality. 
Let {s} = ref (t, ti). 
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For the other direction, consider t' E ref (t,t)/{t1,.. . t}, so that t' is not 
an instance of any t 2. If t' is an instance of s j for some 1 < j < n - 1, then 
as t' is not an instance of any t, t' E r_1/{t1,. . . t,}. Otherwise, t' is not 
an instance of any t, 1 < j < n - 1, and so as t' is an instance of .s, we 
have that t' E ref (t,t)/{t,r_1 }. Thus we have that 
ref (t,t)/{t1  .. . . t,} C ref(t,t)/{t,r_1 } U r_/{t . . .t}. 
Hence 
r/{t1,.. .t} = ref (t,t)/{t,r_1 } U r,_1/{t . . . t,} 
which in turn shows that 
t/{t1,. . . t,} = t/r U r/{t1,. . . t,} 
and so the lemma is true for n. 
Thus by induction we get the result. 
U 
The next lemma is also important computationally. 
Lemma 4.3.8 Let t' be an instance oft. Then t/t' = t/strata(t'). 
Proof: Clearly every ground instance oft' is an instance of an element of strata (t'), 
and vice-versa, and hence t/t' = t/strata(t') 
	
U 
These results suggest that when dealing with the case when s is a restricted in-
stance of t, we should produce some possible answers, and then leave the problem 
in an intermediate state so that we may resume computation later if more answers 
are desired. For a term t = f(t1 . . . t) and a restricted instance s = f(s1,. . . Sn), 
the first step is to break the problem up as suggested by lemma 4.3.6, i.e. we 
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reduce i/s to t/ref(t,$) U ref (t,$)/s. By lemma 4.3.5, t/ref(t,$) is an unre-
stricted relative complement, and so we may use the procedure outlined above 
to produce some answers. By lemma 4.3.6, t/s = t/ref(t,$) U ref (t,$)/s, and 
as i/s is restricted and t/ref(t, s) is unrestricted, we must have that ref (t, s)/s 
is a restricted relative complement, as otherwise the restricted relative comple- 
ment i/s would be finitely representable, contradicting the quoted result in [59]. 
Thus ref (t, s)/s is a restricted relative complement, and so the next step is to 
reduce ref (t, s)/s to ref (t, s)/strata(s), as suggested by lemma 4.3.8. Hence, we 
need to generate the terms strata(s) = {f(s1 . . . s,)[x1 	g+]'.fl I g E El where 
vars(s) = {x 1,. . . X}. Next we divide strata(s) into two disjoint sets U and R 
such that for each t' E U, ref (t, s)/t' is an unrestricted relative complement, and 
that for each t' E R, ref (t, s)/t' is a restricted relative complement. In this way 
the problem is reduced to T/R, where T = ref (t, s)/U. Now we may consider that 
this has reduced the problem enough, and that we may leave T/R as a reasonable 
continuation of the problem which may be resumed later. However, we go a little 
further that this, as there may be terms in T which do not unify with anything in 
R, and so these terms lead to answers which will not take much effort to produce. 
Hence, TIll = T1 U (T2/R) where T1 is the set of all terms in T which do not unify 
with any term in R. The final step before we leave this problem is to reduce T2/R 
to T2/ref(T2, R) U ref (T2, R)/R, which ensures that all answers of the same depth 
are found at once. We then leave ref (T2, R)/R as the continuation of the problem 
which may be resumed later if more answers are needed. 
In this way, we can use the twofold technique of first considering s as an unre-
stricted instance of I, producing the solutions so generated, and then substituting 
for all the variables in s, finding what solutions there may be, and then leaving 
another restricted relative complement problem behind, which may be attacked 
later to provide further answers. Thus we work our way through the infinite num-
ber of possibilities by first finding all answers such that variables first appear at 
depth d (the depth of the term s), then those in which they first appear at depth 
d + 1, then at depth d + 2 and so forth. Thus the level at which variables appear 
in the answers is always increasing. 
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For example, to find f(x,y)/f(z,z) where E = {a/0,g/1}, we proceed as 
follows: 
First, we generate refresh(f(z,z)) = f(.,), and find f(x,y)/f(_,..) = 0. 
Next, we find strata(f(z,z)) = {f(a,a),f(g(w),g(w))}, and so we proceed to 
(f(x, y)/f(a, a))/f(g(w), g(w)). Now f(x, y)/f(a, a) is an unrestricted problem, 
and so we get that this is just {f(g(_),_),f(a,g(_))}, and so the overall problem 
is now {f(g(_),_),f(a,g(_))}/f(g(w),g(w)). This is the stage referred to above 
as T/R. Now as f(a,g(_)) does not unify with f(g(w),g(w)) we may reduce this 
to {f(a,g(_)} U f(g(_),_)/f(g(w),g(w)). It is now that we perform the final "re-
fresh" step, in that we reduce f(g(_),_)/f(g(w),g(w)) to f(g(_),_)/f(g(_),g()) U 
f(g(_),g(..))/f(g(w),g(w)). The first relative complement is easily seen to be just 
{f(g(_),a)}, and so we finally arrive at f(x,y)/f(z,z) = {f(a,g(_),f(g(.),a)} U 
f(g(_),g(_))/f(g(w),g(w))}. Note that any term in the remaining relative com-
plement has variables appearing at level 4 or more. Hence, the known structure 
of the answers is always increasing. 
Note that the sets of terms if (a, ), f(g(_), a)} and {f(a, ), f(..., a)} "cover" 
the same set of instances, in that for the signature E, the set of all term which 
are an instance of either term in the first set is the. same as the set of all terms 
which are an instance of either term in the second set. However, the first set has 
the useful property that the two representative terms do not unify, and so have 
no instances in common. Thus we have a more specific representation than in the 
second case. 
We can ensure that the computational process has a similar partition property, 
i.e. that no two terms in the explicit representation are unifiable. For the unre-
stricted relative complement t/t', consider {t[t +- t"] I t" e t./s1 }. We may think 
of this as the set of all instances of t for which the kth subterm is not an instance 
of 8k  Certainly no instance of t [tk - SkI/t is unifiable with any instance of any 
term in {t[t[k - t"]  I t" e k/Sk}, and so we only need to establish the partition 
property for this latter set. 
If tk is a variable and Sk is a function or constant, then the finite representation 
Of tk/Sk will include any term t" E E such that syrnbol(t") 	syrnbol(sk). As 
Chapter 4. Answer Substitutions for Negated Goals 	 130 
the partition property holds for 	, then it will hold for any terms of the form 
t{tk - t"J where t" E 
Hence, if we only generate the representation of t/s in the above manner, i.e. 
substituting terms from E for tk when tk is a variable and Sk is not a vari-
able, then the above argument shows that the partition property will hold for the 
relative complement. Note that we only generate explicit representations from 
unrestricted complements, and so this establishes the partition property for any 
relative complement. That this is indeed the case here may be seen from the 
algorithm below. 
Thus the process partitions the instances, and so ensures that none of the terms 
representing the relative complement "overlap". 
4.4 The Incremental Algorithm 
Firstly we present the incremental algorithm for the relative complement problem. 
We then give a formal proof of the algorithm's correctness. 
The code for the incremental solution of the relative complement problem 
is given below. We present the algorithm in the style of a producer/consumer 
environment, in that we assume that there is some consumer process waiting 
for the output, and that when enough output has been generated, the consumer 
process will kill this producer. Thus we imagine that the extension of the SLD-
resolution process will use the substitutions generated in the same way as any 
other, i.e. when a substitution is found, it is applied to the rest of the goal and the 
next sub-goal is attempted. If subsequently a failure occurs, then on backtracking 
to this goal we wish for another substitution to be produced, if possible, and then 
to proceed as before. Backtracking may also be asked for by the user, as it may be 
desirable to see some of the possible answers. In either case, the resolution process 
will control the action of the process which generates the substitutions, killing it 
when no more are needed. 
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The procedure complement (Term, Restr, Inst, Cont) below calculates the rela-
tive complement Term/Restr, giving the explicit answer Inst, and implicit answer 
Cont, so that Cont is another relative complement problem which may be at-
tempted later in order to produce more solutions to the original problem. 
When Term/Restr is an unrestricted relative complement, then Cont is the 
empty set and Inst is a finite representation of the relative complement. 
procedure complement (Term,Restr, Inst ,Cont) 
Cont := 0; Inst := Term; 
for each t' E Restr do 
Approx := 0; 
for each t E Inst do 
if not unify(t, t') then 
Approx := Approx U {t}); 
else 
:= mgi(t,t'); 
if re.stricted(t, t') then 
Ref:=z ref(t,t'); 
call complement({i}, Ref, Ansi, ); 
Approx := Approx U Ansi; 
U := Is e strata(t) I unrestricted(Ref,$)}; 
R := Is E strata(t') I restricted(Ref,$)}; 
call complement(Ref, U, T, ); 
T2 	{ t E T I 3r E R such that t unifies with r }; 
T1 T\T2; 
Approx := Approx U T1); 
call complement(T2, ref (T2, R), Ans2, ); 
Approx := Approx U Ans2; 
Cont := ref (T2/R)/R; 
else 
if t' is not a variable and t is not a constant then 
if t is a variable then 
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/ 	 . 	+ for each t 	(>\ {symbol (t )/arzty(t/ )}) do 
Approx := Approx U {t"}; 
1 t 	(syrnbol(t )/arzty(t))+  
MI 
for each i E f  . . . arity(t')} do 
t 	ith argument of t; s := ith argument of t'; 
call complement ({t1}, {s},  Ans,  ); 
for each t" E Ans do 
Approx := Approx U {t[t1 — 






Inst := Approx; 
rof 
erudecorp 
We now show that the procedure complement is correct. First we show that it 
always terminates, and then we prove that all the correct answers are found. 
Lemma 4.4.1 The procedure complement 
always terminates. 
always returns finite sets in the variables Inst and Cont 
Proof: The termination of the two outer loops is immediate, as Inst is not altered 
within the inner loop, and Restr is not altered in the outer loop, and both 
lists are finite. Thus termination will follow if we can show that the procedure 
halts for the two terms t and t'. 
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The proof proceeds in two phases. In the first we show by induction on the 
depth of t' that the procedure halts when t' is an unrestricted instance of t. 
In the second phase we show that this is also the case when t' is a restricted 
instance of t. Notice that the predicates unify(t, t') and restricted(t, t') are 
both decidable and so cause no termination problems, and also that mgi(t, t') 
may be easily computed from the most general unifier. 
It is also obvious that ref (t, t') and .strata(t') cause no termination problems, 
as both may be easily computed. 
The second part of the statement will be shown if we can ensure that only 
finite sets are added to Approx. 
Firstly, assume that t' is an unrestricted instance of t. The if section obvi-
ously terminates and only adds a finite set to Approx, and so we concentrate 
on the for loop. The base case occurs when t' is a constant or a variable. If 
t' is a variable then termination is obvious. If t' is a constant, then we need 
only show that the for loop terminates, which is obvious as arity(t') = 0, 
and so the for loop will not be entered. Obviously, the finite set condition is 
met. 
For the inductive case, the only difference is when t' is a function. As arity(t') 
is finite, we need only show that the recursive call to complement terminates. 
As the depth of si is less than that of t', by the inductive hypothesis we have 
that it terminates. 
The subsequent for loop must terminate, as Ans must be finite by the induc 
tive hypothesis, and so the finite set condition holds for the inductive case 
as well. 
Thus we have that the procedure must halt for any t, t' where t' is an 
unrestricted instance of t, and that the variables Inst and Cont are assigned 
values which are finite sets. 
Secondly, assume that I' is a restricted instance of t. The recursive calls 
to complement must terminate, as each of the three is made with an unre- 
stricted relative complement problem. As noted above, the functions strata 
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and ref and the predicates restricted and unrestricted cause no termination 
problems, and so the procedure complement defined above always terminates 
for restricted relative complement problems. 
The finite set condition must hold also, as we know that it holds for the 
unrestricted case, and so the sets Ansi, T and Ans2 must all be finite, and 
so must T1, being a subset of a finite set, and so only finite sets are ever 
appended to Approx. 
Thus the procedure halts for any t, t' where t' is a restricted instance of t, 
and so from this and the above result, we get the termination of complement 
in all cases, as well as the finite set condition. 	 19 
We now turn to the more difficult task of proving the correctness of the above 
procedure. Consider first the code fragment 
procedure complement (Term, Restr,Inst, Cont) 
Contlist := 0; Inst := Term; 
for each t' E Restr do 
Approx := 0; 
for each t € Inst do 
update Approx and Cont as appropriate 
Inst := Approx; 
rof 
erudecorp 
This code is precisely the code from procedure complement above with most 
of the body replaced by the line beginning "update ...". This code will be correct 
provided that Approx and Cont are updated correctly, as given some I', we cal-
culate the value of I/I' for each element I E Inst, adding it to Approx each time, 
and when Inst is exhausted, we may use Approx rather than go back to Term by 
the fact that t/{t1,t2} = {t/t1 }/t 2 . Thus we only need to prove correct the code 
that updates Approx and Cont. 
Proposition 4.4.2 The procedure complement always returns all correct answers. 
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Proof: From the above discussion and lemma 4.4.1, we need only consider the 
correctness for two terms t and t'. 
lit and t' are not unifiable, then t and t' have no instances in common, and 
so there is no instance of t which is an instance of t'. Hence, t/t' = {t}, and 
so we add {t} to Approx. Otherwise, t and t' are unifiable, and from lemma 
4.3.1 we have that t/t' = t/rngi (t, t'). 
Thus the assignment t' := mgi(t, t') is correct. 
As before, the proof now divides into two phases, one for the unrestricted 
case and the second for the restricted case. 
First, we assume that t' is an unrestricted instance of t. 
We proceed by induction on the depth of t'. The base case occurs when t' 
is a constant or a variable. If t' is a variable then nothing happens, which 
is correct as t must then be a variable too, and so t/t' = 0. If t' is a 
constant and so is t, again nothing happens, and nothing should, as again 
t/t' = 0. Otherwise, t is a variable, and so t/t' = E+\t/,  which is the same as 
(E\{symbol(t')}), as t' is a constant. Now arity(t') = 0, and so nothing is 
done by the for loop and so {t[t - t"] J t" E t/t'} is added to Approx, which 
is correct. 
For the inductive case, assuine that complement is correct for all terms less 
than depth m, and let t' have depth m. As t' is an instance of t, we note 
that t must have depth no more than m. The only interesting case is when 
t' is a function term. 
If t is a variable, then (E\{symbol(t')}) is added to Approx. This addition 
is the same as {t[t - t"] jt" e t/t'}. Next t is updated to symbol (t'), and so 
if the case when t is a function is correct, this will ensure that symbol(t1)+/t 
is added to Approx, and as 
(E\{symbol(t')}) U symbol (t')/t' = +/t' = i/I' 
we know that Approx is updated correctly. 
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If t1 is a function term, then by lemma 4.3.4 we know that the operation of 
the for loop is correct, i.e. that it is correct to compute t 1 /s1 and then apply 
the substitutions [t 1 - t"] to t, where t" G t/s, and so forth for all the 
other arguments of t. Hence, we need only show that each iteration performs 
correctly. 
Now Approx is updated by {t[t2 - t"] I t" E t 2 /s}, which is correct. t 
becomes t[t1 - si ], which, by the above discussion, is also correct. 
Hence, by induction we get that the procedure complement is correct when 
t' is an unrestricted instance of t. 
Next, we assume that t' is a restricted instance of t. Now from lemma 4.3.6 
we know that t/t' = t/ref(t, t') U ref (t, t')/t', and by lemma 4.3.8 this is 
just t/ref (t, t') U ref (t, t')/strata(t'). Hence, the first update to Approx is 
correct as it adds the former of these two relative complements. Now if 
strata (t') = U U R where unrestricted(ref(t, t'), u) holds for each u E U and 
restricted(ref(t, t'), r) holds for each r E R, then by lemma 4.3.2 we have 
ref (t, t')/strata(t') = (ref (t, t')/U)/R. Thus the second call to complement 
is correct, as it calculates T = ref (t, t') U, which is an unrestricted relative 




If t" does not unify with any element of R, then t"/R = {t"}, and so 
T/R = T1 U (T2/R), where T1 is the set of such terms t". Hence the sec-
ond update to Approx is correct. Finally, from lemma 4.3.7 we get that 
T2/R = T2/ref(T2, R) U ref (T2, R)/R. As the first is an unrestricted rel-
ative complement, the third call to complement and update to Approx is 
correct. Thus T2/ref(T2, R) may be given an explicit representation, and so 
the only remaining relative complement problem is ref (T2, R)/R. Hence we 
get 
t/t' = t/ref(t, t') U T1 U T2/ref (T2, R) U ref (T2, R)/R 
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where strata W) = U U R, and T1 U T2 = ref (t, t')/U. 
Thus all the updates to Approx are correct, and Cont is updated correctly. 
0 
Thus we see that our algorithm performs as claimed. 
Now in order to apply the above algorithm to the generation of answer substi-
tutions, we proceed by finding the relative complement of the goal with respect to 
the set of successful instances, i.e. the set of answers. Now if the set of instances 
of p(t1, . . . t,) which succeed is computable and finite, then it is clear that any ele-
ment of p(t1 ,. . . t)/succeeds(p(t1 ,. . . t,)) is an instance of p(t 1 ,. . . t,) which fails, 
and so we may use the above algorithm to find answer substitutions for existen-
tially quantified negated goals. In the case of the completion of a program, we may 
consider the above process as solving the inequations in an incremental fashion, so 
that the solution to previous inequalities may be used to solve later inequalities. 
To see this, consider that the negative part of each predicate definition is of the 
form 
k 
Vx1 ,. . . x, -'p(x1.... x,) C 	V contr(fails(G1))) 
which may be re-written as 
k 
Vx1,. . . X. -'p(x1,. . . x,) C 	V (E1 A contr(fai1s(G)))) 
Hence we use the algorithm to solve the inequations, and the usual process for 
the rest of the goal. Now one possible correct answer for the goal -'p(t1,... , t) is 
given by the relative complement 
p(t 1,.. . , t)/{p(t11,.. . , t1 ), p(t21,.. . , t2 ),. . . ,p(tkl,. . . , tk fl)} 
where E1 = 	t 1 A ... A x, = tin. As we have to find an answer substitution 
which is valid for each conjunct, one way to proceed is to find a substitution for 
the first conjunct, and then use the next conjunct to refine this substitution in 
such a way that the refined substitution is a correct answer substitution for both 
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conjuncts, and so on. This process of refinement is what happens in the normal 
derivation process for conjuncts; an answer substitution for B1 is found, say 01, 
and then we search for an answer substitution for B201, and if one is found, say 
02, we continue the process for B30102 and so forth until all the conjuncts are 
exhausted or the refinement fails, in which case there is no answer substitution 
for the conjunct. The incremental property of our algorithm allows the process of 
generating answer substitutions from the inequations to be smoothly integrated 
into the derivation process; when processing each conjunct, we may choose either 
of two refinement techniques - one for the relevant relative complement problem, 
the other for the substitution generated by the success of the goal B1. A non-
incremental algorithm would not be able to use this simple procedure, as it would 
need to know in advance which conjuncts will be chosen to solve the inequations, 
and hence would need to operate "globally", rather than "locally". 
Another point to note is that it may be necessary to use universal quantification 
in goals to ensure that the correct answer is obtained. For example, given the 
program 
VxVy q(x, j) D p(x) 
Vx q(x,a) 
and the goal ax-'p(x), then the next goal is 2xVy-'q(x, y) which obviously fails, as 
q(x, a) succeeds. Hence, we need to ensure that all such universally quantified vari-
ables are correctly handled. Techniques to handle such variables were discussed in 
section 2.4, and may be used here in addition to the relative complement proce-
dure. This is due to the fact that answer substitutions are only returned through 
existentially quantified variables. For example, given the program 
Vx q(x,a) 
over the signature {a/O,b/O,f/1} and the goal yVx-'q(f(x),y), it is clear that 
q(f(c),y)/q(f(c),a) is {q(f(c),b),q(f(c),f(_)}, and hence y - b is a correct an-
swer. In this way universal quantifications of variables in negated goals reduce 
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the number of variables which may be instantiated by the relative complement 
process. 
In the case when the success set is either infinite or not computable (i.e. some 
instance of the goal loops), then the search for answer substitutions may not termi-
nate. A heuristic which may be useful in this context is to compute A/succeeds(A) 
via A/ref(A, match(A)) Uref(A, match(A))/succeeds(A). This initial computation 
avoids dependence on the search for successful instances, and so may be thought 
of as insurance against the possibility that the success set for a given atom may be 
infinite, or that the search for successful instances loops. This approach ensures 
that the maximal number of answer substitutions is found. 
For example, let E be {a/0,b/O, f/1,g/2}.  Consider the goal y-'p(y) and the 
program 
\/x p(x) D  p(f(x)) 
As the goal will loop, the enumeration of the success set will not terminate, and 
so we will not find the correct answer substitutions y +- a, y - b and y 	g(_, -) 
unless we do so before attempting the enumeration of the success set. We consider 
what may be done about infinite success sets and the like in the next section. 
4.5 Answer Substitutions and Induction 
We have given an incremental algorithm for the relative complement problem 
tailored to the production of answer substitutions for a constructive form of NAF. 
This process allows us to consider existentially quantified negated atoms in the 
same computational fashion as existentially quantified non-negated atoms in that 
both have the existential property, i.e. that a proof of 3xG will always yield a 
term t such that G[t/x} is true. As mentioned above, it is possible that the relative 
complement may not be finitely representable by terms alone. This incompleteness 
will remain even with some form of constraint system; an explicit answer cannot 
always be given, but whenever it can, this process will find one. Also, when no 
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complete explicit representation of all the answers is possible, we may produce any 
finite subset of it, by enumerating all answers of no more than a given depth. 
There is another incompleteness in that the set of positive answers may be 
infinite, and so we may produce no negative answers at all, but just wait for 
the termination of an infinite process. However, the successive approximations 
contain information which may be used to produce exact answers under certain 
circumstances. 
For example, consider the program for the even predicate given above. The 
goal 3x even(x) will generate the success set 
{even(0), even(s2(0)), even(s4(0)), ... } 
The successive values of Approx are 
even(x)/even(0) = {even(s(x))} 
even(s(x))/even(.s2(0)) = {even(.s(0)), even(.s3(x))} 
{even(s(0)), even(s3(x))}/even(s4(0)) = {even(s(0)), even(s3(0)), even(s5(x))} 
and so forth. It is obvious that -'even(s(0)) and -'even(s3(0)) are correct answers 
for the query 3x -leven(x), and so, provided that we can somehow ensure that 
the approximate answers can never succeed, some parts of the approximation may 
be made exact. In this way we may produce some correct answer substitutions 
without waiting for the entire success set to be enumerated. 
It is instructive to examine which programs produce-an infinite set of (distinct) 
answers. The answer seems to be that such programs use inductive definitions. 
For example, consider the two programs P1 and P2 below and the goal xp(x)- 
P, 
	 P2  
p(a) 	 p(a) 
Vxp(x) D p(x) 	 Vxp(x) D p(f(x)) 
In F1, we initially match against the fact to get the answer p(a). Next the rule 
is used to produce the same subgoal, and so we produce the answer p(a) infinitely 
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often. In F2, we again initially produce the answer p(a), and then match p(x) 
against the second clause to produce the subgoal 3x'p(x'), which gives answer 
p(a), and so a second answer is p(f(a)). 
Now for an infinite number of answers (distinct or otherwise) to exist, there 
must be an infinite number of 0-proofs of the goal. We may think of these 0-
proofs as a tree (in the manner of the SLD-tree [61]) in which there are an infinite 
number of finite branches. There may be infinite branches interspersed between 
the finite ones, and so different ways of searching the tree may produce different 
results. Hence, we assume the use of a fair search strategy, so that any of the 
infinite number of answers may be eventually discovered. For this to occur, the 
search strategy must include a fair clause selection strategy, i.e. one which ensures 
that each matching clause is eventually reached by the proof search process. A 
particularly suitable one is given by the "fact first" rule: the facts, or unit clauses, 
are to be used before any other in the derivation. Once all facts are exhausted, we 
may use rules. In this way we may generate the set of answers in a breadth-first 
manner, thus giving us a rough measure of the progress of the search for answers. 
The idea behind this is to ensure that at every step in the generation of aswers, 
the depth of the answers will increase. For example, let P be the program 
even(0) 
Vx even(x) D even(s2(x)) 
For the goal yeven(y), we first get the answer even(0), note the substitution 
Y - s2(x) and then the next goal is 3x even(x). Assuming we match against the 
unit clause first, we then get another answer even(s2(0)), and then using the rule 
generate another goal, and so forth. 
If we now turn our attention to the program itself, it is clear that there are 
only a finite number of clauses in the program and that each (distinct) answer is 
an instance of the head of some clause. Hence by the pigeonhole principle, there 
must be a clause head which is used an infinite number of times in the derivation 
process, and so there must be a predicate whose definition depends on itself, either 
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directly or indirectly. In this way the only class of programs which can possibly 
produce an infinite number of answers are those which contain a self-dependent 
predicate. 
We may define the class of inductive programs as follows: 
Definition 4.5.1 An atom p(t1,. . . t,,) is inductively defined in P if 
p(t1,. . . t,) is not P-self-dependent 
p(t1,. . . t,) is either a unit clause or P-dependent on an atom q(s1, . . . Sm ) which 
is inductively defined 
The definition of a predicate p in a program P is inductive if every term 
p(t1,. . . t,,) is inductively defined. 
A program P is inductive if it contains only inductive predicate definitions. 
The first condition ensures that the inductive definition is not cyclic, 'nd the 
second ensures that the induction must "bottom out" somewhere. For example, 
the even predicate as defined above is inductive. 
Clearly, not all programs are inductive. However, we feel that a number of 
useful programs are inductive, and that many programmers write programs in 
this inductive style. Many list processing predicates are written in the form of one 
clause, often just a unit clause, for the empty list case, and another for the case 
of an element with a list appended to it. For example, the standard definition of 
append below is inductive. 
Vs append([],s,x) 
VxVyVzVw append(y, z, w) D append(x.y, z, x.w) 
There are many similar predicates involving lists, generally of the following 
form, which may not be strictly inductive, but are similar in spirit: 
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base-case(Terms) D process_list ([1' Terms) 
process-element (x,Terms) A process_list(y, Terms) D process_list(x.y, Terms) 
where Terms is a list of terms and both base-case and process-element are inde-
pendent of process-list. 
There are many programs written by a similar process of "signature exhaus-
tion", i.e. writing a clause for each symbol in the signature, which will typically 
depend on a subterm, and so make the definition inductive. 
Now for such programs we may devise some measure of inductive depth, so 
that at each stage in the calculation of an answer substitution, we are guaranteed 
to increase the depth of the answer produced in a measurable way. Thus we can 
produce a lower bound on the depth of the answers in terms of the number of 
times we iterate through a particular clause, and so if we come across an atom A 
in Approx whose depth is less than this lower bound, we know that we can never 
find that A succeeds, and so we know that A is in fact an exact answer. 
For example, consider the even program above and the goal Ix even(x). We 
note that at each iteration through the second clause, the depth of the answer will 
increase by 2, and so after one such iteration, we get that Approx is {even(s(0)), 
even(s3(x))}, and so any further answers must have depth greater than than of 
even(s(0)). Hence even(s(0)) is in fact an exact answer. 
An interesting observation that may be made at this point is that many of the 
programs exhibited here were discussed in a different context in section 2.4, i.e. in 
terms of universally quantified goals. There is clearly a duality between Vx p(x) 
and 2x -'p(x) in that both cannot be true simultaneously. Any algorithm used to 
establish the truth or falsity of Vxp(x) may then be used to establish the truth 
or falsity of 3x -'p(x), particularly if the algorithm constructs counterexamples, 
so that if Vxp(x) fails, then the algorithm finds a term t such that p(t) fails, i.e. 
-'p(t) succeeds. Such an algorithm will then be untroubled by inductive programs, 
as the search to find a term t such that p(t) fails will not loop needlessly. Thus 
an algorithm for computation of universally quantified goals which demonstrates 
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failure by finding counterexamples may be used to find answer substitutions for 
negated goals, making such an algorithm doubly useful. 
Chapter 5 
Semantics and Model Theory 
1n this chapter we give a Kripke-like modal for programs which may contain nega-
tions in the bodies of clauses. This is inspired by the work of Miller on the 
semantics of first-order hereditary Harrop formulae [77]. We concentrate on NAF, 
although some other forms of negation may be incorporated. No restriction on 
the class of programs is needed in this approach; our method allows for programs 
which are not locally stratified [94]. This necessitates a slight departure from the 
standard methods, but the important properties of the construction still hold. 
5.1 A Kripke-like Model 
In [77] it was shown how a Kripke-like model may be constructed for Dmod formu-
lae. This uses techniques inspired by the possible worlds approach of Kripke [107]. 
This construction was then shown to precisely model the computational behaviour 
of Dmod and Gmod formulae, just as the previous construction of Kowalski and van 
Emden [25] did for Horn clauses. We now look at how to extend the construction 
of [77] to cater for the inclusion of negation, and the inclusion of our notion of 
universally quantified goals. We will first extend the model theory to cope with 
negated atoms as goals, and afterwards we shall consider some aspects of a further 
extension to include negated atoms as the heads of clauses. 
145 
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Before plunging into the details of our extension, we review some details about 
the original model theory, and so for the time being we consider Dmod programs 
and Gmod goals, which are given as follows: 
D:=AlVxDID1 AD2 GDA 
G:=AJG1 AG2 IC1 VG2 I *cCID C 
Note the absence of universally quantified goals in this class of formulae. 
The aim of our investigation is to construct a model of the program which 
precisely matches up with the operational behaviour of the program. In this way 
we expect P H0 C to be equivalent to the statement that C is true in the model 
associated with the program P. The model theory of [77] uses a consequence 
relation ft= similar to the relation = defined over Kripke models of first-order 
intuitionistic logic. The worlds in this model are identified with programs. If we 
let U be the set of all closed terms, fl be the set of all closed atomic formulae 
and P be the set of all programs, then an interpretation is defined as an function 
powerset(fl) such that VP1,P2 E P with P1 ç P2,I(P1 ) ç I(P2).Thus, 
interpretations are "internally monotonic". Given this notion the consequence 
relation ft= was defined in [77] as follows: 
I,Pj=AiffAEI(P) 
I, P 1f= G V C2 if I, P 	C1 or I, P J= C2  
I, P 1J= G A C2 if I, P H= G1 and I, P H-- C2  
I, P H-- 3xC if I, P ft= G[t/x] for some t E U 
I,Pft=DGiffI,Pu{D}ft=C 
Next we define the operators fl and U for interpretations. 
Definition 5.1.1 Let I and 12 be interpretations. Then 
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11 	12 if VP E 7),  11(P) c 12(w) 
(I u 12)(P) = 11(P) U 12(P) 
(I n 12)(P) = 11(P) n I(P) 
We may think of this model theory as a large collection of models indexed by 
programs, so that I, P ft= C if G is true in the model located in I at program P. A 
least fixed point method is given in [77] from which we get a single interpretation J 
such that P Fc, G if J, P 14= C. Thus for any program we can find an interpretation 
in this collection which precisely describes the program's behaviour. 
This construction is carried out by an operator on interpretations named T in 
the spirit of [25], and defined as follows: 
T(I)(P) = {A I A E [F] or there is a closed clause G D A e [F] such that 
I,P14=G} 
This operator is shown to be continuous, and so the least fixed point is 
00 
Tw(I±) = Ti(I) 
where I_ L is the null interpretation, i.e. 11(P) = 0 for any P. It is then shown 
how P 1-0 C if T'(I1), P 14= C, so that Tw(11)(P) may be thought of as a model 
for the program P. 
It is interesting to examine the difference between the model constructed and 
the standard Kripke model. The definition in [107] is reproduced below. 
Definition 5.1.2 A Kripke model is a quadruple K = (W, , D, J=) such that W 
is partially ordered by <, D is a non-decreasing function mapping elements of W 
to non-empty sets, and = is a binary relation on worlds and formulae defined via: 
Fort1 ... t, e D(w), if  J= p(t1,. . . t,) then Vw' > w, w' J= At, .... t) 
• 
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wVbiffw=çorwb 
w = xq iffw = [t/x] for some t e D(w) 
w = VXO iffVw' > w, w' = [t/x] for all t E D(w') 
wDbiffVw'>w,jfu/J= then w'Hb 
w=-'çbzff VW, >w,w'q 
The partial order < may be thought of as an "information" ordering; w1 <w2  
is interpreted as stating that w2 has no less information than w1. We often refer to 
as the access relation, or the reachability relation between worlds. The function 
D may be thought of as determining the objects of interest for a given world. As 
knowledge is increased, and hence we progress to worlds which are "higher" in 
the partial order, we may construct new objects of interest, and so there may be 
objects in w2 which do not exist in w1 where w1 w2. Hence the rule for V in the 
definition of = must take this possibility into account, and so we must show that 
for all worlds w' > w, w' J= 0[t/x] for all t G D(w') rather than just w 	.q[t/x} 
for all t e D(w). A similar remark applies to -the cases for D and -. 
We may interpret the statement w j=  qas 0 is true at (or in) world w. We 
write Vw e W, w 	as jz= qf. It is well known that intuitionistic provability is 
sound and complete with respect to Kripke models. More on Kripke models may 
be found in [21,107]. 
In our case, it is. easy to see that a natural choice for W and < is that the 
worlds are derivation states with the reachability relationship between worlds being 
set inclusion. We will consider two worlds (i.e. two derivation states) equal if 
(w1) = (w2). An obvious difference between the two consequence relations is that 
R- is a relation between interpretations, worlds and formulae, whereas = is a 
binary relation between worlds and formulae. This may be thought of as another 
specialisation in our case, as the definition of a Kripke model does not specify 
how the atomic formulae which are true at a given world are to be determined, 
whereas in our case we will always do so by an interpretation. As the formulae 
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true at a given world in the Kripke-like model will clearly depend on the chosen 
interpretation, it seems natural to include the interpretation as above, so that 
I, w ft= G may be interpretated as stating that under the interpretation I, C is 
true at world w. In a similar way, we will sometimes write I, w J= C, to mean that 
if the atomic formulae true at w are specified by the interpretation I, then w j=  G. 
Thus we may interpret the Kripke-like model directly as a Kripke model, using the 
same worlds structure and reachability relation as in the Kripke-like case, so that 
the only difference between the two is the difference between the the consequence 
relations = and j= 
One such difference is given by the rules for implication. Using the above 
syntax and convention, the rule for implication in a Kripke model reads 
I, P J= D D C if for every world w' D P, we have I, w' = D = I, w' j=  G 
As the relation j= is only defined when the antecedent is a D formula and the 
consequent a G formula, this condition cannot be used directly for JJ= . A more 
serious objection is that the T operator resulting from the = definition (i.e. the 
definition of T(I)(P) with I, P H-- C replaced by I, P = G) is not monbtonic, 
and so the usual fixed point method will not work. This may be seen from the 
following example, due to Dale Miller [73]: 
Consider the two programs P1 and P2 below. 
P, 	 P2  
(rDp)Dq 	 (rDp)Dq 
r 
Note that P1 c P2. Now as 11(P1 ) = 11(P2 ) = 0 and there are no atoms in 
P1, we get 
T(Ij(P1 )= {q I Ij,Pi  J= r :Dp} 
Now 11,P1 J= r D p if VW' D P1 we have 11,w' J= r = Ij,W J= p. This is 
vacuously true, as there is no world w' such that Ij, w' f= r. Hence, T(11) (P1 ) = 
{q}. In a similar way we get that T(11)(P2 ) = {q,r}. 
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However, it is obvious that T(11), P1 V= r D p, as we know that P2 D P1, and 
T(11),P2 J= r but T(11), P2 K p. Hence, we get that T 2(11)(P1 ) 	0, and by 
a similar argument that T2(11)(P2) = {r}. Thus the version of the T operator 
defined by = is not monotonic, and so we need to use a different relation. 
However, it can be shown that there is a Kripke model such that = C if 
T(I1), P 	C, so that the two relations j=  and jJ= coincide "at the fixed 
point" [73]. The worlds in this model are the worlds w of the Kripke-like model 
such that w > F, so that P becomes the bottom world. This may be seen to be 
intuitively reasonable by the fact that the lack of monotonicity of the = version 
of the T operator is due to its behaviour on I, but as the iterations increase, this 
idiosyncracy disappears. 
Note that a notion of universality similar to that of the = definition is captured 
in the = definition by the fact that the reachability relation between worlds is 
just set inclusion. As w c w U {D} for any D, we have that w U {D} is always 
reachable from w, i.e. w < w U {D}, and that any w' D w that contains D also 
contains wU{D}. Hence, the 	version may be read as "for any world containing. 
w in which D is assumed", rather than as "for any world containing w in which D 
is provable", as is the case for the = version. Thus 	circumvents the "all worlds 
reachable from w" condition, does not involve definite formulae as consequents and 
leads to a monotonic operator, and hence we may derive our desired interpretation 
by the calculation of a least fixed point. 
In the light of the equivalence result, the JJ= relation may be thought of 
as a computational version of = for this class of formulae, in that H== behaves 
differently and perhaps more intuitively on the internal construction, but leads to 
the same final result. 
We may gain a geometric insight into the structure of the collection of models 
by viewing it as an inverted cone, with the empty program at the bottom. The cone 
extends infinitely upwards in an ever-widening way, as every possible extension 
(of which there are infinitely many) of a program P is reachable from P. A 
representation of this idea is given in Figure 5-1. There are R, worlds here, as any 
program may be extended in an infinite number of ways, as may each extension. 
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P1 U P3 U P4  
0 
Figure 5-1: Inverted cone of models 
The lines between worlds in Figure 5-1 represent reachability, so that P1 may 
reach P1 U P2, P1 U P3 or P1 U P3 U F4, but P1 U P2 may not reach P1 U P3 U P4. 
5.2 Worlds and Accessibility 
We wish to extend the programs and goals covered by this model thebry to DHHF_ 
and GHHF_  formulae, i.e. where D and C formulae are defined as 
D:=AIVXDID1 AD2 ICJA 
C:=Al - AIxGIVxGIGiAG2IG1vG2lDDC 
The definition of H= for a universally quantified formula may be stated as 
follows for a goal G: 
I, P j= VxG if Vw' > P we have I, to' j= G[t/x] for each t E U 
This is just the condition for intuitionistic universal quantification given in 
[107] translated into our syntax and with H--= substituted for =. A feature of 
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the Kripke-like model which is not a general feature of Kripke models is that the 
function D does not change from world to world, but is constant, in that for all 
w E W, D(w) = U. This is a definitive property Of Beth models [21], which use a 
notion of derivability which differs from both of those discussed above. Hence, we 
prefer to think of the Kripke-like model as one in which there are no new objects 
constructed in the process of increasing our knowledge. It is this possibility that 
necessitates the side conditions on the definitions of truth in a Kripke model for 
the connectives V, D and - which state that the formula must not only be true in 
the current world but also true in every future world, as these are the ones which 
will be affected if new objects are constructed at a later stage. The worlds "below" 
the world in which the new object is first constructed can have no knowledge about 
formulae involving the new object, and so in order to preserve the property that 
whatever is true at a given world will always be true in all future worlds, we need 
to restrict the formulae which are considered true in the current world. 
In our case, we saw above that due to the fact that the reachability relation is 
just set inclusion, we may circumvent this side condition for D, and analogously, 
since we will never construct new objects, it should be possible to do th6. same 
for V. Now as we think in terms of a Herbrand universe, which is fixed before the 
program is written, we may simply neglect the side condition for V, so that we 
may replace the above definition by the following: 
I, P J= VxG if I, P ft= G[t/x] for all t e U 
We do not need to consider all worlds w' > P here as we know that no new 
objects can be constructed, and so the Herbrand universe U is never increased. 
Now from the definition of an interpretation it is easy to see that if I, P ft= C 
and w' > P then I, w' ft= C, so if I, P ft= G[t/x] then I, w' ft= G[t/x], and so 
I, P H-- G[t/x] for all t E U implies that I, w1 ft= G[t/x] for all t E U. Clearly 
the reverse holds, i.e. that if I, w1 ft= G[t/x] for all t € U and for all w' > P, then 
I, P ft= G[t/xJ for all t E U. 
A relevant observation at this point is that there are intermediate logics (i.e. 
strictly between intuitionistic logic and classical logic) which have model-theoretic 
Chapter 5. Semantics and Model Theory 	 153 
properties very similar to that of the Kripke-like model. The best known example 
is called the logic of constant domains, whose models are characterised by Kripke 
models in which the domain is constant, i.e. the mapping D is the same for all 
worlds. Clearly the Kripke-like model is one such model, as U is fixed for all worlds. 
However, the logic of constant domains is not quite right in our case, as we are 
interested in one particular domain, rather than a class of domains. Nevertheless, 
the natural place to study the semantics seems to be an intermediate logic, rather 
than intuitionistic logic. This point is taken up in section 6.5. 
Note that we also want the definition of ft= to behave similarly to 1-3, and 
so we will also use representations in the relevant formal definition. However the 
above remarks will still apply. 
The reconciliation between the NAF rule and the condition for truth of a 
negated atom in a Kripke model is more problematic. The desired definition of 
J= for negated formulae, using the analogy of Kripke models, would be 
I,P j= -'A if Vw' > P we have l,w' = A 
If the relation < between worlds is set inclusion (ç), then there is n w and 
A such that T'(11),  w J= -'A, as the world w U {A} is always reachable from w, 
and we know from the properties of interpretations that A e T"(1 )(P U {A}), i.e-
T' (I_L ), 
.
"(1  P  {A} = A for any A. Thus in order to incorporate negated atoms into 
this model, we need to restrict the reachability relation between worlds, so that 
there are less worlds "above" a given world w. We may think of this as a form of 
pruning of the inverted cone. 
It may be informative to consider what sort of pruning occurs if we apply the 
CWA to a program P. The CWA may be understood as identifying P F- -'A with 
P H1  A. So P H1  A means that P U {A} is not reachable from P, and so the only 
worlds reachable from P are those of the form P U {A} where P F-3 A, in which 
case P U {A} H3 C 	P H3 G. Hence, we understand the CWA as saying that 
there are no significant worlds reachable from P, so that P is maximal in the sense 
that the only worlds reachable from P are those in which the information added 
to P is a consequence of P. 
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P = P1 uP2  
P1  P2  
0 
Figure 5-2: Inverted cone + CWA = diamond 
The effect of this pruning of the inverted cone above P is shown in Figure 5-2. 
Note how the maximality of P makes the cone finite, as all elements of the cone 
must be subsets of P. Thus this drastic pruning may be interpreted as stating 
that all true formulae follow from P and P alone. 
This form of pruning is too extreme for our purposes. What we desire is some 
form of selective pruning, whereby we may make some worlds unreachable, but 
allow access to others. Thus we desire some form of inverted cone with "holes" 
appearing here and there, so that the geometric interpretation is in the form of 
Figure 5-3. 
The shaded triangles are the parts pruned from the initial diagram of Figure 5-
1. Here there are several worlds that P can reach, but some that P can not reach. 
The non-reachable ones are intended to include all extensions to the completely 
defined predicates of P. Thus P can only access "reasonable" worlds. 
In order to find the correct form of pruning, let us examine the growth of 
programs in this context. One feature of the Kripke-like model is that it captures 
the growth of programs very nicely. The only programs above a given world w 
are those which extend w. Thus, this approach induces the view that the process 
of programming begins at the tip of the inverted cone and proceeds upwards to 
a point where the finished program is reached. At this point, we may consider 
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Figure 5-3: Inverted cone with holes 
that the programmer has said "That is all that I know to be true", and then the 
machine makes deductions based on the information supplied. We may further 
contemplate that there are some predicates for which the programmer knows his 
or her knowledge to be complete, and so there is more information known to the 
programmer than he is able to express in the program, i.e. the negative parts of 
the information known about the predicates of the program. Such predicates we 
may consider completely defined, i.e. that no other programming process will lead 
to more information. This is certainly not true in the model theory of [77], as if w 
is a program containing clauses for the predicate p, then the program w U {P(01 
is reachable from w for any t, and so it is always possible to extend the definition 
of p given in w. Thus no predicate can be completely defined. Hence, we wish the 
reachability relation between worlds to reflect the following: 
W U {D} is reachable from w if D does not contain any more information than w 
about the completely defined predicates of w. 
The notion of completely and incompletely defined predicates is used to deter-
mine which worlds are reachable and which are not. If P contains an incompletely 
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defined predicate p, then we wish any world which extends the definition of p to 
be reachable from P. On the other hand, any world which extends the definition 
of a completely defined predicate of P should not be reachable from P. 
For example, let P1 be the program which defines the append predicate in the 
usual way, given below: 
Vx append([J,x,x) 
VxVyVzVw append(y, z, w) D append(x.y, z, x.w) 
We wish that no program which extends this definition of append be reachable 
from P1. On the other hand, the program P2 which defines all known carcinogens 
we would wish to be able to extend in any fashion, as we know that our knowledge is 
not complete, and so we wish to be able to extend it in any way possible. Thus the 
world P1 A append([], [1, 2], [3]) is not reachable from F1, as append([], [1, 2], [3]) is 
false, whereas carcinogen (chocolate) is unknown, and so P2 A carcinogen (chocolate) 
is reachable from F2, as we may find that chocolate is a carcinogen at some time 
in the future. 
Now in [77] worlds and sets of definite clauses tended to be interchangeable. As 
noted above, in. our case programs need to be more than just definite clauses; as 
we need to know which predicates are completely defined. Thus whilst in our case 
the worlds will again be just the same as programs, we have a more sophisticated 
notion of worlds as we have a more sophisticated notion of programs. 
As discussed above, the partial order on these worlds will need to be something 
more restrictive than set inclusion. The natural partial order between worlds is 
given below. 
Definition 5.2.1 Let P1 and P2 be sets of definite formulae, and Ni  c names(P) 
x names(P,), i = 1,2. Then (PI , N1 ) < (P2, N2) 1ff 
P1 cP2  
ass(N1) 9  ass(N2) 
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(F1 , (N, {append})) 
(Fl , (N, 0)) 
Figure 5-4: The append program and its possible extensions 
3. den(N1) c den(N2) 
. for each C E P2\P1, rtame(head(C)) e ass(N1) 
The fourth condition in the definition of < is the interesting one, as it ensures 
that no completely defined predicate of P1 is extended by P2. Recall that ass(N1)fl 
den(N1) = 0, and so the only permitted extensions are those which extend the 
definitions of predicates which are known to be incompletely defined. 
For example, let P1  be the two clauses for append given above, and let P2 = P1 U 
{append(nil, nil, [1, 2])1. The partial order for (Ps , (N, 0)) and (Pi, (N, {append})), i = 
1,2 is given in Figure 5-4. 
Note that (P1,(N,O)) < (P2,(N,{append})) but that (P1,(N,{append})) 
(F2 , (N, {append})). Thus our partial order restricts the reachable worlds to those 
which do not extend the completely defined predicates, and in which incompletely 
defined predicates remain incompletely defined. 
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Given this partial order, we know that all worlds above a given world w are 
those which consistently extend w, and so we know that if -A is true at world w, 
then -'A will be true for all worlds w' above w. It is this property that allows us 
to extend the 	relation, as described in the next section. 
5.3 Extending the Framework 
We saw above that an interpretation was defined as any function I mapping sets 
of definite formulae to sets of closed atoms such that whenever P1 c P2 then 
1(P1 ) ç 1(P2). Thus we may think of an interpretation as providing an indication 
of which atoms are true for each definite formula. However, in order to serve 
as an indication of which atoms are false, we will need more information. As 
argued in chapter 2, the computational behaviour of programs fits naturally into 
a constructive setting. As it is possible for neither P H3 A nor P H3 -'A to be true, 
it seems natural to allow an interpretation I to be such that neither I, P = A 
nor I, P 	-'A, and so we wish for a more general notion of interpretation than 
that given in [77]. Due to' the possible occurrence of free variables in programs 
and goals, we also need to consider maps which range over sets of atoms which are 
not necessarily ground. In this way our construction will resemble that of [26]. As 
mentioned in [26], it seems unreasonable for p(x) to be true and p(a) to be false. 
We may circumvent this difficulty by thinking of the ground instances of the atoms 
in the interpretation as the "real" items of interest, and the non-ground atoms as 
place-holders. This leads us to the following definition of an interpretation. Let 
71' be the'set of all atomic formulae. Let W be the set of all derivation states. 
Definition 5.3.1 Let X be a set of atoms. We refer to the set of all instances of 
all elements of X as inst(X). Note that X ç inst(X). 
We define X1 -< X2 as inst(X1) ç inst(X2). When X1 is a singleton set {A} 
we will often write X1 -.< X2 as A -< X2 . 
Let A be an atom. We define A+  to be the set of instances of A in which each 
variable in A is instantiated to an element of E+. 
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Let P be a derivation state. An interpretation is any function I : W -f 	x 
satisfying the following conditions, where 1(P) = (S, F): 
inst(S) fl inst(F) = 0 
for all worlds w1, w2 such that w1 < w2 where I(w1) = (Si, F1) and 1(w2) = 
(S2 , F2), we have S1 -< S2 and F1 -< F2  
Let 1(w) = (S, F). We define pos(I)(w) = S and neg(I)(w) = F. We define 
Ii- (W) = (0, 0)Vw e W. 
We refer to 1(w) as an interpreted world. 
We think of pos(I) as specifying which atoms are true, and of neg(I) as specify-
ing which atoms are false. Thus, we may think of the definition of an interpretation 
given in [77] as the special case of our definition obtained when neg(I)(w) = 0 for 
any world w. The first side condition ensures that no atom is specified as being 
both true and false, and so this condition ensures that interpretations are internally 
consistent. The second condition is a generalisation of the previous condition of in-
ternal monotonicity. This is justified by the perception that as programs increase, 
the knowledge contained in the program cannot decrease, and so no extension to 
a program is allowed to decrease either the set of atoms known to be true or the 
set of atoms known to be false. Thus we preserve the principle of monotonicity of 
information. 
We use the relation -< merely as a shorthand; this is a device which allows us 
to handle the non-ground atoms more easily. 
Note that we do not explicitly require that inst(S U F) = 11'. 
This is possible, of course; indeed, the (global) CWA may be thought of as 
requiring this to be the case for any interpretation, i.e. that if inst(pos(I)) = S, 
then inst(neg(.[)) = ?-I'\S. However, there are many programs for which such 
an interpretation will be inappropriate. For example, consider the simple loop 
program 
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p(a)Dp(a) 
There are no successful goals, but the set of goals which fail does not include p(a), 
and so if we wish for some form of interpretation which precisely matches up with 
computational behaviour, we cannot insist that inst(S U F) = 7-1'. 
The partial order 	on interpretations is extended in the obvious way, as is 
the operator 11. The dual operator U provides a slight difficulty as there is now no 
longer one maximal interpretation. 
This means that the obvious definition of U may not lead to an interpretation, 
as if I(w) = (S1, F) where i = 1, 2, then if inst(S2 ) fl inst(F) 	0 or inst(S1) fl 
inst(F2) 54 0, the mapping (I U 12)(w) = (Si U S2, F1 U F2) is not an interpretation 
as inst(pos(11UI2)(w))ninst(neg(11u12)(w)) 0. However, we may consider two 
interpretations I and '2  with this property as mutually inconsistent, and so we 
never wish to consider the mapping JU '2  as an interpretation. This consideration 
motivates the definitions below. 
Definition 5.3.2 Let 1,, I be interpretations. 
I and 12 are mutually consistent interpretations if for all worlds w we have 
inst(pos(11)(w)) fl inst(neg(12)(w)) = 0 and inst(neg(11)(w)) fl inst(pos(12)(w)) = 
0. Otherwise, I and 12 are mutually inconsistent. 
We define the relations < and t and the operator fl as follows: 
11(w) < 12(w) iffpos(11)(w) -< pos(12)(w) and neg(11)(w) -< neg(12)(w) 
12 iffVw E W we have 11(w) <12(w) 
(I fl I2)(w) = (inst(pos(11)(w)) fl inst(pos(12)(w)), 
inst(neg(11)(w)) fl inst(neg(12)(w))) 
If I and 12 are mutually consistent then we define the operator U as follows: 
(I U 12)(w) = (pos(11)(w) U pos(12) (w) , neg(11)(w) U neg(12)(w)) 
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In this case the interpretations do not form a lattice under the operations U 
and fl, as there are an infinite number of maximal interpretations. For any two 
such maximal interpretations I and 12  with 11(P) = (S1,fl'\S1) and 12(P) = 
(S2, fl'\S2) such that S1 	S2, then I U 12  is not an interpretation. However, it 
will be seen below that the formal results do not depend upon the interpretations 
forming a lattice, and so this will not be a problem. 
There is a third cone structure too, apart from that of worlds and of interpre-
tations. In this structure, each node is a pair of sets of atoms (i.e. each node is 
an interpreted world), with the partial order being componentwise set inclusion. 
It is this structure on which the construction process described below is carried 
out. As the relation ft= relates interpretations, worlds (i.e. derivation states) 
and goals, it may sometimes be helpful to think of the relation ft= as a relation 
between nodes in this third structure (i.e. pairs of sets of atoms) and goals. 
Now we come to the generalisation of the relation ft= defined in [77]. As there 
is both positive and negative information explicitly given in an interpretation, it 
seems natural to define two relations H=+ and H= such that 	is used for 
the positive information and J= for the negative information. These are defined 
below. 
Definition 5.3.3 Let (F, G) be a DHHF derivation pair where P = (D, N) and 
I be an interpretation. Then 
J,p 	A iffA-<pos(I)(P) 
I,P := -iA if A -< neg(I)(P) 
I, P 	G1 V C2 if I, P 	C1 or I, P ft C2  
I, P j= G1 A C2 if I, P 	G1 and I, P ft C2  
I,P Jj= 4  3xG iffl,P J= C[i/x] for some tEU 
I, p + VxG if 3R E 7(U) such that J p ft +  G[t/x] for all t E R where the 
variables in R do not appear free in P or C 
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I,(D,N) ft D'G iffl,(Du{D'},N) ft G and (DU{D'},N)> (1), N) 
I,P I:I= A if A -< neg(I)(P) 
I,P j= -A if A - pos(I)(P) 
I, P j= C1 V C2 if I, P j= G1 and I, P 14= C2 
11 P H= G1 A G2 if I, P 	C1 or I, P = G2 
I, P fz RxC if 2R e R(U) such that I, P 4= G[t/x] for all t e R where the 
variables in R do not appear free in P or G 
I,P 	'c/xC iffl,P f= G[t/x] for some tEU 
I,(D,N) 	D' D C iffl,(Du{D'},N) 	C and (DU{D'},N) ~! (D, N) 
It should be clear that these definitions are similar to those of [77], with the 
main differences being the cases for universal quantification, implication and nega-
tion. The motivation for the universal quantification case is clear from the dis-
cussion in Chapter 2 on the corresponding operational definition. In the case of 
[77] the side condition on implication is vacuously true, as D U {D'} D D. Here 
we explicitly require that (D U {D'}, N) be reachable from (D, N), i.e. that the 
new world is reachable from the first. This may be thought of as ensuring that the 
assumption makes sense. This restriction is not strictly necessary, in that there 
may be weaker restrictions that work. However, this is a safe choice, and in our 
opinion a natural one. 
One interesting thing to note is that given two interpretations 11 and 12, we 
have that I E 12 if for all P and A we have I, P J= A = 12' PH--+ A and 
I, P ft ---iA 	12, p ft + -A This property will be useful in some subsequent 
proofs, as it allows us to deduce that if J P 	C = 12' P ft= C for any P and 
C, then I E 12. 
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Note that this definition of an interpretation may be used for the negation of 
incompletely defined predicates, in that if we know -ip(b), then we may represent 
this information in an interpretation I by ensuring that p(b) E neg(I)(w). Thus, 
Negation as Inconsistency [39] may be captured this way, and so our model theo-
retic framework may be used for more than one kind of negation. Naturally the 
construction process described below would need to be modified, but the notion 
of interpretation would need no extension. We take up this theme in section 5.6. 
The following lemma establishes that interpretations respect the reachability 
relation between worlds. 
Lemma 5.3.1 Let P1 and P2 be DHHF_ derivation states, C be a GHHF_ goal 
formula, and let I be an interpretation. If P1 <P2 then 
1. 1, P, I:1=+  C=.I,P2  I:I=+  C 
. 1, P, = G=I,P2 = C 
Proof: We proceed by induction on the size of C. The base case occurs when G is 
a literal. 
A: 	I. J  P1 ft A implies that A -< pos(I)(P1), and as inst(pos(I(P1 ))) c 
inst(pos(I(P2))), we have J p2 	A. 
2. 1, P, ft= A implies that A -< neg(I)(P1), and as inst(neg(I(P1 ))) c 
inst(neg(I(P2 ))), we have I, P2 	A. 
-'A: As I,P ft -'A if I,P H= A and I,P H= A if I,P H= -'A, this 
case follows directly from the one above. 
Hence we assume that the lemma is true for all goals of no more than a given 
size. There are five cases: 
C1 VC2: 1. J1 ft C1 V C2 if I, Pi 	G1 or I, Pi 	+ C2 and by the 
hypothesis this implies that ],P2 	G1 or j, p2 ft + C2, i.e. 
I, P2 I:1=+ C1 vC2. 
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2. 1, P, JJ= C1 VG2 if I, PI 	G and I, P, H= C2 and by the 
hypothesis this implies that I, P2 ft= C1 and I, P2 ft= C2, i.e. 
I, P2 4= G1 vG2. 
	
C1 A G2: I. J J31 	C1 A G2 if I, P1 	C1 and I, JJ 	+ G2 and by the 
hypothesis this implies that I, P2 	G1 and ] p2 ft= C2, i.e. 
I, P2 ftG1 AG2. 
2. 1, P, 	G AC2 if I, P1 	C1 or 1, P, 	C2 and by the 
hypothesis this implies that I, P2 	C1 or I, P2 j= G2, i.e. 
I, P2 I 	G1AG2. 
dxC: 1. I, P1 H:--+ 3xG iff I, p1 	G[t/x] for some t E U, and by the 
hypothesis this implies that ] p2 ft= G[t/x] for some t e U, i.e. 
1, '2 J:J= 
2. I, P1 	3xC if 3R E 'R(U) such that I, P1 	G{t/x} for all 
t € R, and by the hypothesis this implies that I, P2 ft C[t/x] for 
all t E R, i.e. I, P2 J=- 3xC. 
VxG: 1. I, P1 ft= VxG if 3R E R(U) such that I, P1 H= C[t/xJ for all 
t e R, and by the hypothesis this implies that J p2 + G[t'/x] for 
all t e R, i.e. I, P2 H= VxG. 
2. I, P1 	VxG if I, P1 	G[lx] for some t e U, and by the 
hypothesis this implies that I, P2 ft= C[t/x] for some t e U, i.e. 
I, P2 l:l=: VxG. 
D' DC: 1. I,(D1,NI ) 	D' D G if I, (D, U {D'},NI ) 	C and (D1 U 
{D'}, N1) ~! (D1, N1), and so names(heads(D')) ç ass(N1). Now 
as (D1, N1) 	(D2, N2), this implies that names(heads(D')) c 
ass(N2), and hence names(heads(D')) fl den(N2 ) = 0, i.e. (D1 U 
{D'}, N1) 	(D2 U 1 D'J,  N2). Hence by the hypothesis we have 
I, (D2 U {D'}, N2) ft + C, and names(heads(D')) c ass(N2), and 
sol,(D2,N2) H= D'jC. 
2. I,(D1,NI) = D' D C if I, (DI U {D'}, N1) = G and (D1 U 
{D'}, N1) > (D1, N1), and so names(heads(D')) c ass(N1). Now 
as (D1, N1) 	(D2, N2), this implies that names(heads(D')) c 
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ass(N2), and hence names (heads (D')) fl den(N2) = 0, i.e. (D1 U 
{D'}, N1) < (D2 U {D'}, N2). Hence by the hypothesis we have 
I,(D2 U {D'}, N2) f= C, and names(heads(D')) c ass(N2), and 
so I, (D2, N2) J= D' D C. 
'I 
Note that this result depends critically on the fact that if P1 < P2, then 
ass(N1) C ass(N2). It is difficult to see how such a result could hold in the absence 
of this property. 
It is easy to prove a lemma analogous to lemma 2 of [77]. 
Lemma 5.3.2 Let (P, C) be a DHHF_ derivation pair where P = (D, N) and I 
and 12 be two interpretations. Then 
11 E12 if VP VG 11,P 	GI2,P 	C. 
I E: 12iffVPVGI1,P ft= GI2,P  ft= C. 
Proof: For the = direction of 1, consider the cases G= A and G = -'A. A -< 
pos(11)(P) if I, P j=  A which implies that '2,  P ft A which is equivalent 
to A -.< pos(12)(P). Similarly, A -< neg(11)(P) if I, P ft= -iA which 
implies that 12, p 	+ -'A which is equivalent to A -< neg(12)(P). A similar 
argument establishes 2. 
For the other direction, we proceed by induction on the structure of C. For 
the base case, if C is an atom A and 11,  P J= A, then A -< pos(11)(P), and 
so A -< pos(12)(P), as 11(P) < 12(P), and so 12 p 	A. If C is -'A for 
some A and J PH-- + -'A, then A -< neg(11)(P), so we have A -< neg(12)(P), 
as 11(P) <12(P) and so 12p ft 	A 
Similarly, if I, P = A then A -< neg(11)(P) which implies that A -< 
neg(12)(P), as 11(P) < 12(P), and so 12,P 	A. If C is -'A for some A 
and 11,P = -'A, then A -< pos(11 )(P), so we have A -< pos(12)(P), as 
11(P) <12(P) and so 12,P = -' A. 
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Hence the inductive hypothesis is that the lemma holds for all goals of no 
more than a given size. There are five cases: 
G1 V G2 
As J PH-- + G1 or ] p 	+ C2, by the inductive hypothesis 
12, P H--+ C1 or 12, P 	G2 , and so we have 12,p + G1 V C2 . 
As '1  P J= C1 and '1, P 	C2, by the inductive hypothesis 
12 P ft= C1 and I2  , P ft= G2 , and so we have 12, P 	C1 V G2• 
G1 A C2  
As I, P 	C1 and I, P 	C2, by the inductive hypothesis 
12, P Jf+ C1 and 12, P 	C2, and so we have 12 ]J + C1 A G2- 
As 11,P H= C1 or 11,P 	C2, by the inductive hypothesis 
12,P j= C1 or 12,P ft= C, and so we have 12,P 	C1 AC2 . 
axC 
As I, P ft= G[t/x] for some t E U, by the inductive hypothesis 
12, P H= G[t/x] for some t E U, and so we have 12, P ft dxC. 
As 3R e R(U) such that '1,  P ft= C[t/x] for all t e R, by the 
inductive hypothesis 12'  P J= C[t/x] for all t E R, and so we have 
I2P H= BxG. 
VxC: 
As 3R e 7?(U) such that J p ft C[t/x] for all t E R, by the 
inductive hypothesis 12, P 	G[t/x] for all t E R, and so we have 
12,P I:I=+ VxC 
As I, P = C[t/x] for some t E U, by the inductive hypothesis 
12' P H= G[t/x] for some t E U, and so we have 12'  P H= VxG. 
D'DG' 
As '1,  (D U {D'}, N) 	C', by the inductive hypothesis 12,  (D U 
{D'}) ft C', and so we have 12, P 	D' D C'. 
As I, (D U {D'}, N) H= C', by the inductive hypothesis 12, (D U 
{D'}) ft= C', and so we have 12,  P = D' j G. 
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In the light of Proposition 2.3.3, it should not be surprising that the following 
Lemma holds. 
Lemma 5.3.3 Let (P, G) be a derivation state, and let I be an interpretation. 
Then 
J, PH--+  G ] p 	G[t/x] for any t e U 
I, P 	G = I, P 	G[t/x] for any t E U 
Proof: Obvious. 	 o 
Next we show that interpretations conserve the consistency of 	and 
Lemma 5.3.4 Let I be an interpretation. Then there is no derivation pair (F, G) 
such that 
I,P ft C and l,P ft= C 
Proof: We proceed by induction on the size of G. 
The base case occurs when G is an atom A. Now 
	
I, P J 	A if A -.< pos(I)(P) 
17  I:1= A if A -< neg(I)(P) 
and as I is an interpretation, inst(pos(I)(P)) fl inst(neg(I)(P)) 0, and so 
there can be no atom A such that j p ft A and I, P 	A. 
Hence the induction hypothesis is that the lemma is true for all goals of no 
more than a given size. There are five cases: 
C1 VC2: jp + G1 VC2 if I,P 	G1 orl,P 	G2 and by the hypothesis 
this implies that it is impossible that I, P =- C1 or it is impossible 
that I, F H= G2 , and in either case it is impossible that I, P = C1  
and I, P H--- C2 , i.e. it is impossible that I, P ft= C1 V C2. 
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G1 AG2: I,P 	G AG2 if I,P ft= G and I,P 	C2 and by the hy- 
pothesis this implies that it is impossible that I, P 	C1 and it is 
impossible that I, P ftz G2, and so it is impossible that I, P j= C1  
or I, P 	G2 , i.e. it is impossible that I, P J= C1 A G2 . 
xG: J, p ft= xG if I, P ft= G[t/x] for some t E U, and by the hypothesis 
this implies that it is impossible that I, P H= C[t/x] for some t E U, 
and so by Lemma 5.3.3 it is impossible that 3R e R(U) such that 
I, P J= G[t/x] for all t E R, i.e. it is impossible that I, P 	BxG. 
VxG: J p 	VxG if 3R E R(U) such that ] p + G[t/xJ for all t E R, 
and so ], p j=+  G[t/x] for all t e U, and by the hypothesis this implies 
that it is impossible that I, P 	G[t/x] for all t E U, and so it is 
impossible that I, P J= VxG. 
D'G: I,(D,N) + D'DGiffI,(DU{D'},N) + G and (DU{D'},N)> 
(D, N), and by the hypothesis this implies that it is impossible that 
I, (DU{D'}, N) I= G, and so it is impossible that I, (D, N) ft= D' 
G. 
0 
The next three lemmas are important for the construction process. 
Lemma 5.3.5 Let I and 12 be interpretations. 
If I 	12, then I  and 12  are mutually consistent. 
Proof: As I 12, for any P we have 11(P) <12(P), and so 
pos(11)(P) -< pos(12)(P) 
neg(11)(P) -< neg(12)(P) 
As 12 is an interpretation, inst(pos(12)(P)) fl inst(neg(12)(P)) = 0, and so 
inst(pos(12)(P)) fl inst(neg(11)(P)) = 0, and 
inst(neg(12)(P))ninst(pos(11)(p)) = 0, i.e. I and 12  are mutually consistent. 
0 
jwi J.otuliall(dub Zulu iviuuei ineory 
Lemma 5.3.6 Let I  and 12 be interpretations. If I and 12 are mutually consis-
tent, then I, U I is an interpretation. 
Proof: As '1  and 12 are mutually consistent, we have that for any program P 
inst(pos(11)(P)) fl inst(neg(12)(P)) = 0 
inst(neg(11)(P)) fl inst(pos(12)(P)) = 0 
and so as both ii  and 12 are interpretations, it is clear that 
inst(pos(11)(P) U pos(12)(P)) fl inst(neg(11)(P) U neg(12)(P)) = 0 
Thus I Li 12 is internally consistent. 
Now as I is an interpretation for i = 1, 2, for any programs P1 and P2 such 
that P1 F2, we have 
pos(12)(P1) -< pos(11)(P2 ) 
neg(12)(Pj ) -< neg(11)(P2 ) 
for i = 1, 2, and hence we have 
pos(11)(P1) U pos(12)(P1) -< pos(Ii )(P2) U pos(12)(P2 ) 
neg(11)(P1) U neg(I2)(P) -< neg(11)(P2) U neg(12)(P2) 
Hence, Il 11 12 is an interpretation. 	 107 
Corollary 5.3.7 Let I and 12  be interpretations. If I 	4, then I, LI 12  is an 
interpretation. 
Proof: Follows immediately from lemmas 5.3.5 and 5.3.6. 	 0 
Lemma 5.3.8 Let I and 12 be mutually consistent interpretations. Then I ç 
11 1112 and 12 E11 1112. 
Proof: Obvious. 	 0 
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Another important lemma, again similar to one in [77] is given below. 
Lemma 5.3.9 Let 11 	13 E ... be an increasing sequence of interpretations) 
and let (P, G) be a DHHF_ derivation pair where P = (1), N). 
00 
If [] 11,P :j=+  G, then 2k> 1 such that 4,P 	G. 
1=1 
If U I, P 	C, then 2k > 1 such that 4, P - C. 
Proof: Note that U jOO is an interpretation by corollary 5.3.7. Let I(P) = (Si, P). 
We proceed by induction on the structure of C. 
If G is an atom A and Lj 1 I1,P 	A, then A -< U11 S2, and as A 
is an instance of itself, A e inst(U °1 S1) = U 1  inst(S3. Hence 2k 
such that A E inst(Sk), and so inst(A) c inst(Sk), which implies that 
A -< Sk, i.e. 'k, 	ft= A. 
If C is A and Li1  Ii, P H= -iA, then A -< U 1 F, and as A is an 
instance of itself, A E inst(U00 1 Fj = U inst(F3. Hence 2k such that 
A E inst(Fk ), and so inst(A) C inst(Fk ), which implies that A -< Fk, 
i.e. 'k p 	+ - A. 
As I,P R--.- A if I,P J= -'A and I,P ft= -A if I,P R--t A, this 
follows from the above argument. 
Hence the inductive hypothesis is that the lemma holds for all goals of no 
more than a given size. There are five cases: 
C1 V C2  
1. As U00, 'i  P ft C1VG2, we have [j°°1 I, P 	C1 or [J 1 I, P  J= C2. 
By the hypothesis, we have J. p + C1 or F p + C2 for some 
> I. Let k be the maximum of i and j. By lemma 5.3.2, we 
have 4, P 	C1 or 4, p 	C21  as 	'k and I. 'k and so 
'k'3 :j=+ Ci vC2. 
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2. As [j I, P 	G1VG2, we have L]1 I, P 	01 and 11 I, P H= 02. 
By the hypothesis, we have I, P ft= G and I, P 	C2 for some 
i,j > 1. Let k be the maximum of i and J. By lemma 5.3.2, we 
have 'k,'3 	C and 'k, 	02, as 	Ik and I E 'k, and 
SO 'k, J= G1 vG2. 
C A 02 
00 
1 
As [J.i= I, p 	G1AG2, we have [J I, [3 H--+ G1 and 1100 J, P ft= 02. 
By the hypothesis, we have 1, P 	C1 and L p + C2 for some 
i,j ~: 1. Let k be the maximum of i and j. By lemma 5.3.2, we 
have 'k, P ft C1 and 'k, p + G2, as I, g 'k and Ij E 4, and 
so 'k,' 	C AG2. 
AsU i Ij,PGi AG2,wehaveL i I j,PGi or[j?0 1 J,pftzG2. 
By the hypothesis, we have I, PH--  01 or I, P ft= 02 for some 
> 1. Let k be the maximum of i and j. By lemma 5.3.2, we 
have 'k 	 G1 or 'k P H=+ C2, as I 'k and Ij E 'k and so 
4 J.G1 AG2. 
As U I, P ft= RxG', we have that u Ii, p ft + G'[x/t] for 
some t E U. By the hypothesis, 'k, P t4= G'[x/t] for some k 1, 
and so we have 'k P H=+ 3xG' . 
As U 1 I, P J=- 3xG', we have that IR E 7?(U) such that 
111 I, P ft= C'[x/t] for all t E R, and so by the hypothesis, for 
each t ER there is a k such that Ik,, P ft= C'[t/xJ. Let k be the 
maximum of all the k. Hence 'k, P ft= G'[t/x] for all t E R, and 
so we have 'k, P ft= dxC'. 
1. As 1100 1 P Jfr VxG', we have that IR E R(U) such that 
LJ 	I, p ft + G'[x/t} for all t E R, and so by the hypothesis, for 
each t E R there is a kt such that 'ks, PH--+ G'[t/x]. Let Ic be the 
maximum of all the k. Hence 'k' p ft + G'[t/x} for all t E R, and 
so we have 4, p hI=:+ VxC' 
2xG 
VxG 
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2. As [J'°1  I, P ft= VxG', we have that U001 I, P 	G'[x/t] for 
some t e U. By the hypothesis, 'k  P = G'[x/t] for some k > 1, 
and so we have 'k,  P ft= VxG'. 
D'DG' 
As UOO 1  I, (D, N) ft= D' D C', we have that [j  I I, (DU {D'}, N) 	C'. 
By the hypothesis, Ik ,(D U {D'}, N) ft= C' for some k > 1, and 
so we have 4, (D, N) 	D' D C'. 
As u 1  I, (D, N) ft= D' D G', we have that 	1 Ij,(DU {DJ, N) H= C'. 
By the hypothesis, 'k  (D U {D'}, N) H= C' for some k > 1, and 
so we have 4, (D, N) 	D' D G. 
Note that this result depends critically on the compactness properties of goals 
containing quantifiers. 
Thus our extended notion of interpretation preserves important semantic prop-
erties. We show in the next section how the important properties of the T(I1 ) 
construction are preserved as well. 
5.4 The Construction Process 
We wish to find a single interpretation J such that P I-s C if J, P fj= G and 
P F-1  C if J, P ft= G. The construction of this interpretation may be thought of 
as mirroring the computational process, and is performed by a machine which has 
an unbounded amount of time and space and never makes a mistake. It is this step 
which justifies all the above definitions etc., as we may interpret this as defining 
a model for the program P. The interpretation J is traditionally constructed in 
logic programming semantics as the least fixed point of a monotonic operator T 
which maps interpretations to interpretations. The monotonicity of T guarantees 
that the least fixed point of T is T'(11)  for suitably defined powers of T, where 
I_L is the empty interpretation. 
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We proceed in a similar manner to that in [77], i.e. we build ordinal powers 
of a T operator, and use the union of all such powers to produce the desired 
interpretation. Before we do so, let us consider the nature of the construction 
process. The desired process is one that builds upwards, so that as the process 
goes on, the knowledge we have is always increasing, but never in an inconsistent 
fashion. 
We may think of this process as ascending a cone similar to the worlds described 
above, except that each node is an ordered pair (S, F) where S and F are sets 
of atoms with the accessibility relation being componentwise set inclusion. The 
process begins at the base node and continues upward monotonically, in that when 
going from node (S1, F1) to (S2, F2), we have S1  -< 52 and F1 -< F2. This means 
that whenever the construction process places an atom A in neg(T'(I))(w), we 
must be sure that A will not be placed in pos(T2(I))(w) for some J. 
As our desired interpretation is T'(11),  we are mainly interested in the ordinal 
powers of T so that we may construct Tc?(I1), rather than interpretations and 
fixpoints per se. Before we define these ordinal powers, it is important to note 
that a consequence of the monotonicity of the operator given in [77] is that if 
W 4= C, then T'(I1), w ft= G. This may be seen by the fact that 
I. 	T(11_), and so as T is monotonic, we have T(11) T2(11) and so on. This 
is perhaps a more important consequence of the monotonicity of T than the fact 
that a least fixed point exists. Whilst the fixpoint semantics does display a certain 
mathematical elegance, if the method used to construct the desired interpretation 
does not respect provability via j= , it is difficult to see what use it would be. The 
only thing we lose by using a direct construction rather than an operator is the 
ability to think of T as an operator on arbitrary interpretations, and so produce 
other constructions based on it. Traditionally the only other construction to gain 
much interest has been to produce the greatest fixpoint of T in order to deal with 
NAF. However, we have seen that the constructivist approach necessitates a more 
general notion of interpretation, which allows us to directly incorporate similar 
semantic properties to those of the greatest fixpoint of T. Thus we capture the 
Chapter 5. Semantics and Model Theory 	 174 
same descriptive power as the least fixpoint /greatest fixpoint approach, but in a 
more concrete way. 
In some ways, the above definition of an interpretation is too general, in that 
it allows interpretations which do not correspond to our intuitive understand-
ing of the program. For example, consider the program (p(a), (0, {p})), and the 
interpretation I for which 1(P) = (0, {p(a)}) for all programs P. Clearly this 
interpretation is somehow "at odds" with the program, especially when it comes 
to comparisons with the operational notion of provability. Hence it seems more 
natural to construct the sequence of interpretations in which we are interested (i.e. 
T*(I±)) than to consider an operator on arbitrary interpretations. 
It is possible to define a continuous operator which suits our purposes, but as 
the partial order involved does not form a complete lattice, the Knaster-Tarski 
fixpoint theorem used in [77] will not apply. In the next section we show how 
this operator may be defined, and discuss related issues. Below we present a more 
specific construction which builds the powers of T directly, and for which we may 
derive the desired results. 
We define the powers of T in a slightly more intricate way than is strictly 
necessary, in order to facilitate some later proofs. 
Definition 5.4.1 Let I be an interpretation, and let P = (D, N) be a DHHF_ 
derivation state. We define the ordinal powers of T as follows: 
pos(Pr°(I))(P) = {A I A E (D)} 
neg(Pr°(I))(P) = {A I name(A) E den(N) and VB E (D) and VG D B E (D), B Al 
T°(I) = Pr°(I) 
pos(Pr(I))(P)= {A I 	A E (D) such that Tk(I),P 	G} 
neg(Prk+l(I))(P)= {A J name(A) e den(N) and 'lB e (D), B 9E A and 
VG D B e (D) such that B x A, T'(I), P j= G} 
Tc(I) = Prk+(I) u Tc(I) 
00 
T-  (I) = UT2(I) 
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For an example of how this process works, consider the program below. 
even(0) 
Vx -'even(x) D even(s(x)) 
Let P = (D, (0, {even})) where D is the code in the even program above. Then 
we have 
Pr°(I j )(P) = ({even(0)},0) 
Pr'(11)(P) = (0, {even(s(0))}) 
Pr2 (Ij(P) = ({even(s2(0))}, O) 
Pr3(I j )(P) = (0, {even(s(0))}) 
and so 
T°(11)(P) = ({even(0)},O) 
T'(11)(P) = ({even(0)}, {even(s(0))}) 
2 	 2 T (11)(P) 	({even)(0),even(s (0))}, {even(s(0))}) 
T3(11)(P) = ({even)(0),even(s2(0))}, {even(.s(0)),even(s3(0))}) 
Note that even(x) neither succeeds nor fails, as there are some instances of it 
which succeed and some which fail. 
In this way we may think of the powers of T as using the program to define 
an increasing sequence of interpretations which is used to model the behaviour of 
the program. The final interpretation in this sequence (i.e. T'(I1)) can indeed be 
shown to capture this operational behaviour. 
Below we show that the powers of T are interpretations. 
Lemma 5.4.1 Let I be an interpretation. Then for any i > 0, Pri(11) and T'(11) 
are both interpretations. 
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Proof: We proceed by induction on i. Let P = (D, N) be a DHHF_ derivation 
state. 
In the base case, we have Pr°(I j ) = T°(11), and so we need only show that 
Pr°(11) is an interpretation. Let P = (D, N) be a DHHF_ derivation state. 
It is clear that there can be no atom A such that A E (D) and YB e (D) 
B çk A, and so pos(Pr°(Ii))(P) fl neg(Pr°(Ij)(P) = 0. 
Now given P1 = (D1, N1) and P2 = (D2, N2) such that P1 P2 , we know 
that (D1) C (D2), ass(N1) C ass(N2 ), den(N1) C den(N2), and for each 
C E D2\D1, name(head(C)) E ass(N1). As (D1) 9 (D2), we have that 
pos(Pr°(11))(P1) 9 pos(Pr°(11))(P2). Now if A E neg(Pr°(11))(P1), then 
name(A) E den(N1) and YB E (D1) and VG B E (D1 ) we have B 
A. Now as for each C E DAD, we have name(head(C)) V den(N), it 
follows that YB E (D2) and VG D B E (D2 ) we have B ç A, and so 
A E neg(Pr°(11))(P2). 
Hence we assume that the lemma is true for all 0 < i < k, so that Pr c(I j ) 
and T'(I1) are interpretations. It will be sufficient to show that Pr (Ii) 
is an interpretation, and that Pr k+1  (Ii) and T'(I1 ) are mutually consistent. 
Let P = (D, N) be a DHHF_ derivation state. If A E pos (Pr 4(I1))(P), 
then 3G D A E (D) such that Tk(I±), p 	G, and so it is impossible that 
VG i B E (D) such that B X A, Tk(I±),  P ft= G by lemma 5.3.4, and so 
pos(Prk(Ij))(P) fl neg(Pr 4(I1))(P) = 0. 
Now as above, if P1 and P2 are two program such that P1 < P2, then 
(D1 ) c (D2), and so pos(Prc+(Ij))(Pi)  c pos(Pr 4(I1))(P2). Now if 
A E neg(Pr 1 (11))(P1 ), then name(A) e den(N1 ) and YB E (D1), B A 
and VG D B e (D1) such that B oc A we have that Tk(I±),P1 H= C. As 
above, for each C e D2\D1 we have name(head(C)) 0 den(N1), and so it 
follows that YB E (D2) and VG D B E (D2) such that B oc A we have 
Tk(I1),P2J=_ C, and so A E neg(Pr(I1))(P2 ). 
Hence Prk  (Ii) is an interpretation. 
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Let P = (D, N) beaDHHF_ derivation state. Now ifA e pos(Pr' 1(I1))(P), 
then 3G A E (D) such that Tk(I±),P 	C. If A E neg(Tk(I±))(P), 
then A e neg(Prt(11))(P) for some 0 < i < k, and so name(A) E den(N) 
and VBE(D)B~kA and VGJBE(D) either B~kAorB oc Aand 
T 1(Ij, P H= G, which by lemma 5.3.2 implies that VG D B e (D) ei-
ther B ç A or B oc A and Tk(I±),P H= C. Hence pos(PrIc(I j ))(P) 
pos(Tk(Ij)(P) 
= 0. 
Similarly, if A E neg(Pr 4(I1))(P), then name(A) E den(N) and VB E 
(D) B çk A and VG D B E (D) such that B oc A, Tk(11), P ft= C. If 
A e pos(Tk(11))(P), then A e pos(Prt(Ij)(P) for some 0 < i < k, and so 
either A E (D) or 3G D A E (D) such that T 1(I1),P 	G, and so by 
lemma 5.3.2 this implies that either A E (D) or 3G D A E (D) such that 
Tk(I1),P 	G. Hence pos(Prk+l(I j ))(P) npos(Tk(Ij)(P) = 0. 
Thus Pr''(I1) and T'(I1) are mutually consistent, and so by lemma 5.3.6, 
T''(I1) is an interpretation. 
Ii 
Thus the construction gives us an increasing sequence of interpretations. This 
sequence respects 	and H= as shown below. 
Proposition 5.4.2 Let P be a DHHF_ derivation state and let G be a GHHF_ 
goal formula. Then 
1.Tk(IJ),P+GT3(Ij),pftC for any j>k 
.Tk(Ij),P_GTi(Ij),p_G for any j>k 
Proof: T'(I1) and T3(11) are interpretations by lemma 5.4.1, and as Tk(I±) 
T3(11), 1 & 2 follow immediately by lemma 5.3.2. 	 D 
Thus our construction preserves important properties. 
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We now show the relationship between our construction and the relations H3  
and H. First we show that F-5 and F-1 are sound with respect to the IKripke-like 
model. 
Proposition 5.4.3 Let (P, G) be a DHHF_ derivation pair where P = (D, N). 
Then 
I. PH 3 G=T'(Ii),P=G 
2. If G is negatable, then P F-1  G = T"(11), P 	C 
Note that the restriction in 2 is necessary. As T'(11)  is an interpretation, 
enlarging the program must preserve what is known to be true and what is known 
to be false. On the other hand, enlarging a program may mean that a goal which 
originally failed does not fail in the larger program. 
Proof: We proceed by induction on the depth of the 0-derivation of C. The base 
case occurs when G is an atom A and the sequent P _*+ A (resp. P ----- A) 
is initial. 
As the sequent is initial, we have A E (D), and hence A E pos(T°(I j ))(P), 
and so T(I1),P 	A. 
As the sequent is initial, we have VB E (D) and '/C D B E (D) 
B 	A and as A is negatable, we have name(A) e den(N), and hence 
A e neg(T0(11))(P), and so T"(I1),P 4= A. 
Hence we assume that the proposition is true for all 0-derivations of no more 
than a given depth. There are seven cases: 
A: 	1. If the base case does not hold, we have that 3G D A e (D) such that 
P F-3 C, and by the hypothesis this implies that Tw(I± ) ,  PH-- + G. 
By lemma 5.3.9 we have that T k  (Ii), P ft=
+  C for some k, and so 
Tk+l(I1),P 	A, i.e. Tw(11),P 	A. 
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2. If the base case does not hold, we have that VB E (D) B ç A, and 
VG D B E (D) such that B X A, P F1. G, and as G is negatable, 
by the hypothesis, T"(I1), P j=  C. By lemma 5.3.9 we have 
that T'(11) , p H= G for some k, and so T 1(I1), P 	A, i.e. 
Tw(11),P 	A. 
-A: 	1. P F, -'A if P F1  A and name(A) e den(N), and by the hypothesis, 
T"(11), P 	A. By lemma 5.3.9, we have that Tk(I±),  P ft A 
for some k, and so Tk(I±), p 	-'A, i.e. Tw(Ij, p + -'A 
2. P 1-1  -'A if P F, A, and by the hypothesis, Tw(11),  P Jj= A. By 
lemma 5.3.9, we have that Tk(I1) , p ft=+ A for some k, and so 
Tk(11),P j= -'A, i.e. Tw(11),P ft= -IA. 
G1 V C2: 1. P F, C1 V C2 if P F, C1 or P F, C2, and so by the hypothesis 
T"(Ii),PU= C1  or Tw(11),P + C2,i.e.T(Ij ),P 	C1VC2. 
2. P 1-1  C1 V G2  if P F, G1 and P F, C2 , and so by the hypothesis 
T'(ir1), P H= C1 and T"(11), P = C2, i.e. Tw(11), P H---  C1 V 
C2. 
C1 A C2: 1. P F, G1  A C2 if P F, G1 and P F, C2, and so by the hypothesis 
T"(11),P f= C1 and T"(11),P 	C2, i.e. Tw(I±), P J: 	C1 A 
C2. 
2. P 1-1  G1 A C2 if P F, C1 or P F, C2 , and so by the hypothesis 
Tw(I±),P l= C orT"(11),P 	C2, i.e. Tw(11),P = GAC. 
xG: 	1. P F, ]xG if P F, C[t/x] for some t E U, and so by the hypothesis 
T"(11),P ft= G[t/x], i.e. T(I1),P ft=+ 3xG. 
2. P F f 3xG if 3R E R(U) such that P F1  G[t/x] for all t E 
R, and so by the hypothesis T°'(11), P 	G[t/x] Vt e R, i.e. 
T'"(I1),P ft=- IxG. 
VxG: 1. P F, VxG if 31? E R(U) such that P F, C[t/x] for all t 
1?, and so by the hypothesis T"(I1), p 	G[t/x} Vt e R, i.e. 
Tw(I±),P 	VxG. 
2. P F1  VxG if P Ff C{t/x] for some t E U, and so by the hypothesis 
T°'(Ij,P ft= C[t/x], i.e. Tw(11),P ft VxG. 
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D' D C: I. (D, N) I- D' D G if (D U {D'}, N) F- C and names(heads(D')) c 
ass(N), and so by the hypothesis Tw(I±), (D U {D'}, N) ft= C, i.e. 
T"(I1), (D, N) 	D' :) G. 
2. (D, N) I- D' D G if (D U {D'}, N) F- j C and names(heads(D')) c 
ass(N), and as 	C is negatable, C is negatable, and so by the 
hypothesis T(I1), (DU{D'}, N) H= C, i.e. T(I1), (D, N) 	D' D 
C. 
FEW 
Note that this result may be thought of as demonstrating the compactness 
of F-s and F-1, in that if P I- C, then Tw(I±), p ft G, and by Lemma 5.3.9 
Tk(I), p + C for some k, and similarly for H1 when Gis negatable. 
Next we show that operational provability is complete with respect to the 
Kripke-like model. 
Proposition 5.4.4 Let (P, G) be a DHHF_ derivation pair where P = (D, N). 
Then 
Tw(I±),P =+G=.PH3 G 
T'(I),P H= GPHJ G 
Proof: By lemma 5.3:9 we have that 
T"(I1), p ft + G 3k such that T'(I1), p + C 
T'(11), P j= C 3k such that T'(I1), P 	C 
In each case, let k be the smallest such number. 
We proceed to show 1 & 2 simultaneously by formal induction on the ordinal 
measure w.k + n, where n is the number of connectives in C. 
The base case occurs when n 	k = 0. T°(I jj, p 	+ A implies that 
A -< (D),. i.e. A e (D), and hence P H3 A. T°(Ij,P J= A implies that 
VBE(D) and VCDBE(D),B~kA, and sopHjA. 
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Hence we assume that the proposition is true for all programs and goals for 
which w.k + n does not exceed a certain value. 
There are seven cases: 
A: 	1. Tk(I1),  p 	A implies that 2G D A E (D) such that T'(I1), P 	C, 
and by the hypothesis, P F 9 C, and so P F 9 A. 
2. Tk(Ij,P 	A implies that \/B E (D) B ç A and VG ,B E 
(D) such that B oc A, we have Tk_l(I±),  P Jj= G, and by the 
hypothesis, P F1  C, and so P F1  A. 
-'A: 1. T'(Ij, P J= -A implies that T"(I1), P 	A, and so VB e (D) 
B ç A and VG D BE (D) such that B oc A, TIc_l(Ij,P  j_ C 
and name(A) E den(N). By the hypothesis this implies that P F1  
A and name(A) e den(N), i.e. P Fs -'A. 
2. Tlc(I±),  P = -'A implies that T'(I1), P 	A, and so 2G D A e 
(D) such that T' 1(I1), P ft= C. By the hypothesis this implies 
that P F 3 A, and so P F1  -IA. 
C1  V C2: 1. Tk(Ij,  p + G1 V C2 if Tk(I±),  P 	G1 or Tk(I1),  p 	C2  
and by the hypothesis this implies that P F3 C1 or P F C2, i.e. 
PF,G1 VG2 . 
2. Tk(I±),P ft= G1 VG2 if Tk(I1),P = C1 and Tk(I±),P ft C2  
and by the hypothesis this implies that P F1  C1  and P F 1  C21  i.e. 
P 	C1 V C2. 
C1 A C2: 1. Tk(I1),  p 	C1 AG2 if Tk(11), p + C1 and Tk(I±), p ft + C2  
and by the hypothesis this implies that P F 8 C1 and P F 3 C2, i.e. 
PF 3 C1 AG2 . 
2. Tk(I1), P 	G1 A C2 if Tk(I1),  P 	C1 or Tk(I±),  P 	C2  
and by the hypothesis this implies that P F G1 or P Ff  C 2 , i.e. 
P F1  C1 A C2. 
dxC: 1. Tk(11),  P ft= xC if Tk(11), p 	+ G[t/x] for some t E U, and 
by the hypothesis this implies that P F 3 G[t/x], i.e. P F 3 IxG. 
iiipr o. aemanucs ana iv.zoaei I neory 	 162 
2. T'(11), P ft= 3xG iff 3R E R(U) such that T'(I1), P 	G[t/x] 
for all t e R, and by the hypothesis this implies that P H j G[t/x] Vt e 
R, i.e. P F-1 3xG. 
VxG: 1. T'(I1), p I:i= VxG if 3R e R(U) such that Tk(Ij, p ft + G[t/x] 
for all t E R, and by the hypothesis this implies that P F- 5 G[t/x] Vt e 
R, i.e. P F-3 VxG. 
2. Tk(I1), P f= VxG if Tk(I±), P 	G[t/x] for some t e U, and 
by the hypothesis this implies that P F-i. G[t/x], i.e. P H1 VxG. 
D' D G: 1. Tk(11), (D, N) H= D' D G if Tk(Ij, (D U {D'},N) f= G and 
(D U {D'}, N) ~! (D, N), and by the hypothesis this implies that 
(DU {D'}, N) I-i C and names(heads(D')) C ass(N), i.e. (D, N) H3 
D'jG. 
2. Tk(I1), (D, N) H= D' D G if T'(I1), (D U {D'}, N) j= C and 
(D U {D'}, N) ~! (D, N), and by the hypothesis this implies that 
(DU{D'}, N) F-1 G and names(heads(D')) c ass (N), i.e. (D, N) H1 
D' G. 
I. 
We now come to the main theorem. 
Theorem 5.4.5 Let P = (D, N) be a DHHF derivation state and let C be a 
GHHF_ goal formula. Then 
1. PH8 GTW(Ii),P I:=+ C 
If C is negatable, then P H1 C = T'(I1), P 	C 
PH j C = Tw(I1), P = G 
Proof: Follows directly from propositions 5.4.3 and 5.4.4. 	 11 
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5.5 Comparative Results 
Although we have been concerned with the powers of T themselves, rather than 
interpretations in general and fixpoints, it may be instructive to investigate the 
precise nature of the relationship between our presentation and the traditional 
approach. Below we give a result which may be thought of as characterising the 
fixed point nature of T"(1 ) without finding a particular operator of which this 
interpretation is a fixed point. 
We also show how we may define a version of the T operator "in isolation", as 
is done in the traditional case, i.e., T(I) is defined in terms of the interpretation I 
and that the T operator so defined is continuous. As mentioned above, we cannot 
apply the Knaster-Tarski fixed point theorem used in [77] to derive that Tc)(I±) 
is the least fixed point of T. However, the fact that F is a chain-complete partial 
order on interpretations together with the monotonicity of the operator means 
that the least fixpoint will indeed be T'(11) [60,1]. It is also not hard to show 
directly that T"(1 ) is the least fixpoint. 
First we show the result that gives the implicit characterisation of T(I) as a 
fixed point. 
Proposition 5.5.1 Let P = (D, N) be a DHHF_ derivation state, and let A be 
an atom. Then 
T(I1),P 	A T°(1 ),P 	A or 3G D A e (D) such that Tw(I±),P 	C 
Tw(11), P = A T°(1 ), P ft= A or VB E (D), B ç A and VC D B E (D) 
such that B cx A, T(I1), P H--- C, and name(A) E den(N) 
Proof: 
1(=): T"(I1), p + A if for some i we have Tt (Ij, p 
ft A by lemma 
5.3.9, and so either i = 0, i.e. T°(1 ), P J= A, or i > 0 and 
3G D A E (D) such that T''(11), p jj + C, which implies that 
T'(I1),P H= C. 
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(=): T°(11), p 	A = T'(I1), P H= A by lemma 5.3.2. By lemma 
5.3.9, if T-(11), p 	C then T 2 (11), p 	+ C for some i, and so 
T2+l(11),  p + A, and hence Tw(I±), 	A by lemma 5.3.2. 
Tw(I±), P = A if for some i we have T'(11), P ft= A by lemma 
5.3.9, and so either i = 0, i.e. T°(11),P 	A, or i >0 and,VB E 
(D) B A and VG D B e (D) such that B oc A, T 1(I1), P H= C 
and name(A) e den(N), and so by lemma 5.3.2 T"(I1),P I= G. 
(=): T°(11),P H= A = 13 Tw(I±),P 	A by lemma 5.3.2. By 
lemma 5.3.9, if Tw(I±),  P ft= G, then T'(11), P H= G for some 
i, and as YB E (D) B A, we have T 1(I1), P 	A, and so by 
lemma 5.3.2 T'(11),  P ft= A. 
A 
Thus we may think of Tw(11)(P) as a fixed point of the definition of the powers 
of T, in that replacing Tk44(I1) on the left by Tw(I±)  and T"(11) on the right by 
T"(11) results in a valid equation. 
Next, we show how to define our T operator "in isolation", i.e. define' • what 
T does to an arbitrary interpretation. This is not a definition in which we are 
particularly interested; it is included for purposes of comparison. The operator, 
which we will call S, is defined as follows. 
Definition 5.5.1 Let I be an interpretation, and let w = (D,N) be a DHHF 
derivation state. Then we define 
pos(S(I))(w) = {A I A E (D) or 3G D A E (D) such that I, w 	G} 
neg(S(I))(w) = {A I name(A) e den(N) and YB e (D) B 91 A and 
VG D Be (D) such that B oc A we have I,w H= C } 
S-(I) = US'(I) 
Note that in our earlier definition, we had T°(11), p 	+ A if A E (D). Here 
we have S(11), PH--  A if A e (D). No confusion should arise from this, as we 
are mainly concerned with T''( I1) and S"(11). 
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Below we show that S is indeed a mapping from interpretations to interpreta-
tions. 
Lemma 5.5.2 Let I be an interpretation. Then S(I) is an interpretation. 
Proof: Let P be an arbitrary DHHF_ derivation state. 
A E pos(S(I))(P) = A E (D) or 3G D A E (D) such that ] P J:=+ C. 
A e neg(S(I))(P) #- VB e (D) B çk A and VC D B E (D) such that B cx A, 
I,P 	C. 
Hence, it is clear that inst(pos(S(I))(P)) fl inst(pos(S(I))(P)) = 0. 
Let P1 = (D1, N1) and P2 = (D21  N2) be DHHF_ programs. Let P1 P2. If 
A E pos(S(I))(P1), then either A E (D1) and hence A e (D2), or IG D A E 
(D1) (and hence G D A E (D2)) such that I, P1 J= C, and by lemma 5.3.1 
we have I, p2 	+ C, i.e. A e pos(S(I))(P2). 
If A E rieg(S(I))(P1), then name(A) E den(N1), \/B E (D1), B çk A, and 
VG 	B E (D1) such that B cx A, I, P1 tz= C, and by lemma 5.3.1, 
I, P2 	G. Now as P1 P2, we have VC E (D2)\(D1), name(head(C)) E 
ass(N1) and as ass(N1) 9 ass(N2), we have name(A) e den(N2 ) and name(head(C)) 
den(N1). Hence we have that VB e (D2), B çk A and VC D B E (D2) such 
that B cc A, we have I, P2 H= C, and so A E neg(S(I))(P2). 
Hence 5(I) is an interpretation. 
El 
Next we show that S is monotonic and continuous, as claimed above. 
Lemma 5.5.3 Let 11 and 12  be interpretations. Then 
I1 EI2 S(J1)E5(I2) 
Proof: Let P be a DHHF_ derivation state. 
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If A e pos(S(11))(P), then A E (D) or 3G D A E (D) such that 1 p ft G, 
and by lemma 5.3.2 we have that 12 p + C, and so A E pos(S(12))(P). 
If A E neg(S(11))(P), then name(A) E den(N) and VB e (D) B çÃ A and 
VG D B e (D) such that B x A, I, P ft= G, and by lemma 5.3.2 we have 
that 12,P ft G, and so A E neg(S(12))(P) 
Hence S(11) E S(12). 
Lemma 5.5.4 Let I E 12 	... be an increasing sequence of interpretations. 
Then 
U 1 S(I3 = S(LJ 1 I) 
Proof: 	: I 	U1 I, and so by lemma 5.5.3, we have that S(I) S(U1 I) 
for any j, and hence U1 S(I) S(LJ 1 13. 
: If A e pos(S(IJ 1 11))(P), then either A E (D), in which case A E 
S(12)(P) for all j ~! 0, or 3G D A e (D) such that U001 ]. p 	C, 
which by lemma 5.3.9 implies that Ij,P 	C for some  > 0, and so 
A E pos(S(13))(P). In either case.we have A E pos(Ljr1 S(13)(P). 
If A e neg(S(LJ 1 I))(P), then name(A) e den(N) and VB E (D) 
B ç A and VG D B E (D) such that B x A, Li°°1 I, P 4= C, 
which by lemma 5.3.9 implies that 13, P ft= C for some j > 0, and so 
A e neg(S(13))(P). Hence A e neg([J°1 S(11))(P). 
Hence, S(L1r1 I) ti:1 S(13. 
00 Hence S([] I) 
=
S(11). 
Next we show that S and T define the same sequence of interpretations. 
Proposition 5.5.5 Let the interpretations S(I1) and T3(11) be as defined above. 
Then for any k > 0 
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Tk(I±) = S'' (I1) 
Proof: We proceed by induction on k. Let P = (D, N) be an arbitrary DHHF_ 
derivation state. 
For the base case, it is clear that A e pos(T°(I j ))(P) if A e (D) if A e 
pos(S(11))(P). Similarly (as there is no goal G such that I = C), we 
have that A E neg(T°(11))(P) if name(A) E den(N) and YB E (D) B ç A 
and VG D B E (D) B $ A if A Eneg(S(11))(P). 
Hence the induction hypothesis is that for all 0 < k < n, T'(I1) = 8k+1(11)  
Consider T'+1(Ii) and Sn-f 2(Ii). 
A E pos(T 1(I1))(P) if A e pos(T'(I1))(P) or RG D A e (D) such 
that T'(I1), P 	C, and by the hypothesis this is equivalent to A E 
pos(S' 1(I1))(P) or 3G D A e (D) such that S 1 (Ii), P f= C, and as 
S''(,1) S' 2(11), in either case we get that A e pos(S 2(I1))(P). 
A E pos(S' 2(I1))(P) implies that A E (D) or 3G D A E (D) such 
that S'1(I1),P J= G. If A e (D), then A E pos(T°(11))(P), ;'nd so 
by lemma 5.3.2, we have that A E ps(T'(I1))(P). Otherwise, by the 
hypothesis we have 3G D A E (D) such that T'(I1), p 	G, and so 
A E pos(T 1(I1))(P). 
A E neg(Thl+i(I±))(P) if A E neg(T'(I1))(P) or name(A) E den(N) and 
YB e (D)B ç A and YG D BE (D) such that B X Awe have T'2(11),P = C, 
which by the hypothesis is equivalent to A e neg(S'' (,_L)) (p) or name(A) e 
den(N) and YB E (D) B 9E A and VG B E (D) such that B x A we have 
S"(I1),P J= C, and as S'(I1) 	S 2(I1), in either case we have 
A E neg(S' 2(I1))(P). 
A E neg(S 2(I1))(P) if name(A) e den(N) and YB e (D) B ç A and 
VG D B E (D) such that B cx A we have S(I1),P 	C, and by the 
hypothesis, this implies that name(A) E den(N) and YB E (D) B ç A and 
VG D B E (D) such that B cx A we have T'(I1),P = G, which implies 
that A E neg(T'1(I1))(P). 
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It follows directly from this lemma that the two interpretations Sw(I±) and 
T'(11) are the same. 
Corollary 5.5.6 Let S''(I) and T"(I) be defined as above. Then 
Sw(I±) = T°'(11) 
+ It is also clear that from proposition 5.5.5 and lemma 5.3.2 that S (Ii), P ft= G = 
S3(11),P 	C for any j > i and hence S2(11),P 	G = Sw(I±),P 	G. 
Similarly, S'(11), P J= C = S1(11), P H= C for any j > i and hence 
S(I1), P I:1= C 	Sw(I±),  P I:I= C. 
As mentioned above, it follows from the monotonicity of S and the fact that 
is a chain-complete partial order that the least fixed point of S is S"(I) [1, 
60], which by the above corollary is the same as T"(11). However it is not hard 
to establish the same result directly, and as it is somewhat informative, we do so 
below. 
Lemma 5.5.7 Let S be defined as above, and so 
00 Sw(11) = US1(11) = 51(I) U S2(11) u S3(11) U... 
Then S"(11) is a fixed point of S, i.e. S(Sw(11)) = ScI(I±). 
Proof: Let P = (D, N) be any DHHF_ derivation state. By propositions 5.5.1 and 
5.5.5, we know that 5"(I), p ft + A 	A E (D) or 3G D A E (D) such 
that S"(I),P ft A, which is equivalent to S(S"(11)) ft A. 
By the same propositions we have S"(I), PH---  A if name(A) e den(N) 
and \/B e (D) B çk A and VG D B e (D) such that B x A, 5'(J),  P ft= G, 
which is equivalent to S(Sw(11)), P j=  A. 
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Next we show that S'(I1) is the least fixed point of S, so that if J is any fixed 
point of S, then S'(11) F J 
The key lemma needed to prove that Sw(I±) ç J is given below. 
Lemma 5.5.8 Let J be any fixed point of S. Then for any i ~! 1, 52(J) J. 
Proof: Clearly Ij 	J, and as S is monotonic, we have S(11) 	S(J), and so 
S2(11) S(J). 
Now as J is a fixed point of S, we have that J = S(J) = S2(J) = ... S2(J), 
and so 5i(J) C J. 	 0 
From this lemma we may easily derive the desired result, given below. 
Theorem 5.5.9 S(I1) is the least fixed point of S. 
Proof: We already have that S'(I1) is a fixed point of S from lemma 5.5.7, so let 
J be any fixed point of S. By lemma 5.3.2 it will be sufficient to show that 
S(I1),P :j=+ AJ,P ft A 
S'(Ij,P = A=.J,P = A 
Now by lemma 5.3.9 we have that S" (I), P ft= A implies that S/C(I±) p ft A 
for some k > 1, and so as Sc(I1) C J by lemma 5.5.8, by lemma 5.3.2 we 
have J,P ft A. 
Similarly, by lemma 5.3.9 we have that Sw(I±),P 1J= A implies that S"(J1),P H= A 
for some Ic > 1, and so as S'(I1) C J by lemma 5.5.8, by lemma 5.3.2 we 
have J,P H= A. 
Hence we have that 
5w(J1)p 	A=J,P 	A 
Sw(I±),P = A=J,P j= A 
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for any DHHF_ derivation state P, and so S°(I1) E J, where J is any fixed 
point of S, and so S"(11) is the least fixed point of S. 
D 
Thus even though our partial order does not form a lattice, our operator is 
continuous and Sw(I±) is its least fixed point. Whilst we prefer to think of the 
powers of T without reference to arbitrary interpretations, this result may be 
seen as evidence that our approach does not stray too wildly from the traditional 
methods. 
5.6 Problems with Inconsistency 
The above results were obtained for the following class of programs: 
D:=AIVXDID1 AD2 JGJA 
G:=AI -1AIBXGIVXGIG1AG2IG1VG2JDJG 
A natural extension to this class of programs is the one given below. 
D:=LIVXDJD1AD2IGJL 
G:= L I3xG I VxC 1G1 AG2 1G1 VG, I  DC 
This class of programs is an obvious generalisation of the class given in [77] 
in that programs and goals are built up from literals rather than atoms, and so 
positive and negative information is treated symmetrically. This may thought of 
as allowing "negation in the head", in that clause heads are now literals rather 
than just atoms. 
As discussed in chapter 2, an obvious problem with such an extension is the 
problem of inconsistency, and we cannot dodge this difficulty by restricting our 
attention to consistent programs because of the similarity between 
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-'A I- A D C 
and 
-AAAF3 C 
In this section we discuss the possibility of allowing programs to be inconsistent, 
and show briefly how our framework is not really suitable for this purpose. 
As in [77] and chapters 2 and 3, we assume that there is a distinguished atom 
I which stands for a contradiction and is computed in the same way as any other 
atom. 
As mentioned above (and discussed in [77]), there is a choice to be made - 
are inconsistencies considered global, as in intuitionistic logic, so that if P F3 I 
then P F3 G for any goal G, or are they local, in that when P F3 A A -IA, we wish 
to deal with the inconsistency rather than continue to make deductions from the 
program? Whichever approach is taken causes significant technical problems for 
our framework. 
If we take the approach of intuitionistic logic, so that if P F31. then P F3 C 
for any goal G, then we would wish this to be reflected in the model theory, i.e. 
that if T"(I1), P 	I then Tw(I±), p ft +  G for any goal C. However, our 
definition of an interpretation makes this impossible, as for any interpretation 
I, we must have that inst(pos(I)(P)) fl inst(neg(I)(P)) = 0, and so we cannot 
have I,P ft A A -IA, as there can be no atom A such that A -< pos(I)(P) 
and A -.< neg(I)(P). So the first thing to do is to generalise the notion of an 
interpretation so that we may have inconsistent interpretations. This would be 
done by dropping the condition of internal consistency, so that the definition of 
an interpretation would become 
An interpretation is any function I: P -+ 71' x 11' such that for all worlds w1, w2  
for which w1 <w2 and I(w1) = (S, F), i = 1,2 then S1 -< S2 and F1 -< F2. 
This more general notion of an interpretation will allow us to consider the 
desired interpretation above. In fact, we really only desire one extra interpretation: 
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this is the interpretation IT where IT(p) = ('1-i', 1-1') for any program P. This 
may be thought of as a dual to the null interpretation I which is such that 
11(P) = (0,0), and so we think of this as "topping" the lattice of interpretations. 
In this way it is conceivable that we may model inconsistent programs by setting 
T"(11)(P) = IT(p) whenever P is an inconsistent program. 
One complication for an inconsistent program (D, N) is introduced by the 
necessity that if every goal is provable, then every goal of the form D' D G' must 
be provable, so that 
T"(Ij,(D,N) 	D' jC' 
for all choices of D' and G'. In order to obey the rules of H=+ , we must have that 
(DU{D'}, N) ~! (D, N) for any definite formula D', including clauses whose heads 
have names in common with den(N), i.e. clauses which extend the completely 
defined predicates of the program. Hence, for our relation between worlds to have 
any meaning,' either we must separate the inconsistent worlds from the consistent 
ones or we must have that den(N) = 0 and ass(N) = 0 for inconsistent programs. 
This per se may not seem a bad thing; after all no goal can fail when the program is 
inconsistent, and so the notion of completely defined predicates seems out of place. 
However, this may cause problems when a consistent program is inconsistently 
extended. 
For example, let P = (D, N) be a consistent program with den(N) 0, and 
A be an atom whose name does not occur anywhere in D and name(A) ass(N). 
Now according to the accessibility relation between worlds given above, both 
(D U {A}, N) and (D U {-iA}, N) are accessible from (D, N), as both are con-
sistent with (D, N). However, the inconsistent program (D U {A} U {-iAl, (0, 0)) 
is accessible from neither world. This may be seen to be reasonable, in that the 
choice made at the 'world (D, N) needs to distinguish between two mutually incon-
sistent alternatives, and so the inconsistent world should not be accessible. This 
'Recall that this proposed extension must be conservative in that the previous results 
on consistent programs must still hold. 
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view then leads us to the conclusion that there is are really two lattices of worlds - 
one of consistent worlds and one of inconsistent worlds, and no inconsistent world 
is accessible from any consistent world, with the exception that the bottom world 
(0, (0,0)) can access both consistent and inconsistent worlds. As there seems to 
be two distinct lattices, it seems more natural to separate the consistent programs 
from the inconsistent ones more formally, which is basically what was done above 
when we assumed that all programs were consistent. 
The main objection to be made against this scheme is that it moves very much 
away from the close association between extensions of the program and accessi-
bility between worlds. If we imagine the programming process as commencing at 
the empty world and progressing up the "cone" of worlds, it seems natural to con-
sider an inconsistent extension to a program in the same context as a consistent 
extension. Naturally we will want to distinguish between the two, as we would 
normally think of an inconsistent extension as a dead end from which we need to 
backtrack so that a different choice can be made somewhere further down and the 
programming process resumed, hopefully terminating at a consistent program. In 
order for such a process to work, it is necessary that inconsistent programs be 
accessible from consistent ones, and so it is difficult to see how the framework 
given above can be made useful for such a scheme. 
One possible modification that may be helpful is to take a minimal approach 
to inconsistency, rather than the full intuitionistic one. As discussed in [77], pro-
gramming considerations suggest that the minimal approach is more appropriate, 
as it places the emphasis on detection of inconsistency, rather than trying to make 
sense of an inconsistent program. Also, as discussed in chapter 2, it is difficult 
to see how an inconsistency in the definition of the append predicate should force 
carcinogen (chocolate) A -'carcinogen(chocolate) to be true. Again the notion of 
interpretation would need to be extended in the manner described above, but this 
time there will not just be one inconsistent interpretation of interest, but many. A 
related question is how to interpret J p 	A when A e pos(I)(P) fl neg(I)(P). 
One answer may be to modify the rules for J p + A and I, P 	A as follows: 
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I. J, p 	+ A if A inst(pos(I)(P))\inst(neg(I)(P)) 
2. I, P J= A if A E inst(pos(I)(P))\inst(neg(I)(P)) 
The other rules would be left the same, with the exception of the rule for goals 
of the form D' D G', which would take the simpler form 
	
I, (D, N) I4= D' D G' if I, (D u {D'}, N) 	C' 
This has the effect of pushing the consistency check inwards, in that ft 
can only prove things from the consistent part of the program, and so whilst 
(D U {D'}, N) may be an inconsistent program, G' may still be provable from it 
in the above sense, in that the inconsistency may not "affect" C'. In this way the 
emphasis is on whether C' depends on the inconsistency (if any) or not, rather 
than on whether the extended program is consistent. 
One obvious "safe" but rather uninteresting way to avoid such problems is to 
restrict the class of goals as follows: 
G:=AJ -'AIxGlVxGlG1vG2iGAG 
so that no implications can occur in goals. 	Less drastic restrictions are 
obviously desirable, but a full answer can only really be given by dealing with 
inconsistent programs in a manner similar to that of consistent ones, so that the 
model theory for both sorts of programs may be integrated. 
Chapter 6 
Semantic Properties of Hereditary Harrop 
Formulae 
In this chapter we consider some semantic properties of first-order hereditary Har-
rop formulae. One important question is the precise strength of the class of formu-
lae involved. In order to investigate this, we consider the redundant features of the 
language of [77], and show how they may be removed. This leads to a discussion 
of equivalence for this class of programs, and we show how intuitionistic logic is 
not quite strong enough for questions of equivalence, and we develop notions of 
equivalence for goals and programs based on a slightly stronger (but not classical) 
logic. 
6.1 Structural Properties of Programs 
In [63] it was shown how arbitrary first-order formulae may be converted into sets 
Of DHorn_ and GHorn_ formulae, where equivalence is interpreted in classical logic. 
This means the Horn clauses may be thought of as a normal form for formulae of 
first-order classical logic, and so an interpreter for DHOrn programs and GHorfl _ 
goals may use this translation to interpret programs and goals of full first-order 
classical logic. This conversion relies on the fact that it is possible to define the 
connectives V, V and D in terms of 3, A and - in classical logic, and so once the 
latter trio have been implemented, as in G ff0rn_, then the other three may be 
195 
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implemented without extending the underlying programming engine. In this way 
first-order classical logic may be used for programming, rather than just DH,,,,-. 
This approach is not possible in intuitionistic logic, as the equivalences needed 
to prove the correctness of the interdefinability results are not intuitionistically 
valid. Given that intuitionistic logic seems to be a better context in which to 
interpret hereditary Harrop formulae, we may conclude that the approach using 
classical logic may be seen as more significant for automated theorem proving than 
for the semantics of logic programming and extensions to Horn clauses. 
This, of course, does not mean that normal forms cannot exist for hereditary 
Harrop formula, when interpreted in intuitionistic logic. We may think of the 
translation of [63] as exploiting the redundancy of the connectives in classical 
logic. Here we examine what redundancies there may be in hereditary Harrop 
formula, in order to derive some kind of normal form. 
An example of this redundancy may be given by the question of quantification 
in Horn clauses. We may consider all variables which appear in a Horn clause as 
being universally quantified at the front of the clause, e.g. 
VxVy q(x,y) Dp(x) 
However, we may also consider variables which do not appear in the head of 
the clause as being existentially quantified at the front of the body, so that the 
above clause is equivalent to 
Vx(yq(x,y)) D p(x) 
Thus we may consider Horn clauses to be defined in the latter style (i.e. in 
which existential quantifiers are allowed in the bodies of clauses), implement the 
former language (i.e. in which existential quantifiers are not allowed in the bodies of 
clauses) and use the equivalence of the former and latter clauses to allow program 
of either definition to be used. 
We can generalise this line of thought to a more general class of programs 
provided that we can perform a similar process of removing 3 and V from the 
Chapter 6. Semantic Properties of Hereditary Harrop Formulae 	 197 
bodies of clauses. One step in this direction was given in [77], in which it was 
shown how disjunctions may be removed from Dmod programs. This result was 
established by showing that for any program which contains a disjunction, there 
is a program with the same operational behaviour, which, although usually much 
larger, contains no disjunctions. We may think of this as exploiting the structure of 
the program so that programs may be given a simpler definition, in that there is a 
smaller class of formulae with the same expressive power. We extend this result to 
the case when negations may be present, and also show how existential quantifiers 
may be similarly removed from programs. We may think of the transformed 
program as a normal form. 
In this section, we will be considering Dmod_ and Gmod.... formulae, i.e. D for-
mulae and C formulae of the form 
D:=AIVXDJD1AD2IGJA 
G:=Al -1AI ]XCIC1AC2JC1VC2IDJC 
Using DHHF_ and CHHF_ formulae present some technical difficulties which 
are discussed in section 7.2. 
The process of removing disjunctions is inspired by the intuitionistic equiva-
lence 
(C1 vG2)A 1 (GI DA)A(G2 DA) 
A similar process for removing existential quantifiers is specified by the corre-
spoiiding equivalence 
(xG) D A Vx(G D A) 
where x does not appear in A. 
The first of these two equivalences is proved in Appendix A, and the second is 
given in [51]. 
The formal definition of both of these processes are given below. 
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As in [77], dnf and dfnf denote respectively the disjunctive normal form of a 
goal, and the disjunction-free normal form of a program. The definitions in [77] 
are given in a slightly modified form here, so that we may consider dnf(G) as a 
formula, rather than a set. We introduce along similar lines the existential normal 
form of a goal and the existential-free normal form of a program, here denoted by 
enf and efnf respectively. We will assume that each existentially quantified variable 
is unique, so that a goal such as (xp(x))A(xq(x)) is written as 3xp(x)Ayq(y). 
Definition 6. 1.1 Let D be a Dmod_ formula, G be a Gmod_ goal formula, and 
be all the existentially quantified variables of G. Then we define dfnf(D), efnf(D), 
dnf(G) and enf(G) as follows: 
dnf(G) 	= Vdnf'(G) 
dnf'(A) 	= {A} 
dnf'(-IA) 	= {-'A} 
dnf'(G1 V G2) = dnf'(G1 ) U dnf'(G) 
dnf'(G1 A G2) = {G' A G" I C' € dnf'(G1), C" E dnf'(G2)1 
dnf'(xG) 	= {RxC' I G' E dnf(G)} 
dnf'(D D C) = {dfnf(D) D G' I C' E dnf'(C)} 
dfnf(A) 	= A 
dfnf(C D A) = AIG'D A I C' E dnf'(G)} 
dfnf(D1 A D2) = dfnf(D1 ) A dfnf(D2 ) 
dfnf(VxD) 	= \fx dfnf(D) 
enf(G) = 3i enf'(G) 
enf'(A) = A 
enf'(-iA) = 
enf'(C1 V G2 ) = enf'(C1 ) V enf'(G2 ) 
enf'(G1 A C2 ) = enf'(C1 ) A enf'(G2 ) 
enf'(axG) = enf'(G) 
enf'(D D G) = efnf(D) D enf'(G) 
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efnf(A) 	= A 
efnf(G D A) = V (enf'(G) D A) 
efnf(VxD) 	= Vx efnf(D) 
efnf(D1 AD2)= efnf(D1)Aefnf(D2 ) 
We define dfnf({D1,. . . D,}) = U 1dfnf(D1), and efnf({D1,. . D,}) = U.1efnf(D). 
We may think of the process described by dnf(G) as pushing all disjunctions to 
the top level of the goal, so that dnf(G) is a disjunction of disjunction-free formulae. 
We may then apply the identity above to dnf(G) D A to obtain the disjunction-
free program. A similar remark applies to enf(G); all existential quantifiers are 
pushed to the top of the formula, and so we may apply the corresponding identity 
to enf(G) D A to obtain a program free of existential quantifications. Thus the 
above equivalences imply that 
dfnf(G D A) = V1 G' D A I C' e dnf'(G)} 	dnf(G) D A 
efnf(G D A) = V(enf'(G D A)) j enf(G) D A 
where i are all the existentially quantified variables of C. 
In this way we may specify the program equivalent to D which contains no 
occurrences of 2 or V as efnf(dfnf(D)). Note that there may be a slight syntactic 
difference between efnf(dfnf(D)) and dfnf(efnf(D)). For example, consider the 
program D below. 
r C (2xp(x) V 3y q(y)) 
It is easy to see that dfnf(D) and efnf(D) are just 
dfnf(D) 	 efnf(D) 
2xp(x) D r A 3xyp(y) D r 	VxVy (p(x) V p(y)) D r 
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(Vxp(x) D r) A (Vy q(y) D r) 
	
VxVy (p(x) D r) A (q(y) D r) 
Note also that the two processes only alter the bodies of clauses, possibly 
replacing a rule by several rules, and do nothing to facts. This is formally stated 
in the lemma below. 
Lemma 6.1.1 Let P be a Dmod derivation state. Then 
A € (D) 	A E (dfnf(D)) A E (efnf(D)) 
G D A E (D) s Gi D A E (dfnf(D)) for all i 	A E (efnf(D)) 
where dnf(G) = G1 V . .. V G and enf(G) = 
Proof: Obvious. 
It is easy to see from the definitions that 
dnf(G1 V C2) = dnf(G1 ) V dnf(G2 ) 
and that 
dnf(G1 A C2) = V{G' A G" I G' E dnf'(G1), G" e dnf'(C2)} 
Similarly it is clear that 
enf(D D 3x G) = 3x enf(D G) 
This equivalences will be useful in the proofs below. 
The formal results which establish the operational properties of D, dfnf(D) 
and efnf(D) are given below. 
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Proposition 6.1.2 Let (D, N) be a Dmod_ derivation state, and let G be a Gmod_ 
goal formula. Then 
(D, N) F, G , (dfnf (D), N) I- G 	(D, N) F-, dnf(G) 
(D, N) F1  G <> (dfnf (D), N) F- f C <=> (D, N) k f dnf(G) 
Proof: We proceed by induction on the depth of the 0-derivation of C. 
In the base case G is an atom A. It is then easy to see that both 1 and 2 
follow, as dnf(A) = A and A E (D) 	A e dfnf (D). A similar argument 
establishes 2 in this case. 
Hence we assume that 1 and 2 are true for all programs and for all goals 
whose 0-derivation is less than a given size. There are six cases: 
A: 	1. As dnf(A) = A, it suffices to show that (D, N) F, A (dfnf (D), N) F, 
A. 	Now if the base case does not hold, then (D, N) F, A if 
G 	A e (D) such that (D, N) F-, C and by the hyppthesis 
this is -equivalent to (dfnf (D),N) F, dnf(G), i.e. (dfnf (D),N) F, 
C1 V ... V G,, which is just (dfnf (D), N) F, G• for some i. Now 
as G  A E (D) if C2 D A E (dfnf (D)) for all 1< i < n where 
dnf(G) = C1 V... VG, this is equivalent to G' i A e dfnf (D) such 
that (dfnf (D), N) F, G' which is equivalent to (dfnf (D), N) F, A. 
2. As dnf(A) = A, it suffices to show that (D, N) 1-1  A 	(dfnf (D), N) F 
A. 	Now if the base case does not hold, then (D, N) F1  A if 
VB 	(D) B çk A and VG D B e (D) such that B oc A we 
have (D, N) F1  C and by the hypothesis this is equivalent to 
(dfnf (D),N) F- f dnf(G), i.e. (dfnf (D),N) F1  C1 V ... V G, which 
is just (dfnf (D), N) F1  C2 for all i. Now as C D A E (D) if C2 D 
A E (dfnf (D)) for all 1 <i <n where dnf(G) = C1 V ... V G, this 
is equivalent to VB' E (dfnf (D)) B' çk A and VG' D B' e (dfnf (D)) 
such that B' x A we have (dfnf (D), N) F f C', which is equivalent 
to (dfnf (D), N) F1  A. 
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-'A: 1. As dnf(-'A) = -'A, it suffices to show that (D, N) F- -'A < 
(dfnf(D),N) F-, -IA. Now (D,N) H, -'A if name(A) € den(N) 
and (D, N) F-, A, and by the hypothesis this is equivalent to 
(dfnf(D), N) H f A, which is just (dfnf(D), N) H, -'A. 
2. As dnf(-'A) = -'A, it suffices to show that (D, N) F-1 -'A 
(dfnf(D),N) H -'A. Now (D, N) H -'A if (1), N) H, A, and 
by the hypothesis this is equivalent to (dfnf(D), N) H, A, which is 
just (dfnf(D), N) F- f -'A. 
G1 VG2: 1. (D, N) H, G1 VG2 if (1), N) F-, C1 or (D, N) I-., G. 
By the hypothesis this is just (dfnf(D), N) 1-, C1 or (dfnf (D), N) 
G2, which in turn is just (dfnf(D), N) F-, G1 V G2 . 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to (D, N) F-3 dnf(G1) or (D, N) F-, dnf(G2) which is just 
(D, N) F-, dnf(G1) V dnf(G2 ), i.e. (D, N) F-, dnf(G1 V G2 ). 
2. (D, N) H1 G1 V C2 if (D, N) H G1 and (D, N) H1 C2. 
By the hypothesis this is just (dfnf(D), N) F-1 C1 and (dfnf(D), N) F-1  
C2, which in turn is just (dfnf(D), N) H f C1 V G2. 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to (D, N) F-i dnf(G1) and (D, N) F-1  dnf(G2 ) which is just 
(D, N) F-1  dnf(G1) V dnf(G2 ), i.e. (D, N) H f dnf(G1 V C2). 
C1 AC2: 1. (D, N) F-, C1 AG2 if (D, N) F-, C1 and (D, N) F-, C2. 
By the hypothesis this is just (dfnf(D),N) F-, G1 and (dfnf(D),N) 
C2, which in turn is just (dfnf(D), N) H, C1 A C2 . 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to (D, N) H, dnf(G1) and (D, N) F-, dnf(C2) which is just 
(D, N) I-, dnf(G1)Adnf(C2), i.e. (D, N) I-, (V{ G' I C' e dnf'(C1)})A 
(V{G" I C" E dnf'(G2 )}) which is equivalent to (D, N) F-, V{G' A 
G" I G' E dnf'(G1), G" € dnf'(C2)11  which is just (D, N) 
dnf(G1 A C2 ). 
2. (D, N) F-1  C1 AG2 if (D, N) V, C1 or (1), N) H f C2. 
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By the hypothesis, this is just (dfnf(D),N) H1 C1 or (dfnf(D),N) F-1  
G2, which in turn is just (dfnf(D), N) t- C1 A G2 . 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to (D, N) I- dnf(G1) or (D, N) H1  dnf(G2 ) which is just 
(D, N) I- dnf(G1) A dnf(G2), and as we saw above, this is just 
(D, N) V3 dnf(Gj A G2 ). 
2xG: 1. (D, N) F-3 IxG if (D, N) H3 G[t/x} for some t E U. 
By the hypothesis this is equivalent to (dfnf(D), N) H3 G[t/x], 
which is just (dfnf(D), N) F-3 3xG. 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to (D,N) F-3 dnf(G[t/x]), which is (D,N) H3 V{G' I C' e 
dnf'(G[t/x])} which in turn is equivalent to (D, N) I- G'[t/x} for 
some G' E dnf'(G), and this is clearly equivalent to (D, N) I- 3xG' , 
which in turn is just (D,N) I- V{axG' I C' E dnf'(G)}, i.e. 
(D, N) L dnf(xG). 
2. (D, N) I- axc if 3R E 7?(U) such that (D, N) F-1  G[t/x] for all 
tER. 
By the hypothesis this is equivalent to (dfnf(D), N) F-1  G[t/x] for 
all t E R, which is just (dfnf(D), N) F-1  xG. 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to (D, N) F-1  dnf(G[t/x]) for any t e R, and by a similar 
argument to that above, this is equivalent to (D, N) H1  dnf(xG). 
D' D G: 1. (D, N) F-3 D' j C if names(heads(D)) c ass(N) and (DU{D'}, N) H3 
C. 
By the hypothesis this is equivalent to names(heads(D)) c ass(N) 
and (dfnf(DU{D'}),N) F-3 G, which is just (dfnf(D)U{dfnf(D')},N) H3  
G, which by another application of the hypothesis is the same as 
(dfnf(D) U {D'}, N) H3 C, i.e. (dfnf(D), N) H3 D' D C. 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to names(heads(D)) C ass(N) and (D U {D'}, N) H3 dnf(G) 
which by another application of the hypothesis is equivalent to 
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(D U {dfnf (D')}, N) F-3 dnf(G), which is just (D, N) F3 dfnf(D') D 
dnf(G). 
This in turn i equivalent to (D, N) F3 dfnf(D') D V{G' I G' E 
dnf'(G)} which is just (D, N) F3  V{dfnf(D') D G' I G' E dnf'(G)}, 
which is equivalent to (D, N) F3 dnf(D' D G). 
2. (D, N) F f D' D C iff names(heads (D)) c ass(N) and (DU {D'}, N) H f 
G. 
By the hypothesis this is equivalent to names(heads(D)) c ass(N) 
and (dfnf(DU{D'}),N) F1  G, which is just (dfnf(D)U{dfnf(D')},N) F1  
G, which by another application of the hypothesis is the same as 
(dfnf(D) U {D'},N) F1  C, i.e. (dfnf(D),N) F1  D' D C. 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to names(heads(D)) ç ass(N) and (D U {D'}, N) F-f dnf(G) 
which by another application of the hypothesis is equivalent to 
(D U {dfnf(D')}, N) F1  dnf(G), which is just (D, N) F- f dfnf(D') 
dnf(G), and as above, this is equivalent to (D, N) F1  dnf(D' D C). 
II 
An immediate consequence of this result is given in the corollary below. 
Corollary 6.1.3 Let (F, C) be a Dmod_ derivation pair where P = (D, N). Then 
(D, N) F3 C (dfnf (D), N) F3 dnf(G) 
(D, N) F1  C (dfnf(D), N) F- f dnf(G) 
Proof: Follows immediately from proposition 6.1.2. 	 * 	0 
This result, in the absence of negation, was shown in [77], but the result cor-
responding to proposition 6.1.2 was not. 
Note that the stronger statement D j dfnf(D) is not true. A counterexample, 
due to Dale Miller [75], is given by the program D below. 
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(r D (p V q)) D s 
It is clear that dfnf(D) is 
((rDp) Ds)A((rDq) Ds) 
Whilst D Ij dfnf(D), the converse is not true. The reason is that the two goals 
G1 = r D (p V q) and G2 = (r D p) V (r D q) are not intuitionistically equivalent, 
as C1 I/ C2. This will be discussed more fully in a later section. 
We now turn to the corresponding result for existential quantifications. 
Note that the statement corresponding directly to Proposition 6.1.2 does not 
hold. Essentially, this is due to the way that failure for existentially quantified 
goals is defined. For example, consider the program P = (D, (0, {p}))  where D 




2x-'p(x) J q 
It should be clear that P I- q, as -'p(a), -'p(f(a)) and -'p(f(f(y)))  all fail, and 




Vx (-lp(x) q) 
Here -'p(f(y)) j qE efnf(D), and (efnf(D), {p}) VI -ip(f(y)), as (efnf(D), {p}) i/ 
p(f(y)). Hence, (efnf(D), {p})  F/1 q. 
This discrepancy is essentially due to the fact that (D) contains all instances 
of the clauses in D, and so contains all possible representations of those clauses, 
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whereas the failure of an existentially quantified goal requires only the failure of 
one representation. Hence, to show that q fails in the original program requires 
only that one representation fails, whereas to show that q fails in the transformed 
program requires that all representations fail. 
However, it can be shown that (D, N) and (efnf(D), N) have the same opera-
tional behaviour provided that D does not contain any negations, which is done 
below. 
Proposition 6.1.4 Let (F, G) be a Dmod derivation pair where P = (D, N). Then 
(D, N) F 3 G (efnf(D), N) H3 G (D, N) I- enf(G) 
(D, N) I- G (efnf(D), N) 1-1  G (D, N) Fj  enf(G) 
Proof: As above, we proceed by induction on the depth of the 0-derivation of G. 
In the base case G is an atom A. It is then easy to see that both 1 and 2 
follow, as enf(A) = A and A E (D) A E efnf(D). 
Hence we assume that 1 and 2 are true for all goals whose 0-derivation is 
less than a given size. There are five cases: 
A: 	1. As enf(A) = A, it suffices to show that (D, N) H3 A < (efnf (D), N) F-,9 
A. If the base case does not hold, then (D, N) H,5 A if RC D A E 
(D) such that (D, N) F-3 G which by the hypothesis is equivalent to 
3G D A e (D) such that (efnf(D), N) F-3 G. Now by the hypothe-
sis, this is equivalent to (efnf(D), N) H3 enf(G), i.e. (efnf (D), N) F-3  
MG which is just (efnf(D), N) H, G" where G" is some instance 
of G'. Now as 3G D A e (D) if HG"D A E (efnf(D)) where 
enf(G) = 3G' and G" is an instance of C', this is equivalent to 
A E (efnf(D)) such that (efnf(D), N) H3 C", which is just 
(efnf(D), N) H3 A. 
2. As enf(A) = A, it suffices to show that (D, N) H1  A s (efnf(D), N) Hf  
A. If the base case does not hold, then (D, N) H1  A if VB E (D) 
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B ç A and VG Be (D) such that B DC A we have (1), N) F-i. G 
which by the hypothesis is equivalent to VB e (D) B 	A and 
VG D B e (D) such that B oc A we have (efnf(D), N) I- G, 
which by the hypothesis is equivalent to (efnf(D), N) H enf(G), 
i.e. (efnf(D), N) F f  IiG', which is just that there is a represen-
tative set of instances R of C' such that (efnf(D), N) H1 C" for 
all C" E R. Note that without loss of generality we may assume 
that none of the variables of R occur free or bound in D or C. 
Hence by Proposition 2.3.4 this is equivalent to (efnf(D), N) H1  C" 
for all instances C,,  of GI 	 i such that no variables free n CI,  occur 
bound in D or C'. Now as 	A E (D) if HG" D A e (efnf(D)) 
where enf(G) = 3.G' and C" is an instance of G', this is equiv-
alent to VB E (efnf(D)) B ç A and VG B e (efnf(D)) such 
that B oc A we have (efnf(D), N) I f C, which is equivalent to 
(efnf(D),N) F-1  A. 
G1 VG2: 1. (D, N) F3 G1 VG2 if (D,N)F-8 C1 or (D,N)f-8 C2. 
By the hypothesis this is just (efnf (D), N) I 9 C1 or (efnf(D), N) H3  
G2, which in turn is just (efnf(D), N) H3 G1 V C2. 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to (D, N) H enf(G1) or (D, N) H3 enf(G2) which is just 
(D, N) 1-3 enf(G1) V enf(G2 ), and this is the same as (D, N) H3  
3i enf'(G1) V enf'(G2). Now without loss of generality, we may 
assume that the variables in g do not occur bound or free in C1, 
and similarly for i and C2, and so this is equivalent to (D, N) H3  
enf'(G1 V G), which is just (D, N) H3 enf(C1 V G2)- 
2. (D, N) H f C1 V G2  if (D, N) H f C1 and (D, N) H1  C2. 
By the hypothesis this is just (efnf(D), N) H C1 and (efnf(D), N) H1  
C2, which in turn is just (efnf(D), N) H f C1 V C2. 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to (D, N) H enf(G1) and (D, N) H1  enf(C2 ) which is just 
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(D, N) I-i enf(G1) V enf(G2), and as above, this is equivalent to 
(D, N) F-1  enf(G1 V C2). 
C1 AG2: 1. (1), N) I 9 C1 AC2 if (D, N) F- 9 G and (D, N) F-3 G2. 
By the hypothesis this is just (efnf(D), N) F-3 G1  and (efnf(D), N) F- 5 
G21  which in turn is just (efnf(D), N) F- 5 G1 A C2. 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to (D, N) F-3 enf(G1) and (D, N) F-3 enf(G2) which is just 
(D, N) F-3 enf(G1) A enf(G2 ), and this is the same as (D, N) F-3  
EIi enf'(G1) A enf'(G2 ). Now without loss of generality we may 
assume that the variables in g do not occur bound or free in G!, 
and similarly for i and C2, and so this is equivalent to (D, N) F-3  
enf'(G A C2 ), i.e. (D, N) F-3 enf(G1  A G2)- 
2. (D, N) F- f C1 AG2 if (D,N)F-1  C1 or(D,N) F-1  C2. 
By the hypothesis, this is just (efnf(D), N) F-1  C1 or (efnf(D), N) F-1  
C2, which in turn is just (efnf(D), N) F-1  C1 A G2 . 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to (D, N) F-1  enf(G1) or (D, N) F-1  enf(G2) whichis just 
(D, N) F-1  enf(G1) A enf(G2), and as we saw above, this is just 
(D, N) F- f enf(G1 A C2). 
xG: 	1. (D, N) F-3 3xG if (D, N) F-3 G[t/x] for some t e U. 
By the hypothesis this is equivalent to (efnf(D),N) F-3 C[t/x], 
which is just (efnf(D), N) F-3 2xG. 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiva- 
lent to (D, N) F-3 enf(G[t/x]), i.e. (D, N) F-3 	enf'(G[t/x]), which 
is equivalent to (D, N) F-3 3i3x enf'(G), which is just (D, N) F-3 
enf (C). 
2. (D, N) F-1  axG if 3R E R(U) such that (D, N) F- G[t/x] for all 
tER. 
By the hypothesis this is equivalent to (efnf(D), N) F- G[t/x] for 
all t E R, which is just (efnf(D), N) F- f dxC. 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiva- 
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lent to 317 € R(U) such that (D, N) H f enf(G[t/x]) for any t E R., 
and by a similar argument to that above, this is equivalent to 
(D, N) Ij  enf(xG). 
D' D G: 1. (D, N) F-3 D' D G iff names(heads(D)) 9 ass(N) and (DU{D'},N) F-3  
G. 
By the hypothesis this is equivalent to names(heads(D)) c ass(N) 
and (efnf(DU{D'}),N) F 3 C, which is just (efnf(D)U{efnf(D')},N) f-s 
G, which by another application of the hypothesis is equivalent to 
(efnf(D) U {D'}, N) F-3 G, i.e. (efnf(D), N) F-3 D' D G. 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to names(heads(D)) 9 ass(N) and (D U {D'}, N) F-3 enf(G) 
which by another application of the hypothesis is equivalent to 
(D U {efnf(D')}, N) I- enf(G), which is just (D, N) F-3 efnf(D') D 
enf(G), i.e. (D, N) 1-8 efnf(D') D 3(enf'(G)) which is equivalent to 
(D, N) I-, (efnf(D') D enf'(G)) which is just (D, N) I- enf(D' 
G). 
2. (1), N) F-1  D' j G iff names(heads(D)) 9 ass(N) and (DU{D},N) F 
G. 
By the hypothesis this is equivalent to names(heads(D)) 9 ass(N) 
and (efnf(DU{D'}),N) F-1  C, which is just (efnf(D)U{efnf(D')},N) H f  
G, which by another application of the hypothesis is the same as 
(efnf(D) U {D'}, N) F-1  C, i.e. (efnf(D), N) F-1  D' D G. 
From the hypothesis we may also deduce that the above is equiv-
alent to names(heads(D)) fl N = 0 and (D U {D'}, N) H f enf(G) 
which by another application of the hypothesis is equivalent to 
(D U {efnf(D')}, N) I- enf(G), which is just (D, N) H1  efnf(D') D 
enf(G), and as above this is equivalent to (D, N) F- enf(D' D C). 
r 
Note that this result depends upon Proposition 2.3.4, i.e. that all sets of repre-
sentative instances of a goal fail if a single representative set of instances of it fails. 
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The lack of a corresponding result for success is what necessitates the restriction 
to programs which do not contain negations. 
As in the previous case, the generalisation of the corresponding result in [77] 
now follows immediately. 
Corollary 6.1.5 Let (P, G) be a Dmod derivation pair where P = (D, N). Then 
(D, N) F3 G (efnf (D), N) F3 enf(G) 
(D, N) F- f G 	(efnf(D), N) F- f enf(G) 
Proof: Follows immediately from Proposition 6.1.4. 	 FE- 
As may be expected in the aftermath of corollary 6.1.3, the stronger statement 
D 	j efnf(D) is not true. A counterexample is given by the program D below. 
(p D xq(x)) D r 
It is clear that efnf(D) is 
Vx((p D q(x)) D r) 
Whilst D F1 efnf(D), the converse is not true. The reason is that the two goals 
C1  = p D 3x q(x) and G2 = 3x p D q(x) are not intuitionistically equivalent, as 
C1 F/1 C2. This will also be discussed more fully in a later section. 
Note that a consequence of propositions 6.1.2 and 6.1.4 is that P F3 C if 
P F3 dnf(G) if P F3 enf(G) when P is a Dmod program and C is a Gmod goal. 
It may be possible to strengthen Proposition 6.1.4 somewhat. For example, 
any derivation pair (F, C) for which efnf(P) = P and enf(G) = G will clearly have 
this property, whether they contain negations or not. 
Clearly the definition of failure for existentially quantified goals affects whether 
Proposition 6.1.4 will hold for Dmod.. programs or not. It seems clear that if 3xG 
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were to fail precisely when G[t/x] fails for all t E T, then Proposition 6.1.4 would 
indeed hold for Dmod_ programs and Gmod_ goals. Hence the failure of the efnf 
transformation to preserve operational equivalence under Negation as Failure is a 
consequence of the compactness properties of our definition of failure. 
We now come to the result which shows the operational equivalence (for Dmod 
programs) of the original program and the program with the disjunctions and 
existential quantifications removed. 
Theorem 6.1.6 Let (P, G) be a Dmod derivation pair where P = (D, N). Then 
(D, N) F G s (efnf(dfnf(D)), N) F-, G 
(D, N) H1  G 	(efnf(dfnf(D)),N) I-i G 
Proof: Follows immediately from propositions 6.1.2 and 6.1.4. 
U 
Thus the theorem above not only ensures that for any Dmod program there 
exists another program free of disjunctions and existential quantifications which 
is equivalent to the original, but also shows how such a program may be derived 
from the original one. 
We may interpret the above result as showing that the class of programs in 
which universal quantifiers cannot occur positively in goals is of no greater expres-
sive power than the core programs. This may be seen by the fact that any program 
in this class which contains neither 3 nor V is a core program, and the above re-
suit shows that for any program containing 3 or V there is an equivalent program 
with no such occurrences. In fact this class of programs is strictly less expressive 
than the core programs, as a core program may contain a positive occurrence of a 
universal quantifier in a goal, i.e. in the body of a clause. 
Chapter 6. Semantic Properties of Hereditary Harrop Formulae 	 212 
6.2 Normal Forms and Representation 
In the light of the above results, we may think of Dobject programs as a normal 
form for Dmod programs. In other words, for any Dmod program D, there is an 
operationally equivalent Dobject  program D', where D' satisfies 
D:=AIVxDID1 AD2 IQJA 
Q:=AIQ1 AQ2 IDDQ 
Note that the Q formulae are only used to define D'; the queries remain the 
same as before, i.e. Gmod formulae, which may be given as 
G:=AIG1 VG2 IG1 AG2 I.xGID D G 
where D is a Do&ject formula. 
Computation takes place in the same way as before, in that we search for a 
proof of a goal G from a program P = (D, N), and so we may think of the above 
processes as statically converting the program into a more specific form. 
As noted above, these computations take the form of searching for uniform 
proofs of goal formulae, but it is interesting to note that a successful search for a 
uniform proof of a goal G may be thought of as converting C into a more definite 
statement. Naively, we may think of this, as converting G into a D formula. For 
example, it is well-known that the usual unification methods used to implement 
the search for a proof of a goal of the form 3xG will return an answer substitution 
0 which not only provides a witness, i.e. a term t e U such that G[t/x] succeeds, 
but where 0 is such that any instance of GO succeeds, so that we may in fact 
conclude V(GO). Thus the search process "converts" the 3 quantifier into a number 
(possibly zero) of V quantifiers. In this way we may view the result of a successful 
computation not as "yes with the answer substitution 0", but as "V(GO)", in the 
sense that V(GO) H1 3xG.' 
'We assume that U is not empty, and so this will always be true. 
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It is easy to see that a similar property holds for disjunction, in that a uniform 
proof of G1 V G2 will prove one of the disjuncts, and so we may consider the proof 
search process as determining which of the disjuncts is true, and so we again get 
that G• Ij G1 V G2, where i is either 1 or 2. Now if we carry out this conversion 
procedure for each positive occurrence of 3 and V in the goal, then it is easy to 
see that the resulting formula looks very much like a definite formula. 
For example, consider the program P = (p(a) A q(b), 0). It is easy to see that 
the goal C = 2x p(x) V 2y q(y) succeeds, i.e. P F, C, as both p(a) and q(b) succeed. 
Now we may think of either of these as an "answer form" of the original goal, in 
that not only does the computation process supply witnesses for the existential 
quantifications, but also determines which of the disjuncts holds. In this way we 
may think of p(a) and q(b) as realizers of C in the sense of Kleene [51], in that 
either supplies sufficient information "missing" from the statement that P F, G so 
that intuitionistic truth is established. We may think of these realizers as the real 
objects of computation, in that the search process may be considered to operate 
by establishing that p(a) succeeds, and from that deducing that the success of 
p(a) implies the success of 3xp(x) V ayq(y). A similar remark applies to q(b). 
In this way the computation process finds a goal G' which contains no existential 
quantifiers or disjunctions such that P F, G' and G' F1  G. The analogy should not 
be pushed too far, but it seems intriguing that the answer forms may be thought 
of as supplying the information needed to establish the truth of the goal, and in a 
computational way. 
As noted above, this formula G' contains no disjunctions nor existential quanti-
fiers, but it may contain universal quantifiers. For example, consider the program 
P = (D, (0, 0)) where D is Vx p(f(x)). The goal 2y p(y) succeeds with the answer 
substitution being y - f(x), and so the answer form of the goal is Vs p(f(x)). 
A more specific definition of the possible answer forms for a goal may be given 
by another of the results above, namely that the success of C is equivalent to the 
success of enf(dnf(C)), which we may write as 
(Q1 v ... vQ) 
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where each of the Q• are goals which contain no disjunctions nor existential quan-
tifications, and so are just Q formulae (defined above). Thus any answer form for 
G must be just V(Q10) for some 1 < i < n and some substitution 0, and so we 
may consider a successful search for a proof of C from P as finding an i and a 0 
such that 
P F-3 V(Q10) and V(Q0) H1  C 2 
In this way an answer form plays a similar role to a cut formula (in the proof-
theoretic sense), in that in order to establish that P I 3 G, we find a formula V(Q10) 
such that P F- V(Q0) and V(Q0) F-i G, but in our case we know that the second 
statement is trivially established, whereas the first may take considerable effort to 
derive. Thus this is really a special case of the cut rule, in that C defines a finite 
number of possible choices for Q, and so we do not need to search for an arbitrary 
formula, and that one of the two sub-derivations will require no effort to establish. 
Hence we may view this form of computation as a restricted form of the cut rule. 
In order to view an answer form V(Q2 0) as a definite clause, the main difficulty 
is to accommodate the different classes of formulae which may appear on either 
side of the D connective. For example, D D Q is a Q formula, and hence a possible 
answer form, but it is not necessarily a D formula. However, it is clear that it 
is not far away from one in some sense, and so it should not be too difficult to 
convert an answer form into an equivalent D formula. This process is defined 
formally below. 
There is one other potential difficulty, and that is the possible occurrence of a 
negation in an answer form, which precludes it from being a D formula. We can 
circumvent this problem by allowing negated atoms as definite formula under the 
restriction that negation is still only applied to completely defined predicates and 
that if -'A is a clause in a program F, then P H f A. This process will be discussed 
'This is a slight abuse of notation, as we do not allow universal quantifiers in goals. 
This matter will be dealt with shortly. 
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more fully in a later section, but for now we note that we are mainly interested in 
the structure of the answer forms, and that we may think of an answer form as 
being stored in a cache somewhere, and hence is separate from the program itself. 
In this way we can allow a limited form of negation in the known consequences 
of the program without allowing this form of negation to appear in the original 
program. 
The process of re-writing an answer form to make it a definite formula is given 
below. For convenience we use the extended form of Dobject_ formulae, in which the 
conclusion of an implication in a program may be an arbitrary D formula rather 
than just an atom. As remarked previously, this does not increase the power of 
the language. 
Definition 6.2.1 Let D be an extended Dobject_ program and a Q an extended 
Gobject _ goal, that is, D and Q belong to the class of formulae defined below. 
D:=AVxDjD1 AD2 JQD 
Q:=AJ-'AIQ1 AQ2 IDDQ 
We define defp(D) and defq(Q) as follows: 
defp(A) = A 
defp(VxD) = Vx defp(D) 
defp(D1  A D2) = defp(D1) A defp(D2 ) 
defp(Q D \/xD') = Vx defp(Q D D') 
defp(Q D (D1 A D2)) = defp(Q D D1) Adefp(Q D D2) 
defp(Q D (Q' D D')) = defp((Q A Q') D D') 
defp(Q D A) = defq(Q) D A 
defq(A) 	 = A 
defq(-'A) 	 = -'A 
defq(Q1 A Q2) 	= defq(Q1) A defq(Q2) 
defq(D D (Q1 A  Q2)) = defq(D D Q1) A defq(D D Q2) 
Chapter 6. Semantic Properties of Hereditary Harrop Formulae 	 216 
defq(D D (D' Q')) = defq((D A D') D Q') 
defq(D D A) 	= defp(D) D A 
defq(D D -A) 	= defp(D) D -'A 
Note that we assume that all bound variables are unique and distinct from 
all free variables, so that we do not need to worry about variable capture when 
moving quantifiers around. 
Proposition 6.2.1 Let D be an extended Dobject_ program, and let Q be an ex-
tended Gobjeci.... goal. Then 
D defp(D) 
Q defq(Q) 
Proof: We proceed by simultaneous induction on the structure of D and Q. The 
base case occurs when D is an atom and when Q is a literal. It is obvious 
that in this case D 	defp(D) and Q 	defq(Q). 
Thus the hypothesis is that for all D and Q formulae of no more than a given 
size, D 	defp(D) and Q 	defq(Q). There are several cases to examine. 
The cases for D: 
VxD: By the hypothesis, D 	defp(D), and so \/xD = \/x defp(D), which 
is just defp(VxD). 
D1 A D2: By the hypothesis, D1 A D2 	defp(D1) A defp(D2), which is just 
defp(D1  A D2). 
Q' D D': There are four sub-cases here. We proceed via an inductive argument 
on the size of D'. The base case occurs when D' is just an atom A. By 
the hypothesis Q' 	defq(Q'), and so Q' D A 	defq(Q') D A, which 
is just defp(Q' D A). 
Hence we will assume, in addition to the main hypothesis, that for all 
Q formulae with less connectives than Q' D D' and for all D formula 
of no more than a given size that Q D D 	defp(Q D D). 
The three inductive subcases are given below 
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Q D VxD: It is clear that Q D VxD 	Vx Q D D as x is not free in Q, and 
by the hypothesis, this is equivalent to Vx defp(Q D D), which is 
just defp(Q D VxD). 
Q D (DI A D2): Q D (D1 AD2) is clearly equivalent to (Q D D1)A(Q D D2), and by 
the hypothesis this is equivalent to defp(Q D D1 ) A defp(Q D D2), 
which is just defp(Q (D1 A D2)). 
Q D  (Q"  D D): Q D  (Q"  D D) is equivalent to (QAQ") D D, and as QAQ" clearly 
has less connectives than Q D  (Q" D D), by the hypothesis this is 
equivalent to defp((Q A Q") D D), which is just defp(Q D (Q" 
D)). 
Thus we establish the result for any formula of the form Q D D. 
The cases for Q: 
Qi A Q2: By the hypothesis, Q1 A  Q2 	defq(Q1) A defq(Q2), which is just 
defq(Q1 A Q2). 
D' D Q': There are four cases here, and as above, we use an inductive argument 
to establish the overall case. The base case occurs when Q' is a literal 
L, and so by the hypothesis, D' D L j defp(D') D L, which is just 
defq(D' D L). 
Hence we will assume, in addition to the main hypothesis, that for 
all D formulae with less connectives than D' j Q' and for all extended 
Gobject _ formulae of no more than a given size that D D Q j defq(D D 
Q). 
There are two sub-cases: 
D D (Q1 A Q 2): It is clear that D D (Q1 AQ2) is equivalent to (D D Q1 )A(D D 
and by the hypothesis this is equivalent to defq(D D Q1 )Adefq(D D 
Q2), which is just defq(D D Q1 A  Q2). 
D D (D" D Q): D D (D" D Q) is clearly equivalent to (DAD") D Q, and as DAD" 
must have less connectives than D D (D" D Q), by the hypothesis 
we have that this is equivalent to defq((D A D") D Q), which is 
just defq(D D (D" D Q)). 
Chapter 6. Semantic Properties of Hereditary Harrop Formulae 	 218 
Thus we establish the result for any formula of the form D D Q. 
FEW 
It is clear from the above proof that for any program in the larger class there 
is an equivalent program in the smaller class, i.e. the class defined by using Q D A 
in place of Q D in the above definition. 
For the smaller class of programs, consider defq(D D Q). The only changes 
that the process can make are made by the defq process rather than the defp 
one, as there can be no sub-formulae of D of the form Q D D' unless D' is just 
an atom. Hence, defq(D D Q) will be just AdD1  D L} for some object level 
programs Di and literals L2. The important observation is that each D1 must have 
less connectives than D D Q, although it may contain more than D. This is due 
to the fact that any D• of greater size than D must have "gained" the relevant 
connectives from Q, and so cannot exceed this number. 
Recall that Dmeta and Gmeta formulae may be defined as follows: 
L:=AJ-'A 
D:=LIVXDJD1AD2IGDL 
G:= L IG1 A C2  I G1 v C2 I3xG IVxG ID 
Recall also that an Mmeta formula is any formula satisfying 
M:=LIVXMIM1 AM2 IMJL 
so that any Mmeja formula is both a Dmeta formula and a Gmeja formula. 
Proposition 6.2.2 Let D be an Do&ject _ program, Q be a Cobject_ goal. Then 
defp(D) is a Qmeta  formula. 
defq(C) is a Dmeta formula. 
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Proof: We will show that defp(D) and defq(Q) are both Mmeta formulae. 
We proceed by simultaneous induction on the structure of D and Q. The 
base case occurs when D is an atom and when Q is a literal. It is obvious 
that in this case that both defp(D) and defq(Q) are Mmeia formulae. 
Thus we assume that for all D and Q formulae of no more than a given size, 
defp(D) is an Mmeja formula and defq(Q) is an Mmea formula. We then 
proceed by cases as follows. 
There are three cases for D: 
\/xD': defp(VxD') = Vx defp(D'), and by the hypothesis, defp(D') is some 
core formula M, and so defp(VxD') is just VxM, and it is clear that 
VxM is a core formula. 
D1 A D2: defp(D1 A D2) = defp(D1) A defp(D2), and by the hypothesis, 
defp(D1) and defp(D2) are core formulae M1 and M2, and so defp (DI A 
D2) is M1 A M2, which is obviously a core formula. 
Q D A: defp(Q D A) = (defq(Q)) D A, and by the hypothesis defq(Q) is a 
core formula M, and so defq(Q D A) is M D A, which is clearly a 
core formula. 
There are two cases for Q: 
Qi A Q2: defq(Q1AQ2) = defq(Q1)Adefq(Q2), and by the hypothesis defq(Q1) 
and defq(Q2) are core formulae M1 and M2, and so defq(Q1 AQ2) = 
M1 A M2, which is transparently a core formula. 
D' i Q': There are four cases here, and as above, we use an inductive argu-
ment to establish the overall case. The base case occurs when Q' is 
a literal L, and so defq(D D L) = defp(D) D L, and by the hypoth-
esis defp(D) is a core formula M, and so defq(D D L) = M 3 L, 
which is clearly a core formula. 
Hence we will assume, in addition to the main hypothesis, that for 
all D formulae with less connectives than D' j Q' and for all Q 
formula of no more than a given size that defq(D 3 Q) is a core 
formula. 
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There are two remaining cases: 
D D (Q1 A Q2): defq(D D (Q1 A  Q2)) = defq(D D Q1) A defq(D D Q2), and by 
the hypothesis this is just M1 A M2 where M1 and M2 are core 
formulae, and obviously so is M1 A M2 . 
D D (D" D Q): defq(D D (D" D Q)) = defq((D A D") D Q) and by the hy-
pothesis this is a core formula M. 
Thus we establish the result for any formula of the form D D Q. 
FM- 
This result shows that we may consider computation as converting Gmod_ for-
mulae into definite clauses of a certain form, which may then be stored in addition 
to the program, in that a Gmod_ goal C may be re-written as (Q1 V ... V Q,j 
where each Q• is a G0bj€t_ formula, and if the goal succeeds, we get an answer 
form V(QO) for some 1 < i < n and so V(defq(Q)O) = V(defq(QO)) is a Dmeta 
formula. 
It is interesting to note that Horn clauses have a similar property. Consider 
the class of DH0rnV programs and GHornV goals, i.e. .D and G formulae satisfying 
D:=AID1AD2IVxDIGJA 
G:=AIGi AG2 jGi VG2 IiG 
As noted above, an equivalent class of programs is given the programs for which 
D and C formulae are given by 
D:=AID1 AD2 JVXDJGDA 
G:=AJG1 AG2  
Now in this case, for any GH0rnV  goal C, enf(dnf(G)) may be written as ](G1 V 
V C,1), and so any answer form is of the form V(CO), where the G• are the G 
formulae above. As C1 can only be a conjunction of atoms, it is obvious that 
V(G10) is a DHorn  formula. 
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In this way we may see the above results as restoring properties lost when 
generalising from Horn clauses to the class of programs defined above. Not sur-
prisingly, this required a more sophisticated approach than for Horn clauses, but 
this more complex approach still retains the essential features of the original class 
of programs in a natural way. 
6.3 Minimal Conditions for Operational Equiva-
lence 
For the rest of this chapter, we omit consideration of negation for the sake of sim-
plicity. There is no obvious problem in incorporating negation into what follows, 
but the required detail would obscure the salient points of the discussion. 
Note that F-8 and F-i, coincide on Dmod programs and Gmod goals when there 
are no completely defined predicates. 
One way to interpret the results of section 6.1 is that they define two program 
transformations which preserve the operational behaviour of programs, in that the 
original program and the transformed program are indistinguishable if the only 
available method of inspection is the evaluation of goals. If two programs produce 
the same results, i.e. the same goals succeed and fail, then we say that the two 
programs are operationally equivalent. An interesting question which arises is the 
question of "minimal testing" for observational equivalence. More formally, the 
question is what is the smallest class of goals for which operational equivalence 
needs to be established in order to show operational equivalence for all goals. It 
is easy to see that this smallest class must properly include all atomic goals. The 
reason that atomic goals alone are not sufficient is demonstrated by the following 
example. 
p 	 p 
r D q 	 q D r 
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It is clear that for both programs p succeeds and all other atoms fail, but that 
the goal q r succeeds from one program but not the other. 
An "upper bound" for this minimal class is given in the lemma below. 
Lemma 6.3.1 Let Q formulae be defined by 
Q:=AIDjQ 
where D is any DHHF formula. 
Let D1 and D2 be sets of DHHF definite formulae, and let G range over GHHF 
goal formulae. Then 
(VQ D1 FS Q=D2 F3 Q)=. (VG D1 H3 G=D2 F8 G) 
Note that the Q formulae defined above are not a subclass of Gobject  formulae, 
as the implications in the Q formulae may be DHHF formulae, rather than D066  ct 
formulae. 
Proof: Assume that VQ D1 1-3 Q = D2 F-, Q. 
First note that from the assumption we may derive that 
VQ VD D1 u {D} I-, Q D U {D} H, Q 
as for any Q formula and for any DHHF program D, D Q is a Q formula. 
Wewill show that VG VD D1 U {D} H, G = D2 U {D} H, G. It is clear that 
this will establish the result.3  
Assume that D1 U {D} F-, G. We proceed by induction on the structure of 
G. 
3 W allow the possibility that D may be the empty program. 
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The base case occurs when G is an atom A, and it is clear from the initial 
assumption that D2 F-3 A. 
Hence the induction hypothesis is that the lemma is true for all programs D 
and for all goals of less than a given size. 
There are five cases: 
G1 V G2: D1 U {D} F-s C1 V G2 if D U {D} F-3 C1 or D1 U {D} F- C2, and by 
the hypothesis this implies D2 U {D} F3 C1 or D2 U {D} F3 G21  i.e. 
D2 u{D}F3 G1 vG2 . 
C1 A C2: D1 U {D} F3 C1 A C2 if D1 U {D} F-3 C1 and D1 U {D} F3 G2, and by 
the hypothesis this implies D2 U {D} F-3 C1 and D2 U {D} F-3 C2 , i.e. 
D2 U{D}F3 G1 AG2. 
axG: D1 U{D} F3 3x G if D1 U{D} I-s G[t/x] for some tEU, and by 
the hypothesis this implies D2 U {D} F3 C[t/x] for some t E U, i.e. 
D2 U {D} F3 3x C. 
VxG: D1 U {D} l- Vx C if 3R E R(U) such that D1 U {D} F3 G[t/x]for all 
t E R, and by the hypothesis this implies D2 U {D} F8 G[t/x] for all 
t 	R, i.e. D2 U {D} 1-3 Vx G. 
D' j G': D1 U {D} F3 D':) G' if D1 U {D} U {D'} I-s G', and by the hypothesis 
this implies D2 U {D} U {D'} F3 C', i.e. D2 U {D} F5 D' D G'. 
t 
We may think of the above result as establishing that operational equivalence 
for atoms and implications is sufficient to establish operational equivalence for all 
GHHF goals. We shall see in section 6.4 how this result is useful in another context. 
A stronger result may be possible, in that operational equivalence for a smaller 
class of goals than those in the above lemma may imply operational equivalence 
for CHHF goals. Whilst such a result seems to be true, it will take more work to 
establish, and, as discussed in 6.4, the above is usually adequate. 
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Alternatively, the above result may be interpreted as stating that if we can 
establish that all extensions of two programs enable the same atoms to be derived, 
then we have established operational equivalence. Thus if we cannot distinguish 
between two programs by arbitrary mutual extensions of them, even when the only 
goals which may be asked are atomic, then the two programs are operationally 
equivalent. There may be weaker conditions under which operational equivalence 
holds, but it would seem that any weakening of this condition would come from 
restricting the extensions that may be made to the programs. 
6.4 	Notions of Equivalence 
The above deliberations involve detailed consideration of the precise relationship 
between the relations F-3 and I-I . Whilst we know that D F-3 G if D F1  G for Dmod 
and Gmod formulae, we may use I- between programs, i.e. we may ask whether 
D1 F-1 D2 or not, but we cannot use F- in the same way unless D2 is a G formula. 
Thus the greater restriction placed upon the relationship l- may have some- subtle 
affects, and so it seems worthwhile to investigate the relationship between the two 
more closely. 
One way to explore this relationship is to consider different ways in which 
consequence relations give rise to equivalence relations between programs. Maher 
[67] has shown that there are several meaningful conceptions of equivalence be-
tween logic programs; here we consider two such notions. One is the operational 
equivalence referred to above, so that two programs D1 and D2 are operationally 
equivalent if for every goal G, D1 F- G .@ D2 F-, C. This may be thought of as 
treating the programs as two black boxes, so that the only way that we may dis-
tinguish between them is by how they react to queries from the outside world. We 
will denote the operational equivalence of two programs D1 and D2 as D1 	- 
Another obvious notion of equivalence is given by the consequence relation F1 , so 
that two programs D1 and D2 are considered equivalent if D1 =_ 1 D2 . We may 
think of this as logical equivalence. 
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A natural question which then arises is whether these two notions of equivalence 
coincide, i.e. whether two programs D1 and D2 are operationally equivalent if D1  
and D2  are logically equivalent. It is easy to see that logical equivalence implies 
operational equivalence, as if D1 F1 D2 and D2 F3 C, then as D2 F3 C implies 
that D2 F1  C, we have that D1 F1  C, i.e. D1 F3 C. The corresponding case 
for D2 F1  D1  is similar. Hence, the question is whether operational equivalence 
implies logical equivalence. 
It is known that for full first-order hereditary Harrop formulae under the "new 
constant" interpretation of the universal quantifier, the notions of equivalence do 
not coincide. A counterexample, due to Frank Pfenning, is given by the two 
programs D1 and D2 given below. 
D1 	 D2  
Vs (p(x) V q(x)) D r 
	
(Vs p(x)VVx q(x)) Dr 
Let C1 = Vs (p(x) V q(x)), C2 = Vxp(x) V Vs q(x). It is clear that C2 F1  C1, 
and so C1 D r F-I C2 D r, i.e. D1 F1  D2. However, C1  F/i C2 , and so D2 F/1 D1. 
All that remains is to show that VG D1 F3 C D2 F- G (the converse is obvious 
from the fact that D1 F1  D2). From the operational interpretation of V as a new 
constant, it is clear that we may equivalently re-write D1 and D2 as D'1 and D 
as follows: 
DI 	 DI  
(p(c) V q(c)) D r 	 (p(c1) V q(c)) D r 
It should now be clear that any goal provable from D'1 is provable from 
under the operational rules given. This is because the goal Vs (p(x) V q(x)) can 
only succeed when either Vs p(x) succeeds or when Vs q(x) succeeds, due to the 
fact that in the goal p(c) Vq(c) the new constant c is treated in the same way as an 
"old" constant, rather than as a meta-variable. Hence there can be no interaction 
between the two disjuncts, which is necessary to prove Vs p(x) V q(x) in the case 
when neither Vxp(x) nor Vxq(x) succeed. 
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w3 = {r,p,s} 	 W2 = jr, q,s} 
= 0 
Figure 6-1: Kripke model in which D4 is true but D3 is not 
This still leaves the question open for the class of programs in which universal 
quantifiers are not allowed in goals, as well as for full first-order hereditary Harrop 
formulae under the extensional interpretation of the universal quantifier. How-
ever, operational equivalence does not imply logical equivalence for either class 
of programs, as is shown by the following counterexample (mentioned earlier in 
another context): 
D3  
(r D (p V q)) Ds 	((rD p) D s) A ((r D q) D s) 
Whilst D3 	D4 due to the fact that D4 = dfnf(D3), D3 and D4 are not 
logically equivalent. A Kripke model in which D4 is true but D3 is not is given in 
Figure 6-1. The reason that D3 is not true is that w1 	r D (p V q), and so for 
D3 to be true in w1, we require that s be true in w1, which it is not, and so D3 is 
not true in w1. On the other hand, we have that w1 r D p and w1  V= r D q, and 
so for D4 to be true in w1, we do not require that .s be true in w1, and in fact D4  
is trivially true in w1, as w, K r. Hence D4 is true for every world in the model, 
whereas D3 is not true in world w1. 
Thus operational equivalence is not strong enough to establish (intuitionistic) 
logical equivalence. One way to interpret this result is that the natural choice of 
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= {p, q(a), r} 	 w2 = {p, q(b), r} 
Wi = 0 
Figure 6-2: Kripke model in which D6 is true but D5 is not 
logic for programming in this context needs to have a stronger consequence relation 
than F-1, so that operationally equivalent programs are logically equivalent. Thus 
some intermediate logic is required, as D3 	D4, and we saw earlier that F-C was 
too strong to be suitable in this context. 
Not surprisingly, there is a property dual to that above which involves exis-
tential quantification, in that the programs D5 and D6 below are operationally, 
equivalent but not logically equivalent. 
D6 
(p D 3x q(x)) D r 	 'v'x ((p D q(x)) D r) 
Note that D6 = efnf(D5), which establishes the operational equivalence, but 
whilst D5 f-1 D61  the converse is not true. A Kripke model in which D6 is true 
but D5 is not is given in Figure 6-2. As in the previous case, it is easy to see 
that both formulae are true in worlds w2 and w3, but whilst D6 is true at w1, (as 
p D q(x) and so the condition that if 3xp D q(x) is true then r is true is 
satisfied), D5 is not true at w1, as w1  J= p D 3x q(x) but w1 K r. 
Thus any intermediate logic, say I', appropriate for this application will need 
to satisfy the following equivalences: 
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D D (G1 v G2 ) =P  (D C 1 ) V (D D C2) 
Dj*cG j,3xDjG 
where x is not free in D. Note that the = direction of both equivalences hold in 
intuitionistic logic. These equivalences are natural ones to choose given that we 
expect that goals which are operationally equivalent are logically equivalent. We 
will see in section 6.5 that this is indeed the case. 
The 	. directions of these rules are known as the Independence of Premise 
axioms [109], and although there are some results regarding the addition of these 
and similar axioms to Heyting arithmetic [109], not much seems to be known about 
the logic obtained by adding these rules to intuitionistic logic. 
We may think of such a logic as a logic of "present choice", in that the choice 
of witness for the existentially quantified variable cannot be postponed; if we can 
ever choose such a witness, then we can do so immediately, without investigating 
future worlds. Similar remarks apply to the disjunctive case, in that if we can ever 
choose between the two alternatives we can do so immediately, without waiting to 
see what will happen in the future. This immediacy is reflected in the computation 
process by the fact that in order to establish the truth of r from either D 5 or 
we do so by trying to prove the body of the clause, rather than considering 
possible future choices. In this way the knowledge which we may use to make the 
relevant choice is already present in the program, and so it is merely a matter of 
seeing if such a choice can be made. If it cannot, then we have no other way to 
proceed. Hence, the logic of present choice will reflect the fact that we can only 
use information encoded in the program. 
We consider the precise nature of the desired logic in section 6.5; for now, we 
look at the properties of such a logic. 
The feature which causes the failure of operational equivalence to imply equiv-
alence in intuitionistic logic is the mutual interaction of D with 3 or V. Not 
surprisingly, when one or the other of these is absent from the body of clauses 
in programs, then we do have that operational equivalence implies equivalence in 
intuitionistic logic. It is easy to see this when D1 is a core formula as if 
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VG D1 F3 G D2 FS G 
then as D1  is a G formula, it immediately follows that D2 F 9 D1, and so D2 F1  D1. 
Similarly, it is not hard to show that if there are no implications in the body 
of a clause in D1, then 
D1 dfnf(D1) efnf(D) 
and this gives D1 FAr defp(dfnf(efnf(D1))) which may be similarly used to derive 
that D2 F1  D1. 
Hence, intuitionistic logic performs precisely as computational intuition would 
suggest when there is no "mixing" of D and either 3 or V, but otherwise some 
stronger logic, whose nature seems difficult to elucidate, is needed. 
Naturally we expect a similar result to hold in the presence of such mixing 
for an intermediate logic I' in which the equivalences mentioned above hold. We 
may think of this requirement on I' as demanding that all connectives be treated 
similarly, since the corresponding equivalences for the other connectives, given 
below, are intuitionistically valid. 
DD(G1 AG2 ) I (DDG1)A(DDG2 ) 
D j (D' G) (D A D') D G 
DDVxG 1 Vx(DDG) 
where x is not free in D. 
In any such logic I', it may be shown that D 	dfnf(D) and D p efnf(D). 
This is done below. 
Proposition 6.4.1 Let D be a Dmod definite formula and G be a Gmod  goal for-
mula. Then 
D dfnf(D) 
G 	, dnf(G) 
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Proof: We proceed by mutual induction on the structure of D and C. When D 
is an atom, D = dfnf (D), and when C is an atom, C = dnf(G), and so the 
proposition is obviously true for the base case. 
Hence the hypothesis is that for all D and G formulae with less than a given 
number of connectives, the proposition holds. 
There are three cases for D: 
VxD': By the hypothesis D' 	dfnf (D'), and so VxD' is equivalent to Vx dfrif(D'), 
which is just dfnf(VxD'). 
D1 A D2: By the hypothesis each D1 is equivalent to dfnf(D1), and so D1 A D2 is 
equivalent to dfnf(D1) A dfnf(D2 ), which is just dfnf(D1  A D2). 
G D A: By the hypothesis C D A is equivalent to dnf(G) D A, which in turn 
is just (V{C' I C' E dnf'(G)}) D A. This is equivalent to A{C' D A 
E dnf'(G)}, i.e. dfnf(G D A). 
There are four cases for C: 
C1 V C2: By the hypothesis each Gi is equivalent to dnf(C), and so C1 V C2 is 
equivalent to dnf(G1) V dnf(G2) which is just dnf(C1 V G2)- 
G, A C2: By the hypothesis each Gi is equivalent to dnf(C), and so C1 A C2 is 
equivalent to dnf(C1)Adnf(G2), which is just (V{G' I C' E dnf'(C1)})A 
(V{(3' J C' E dnf'(C2)}). This is equivalent to V{C A C'2  I C'1 E 
dnf'(G1), C'2 E dnf'(G2)}, which in turn in just dnf(C1 A C2). 
xG: By the hypothesis C is equivalent to dnf(G), and so 3xG is equivalent 
to axdnf(C), which is just 3x V{G' I C' e dnf'(C)} which in turn is 
equivalent to V{xC' I C' E dnf'(G)}, i.e. dnf(xC). 
D' D C': By the hypothesis D' D G' is equivalent to dfnf(D') D dnf(C'), which 
is just dfnf(D') D V{C" I C" e dnf'(G')}. Due to the equivalence in I' 
of D D (C1 V C2) and (D D C1) V (D C2), this in turn is equivalent 
to V{dfnf(D') D C" I C" E dnf'(G') 1, i.e. dnf(D' D C'). 
EM 
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The corresponding result for the existential case is given below. 
Proposition 6.4.2 Let (D, N) be a Dmod definite formula, and let G be a Gmod  
goal formula. Then 
D j efnf(D) 
G p enf(G) 
Proof: We proceed by mutual induction on the structure of D and C. When D 
is an atom, D = efnf(D), and when G is a literal, G = enf(G), and so the 
proposition is obviously true for the base case. 
Hence the hypothesis is that for all D and G formulae with less than a given 
number of connectives, the proposition holds. 
There are three cases for D: 
VxD': By the hypothesis D' 	efnf(D'), and so VxD' is equivalent to Vx efnf(D'), 
which is just efnf(VxD'). 
D1 A D2: By the hypothesis D1 A D2 is equivalent to efnf(D1) A efnf(D2), which 
is just efnf(D1 A D2). 
G D A: By the hypothesis C D A is equivalent to enf(G) D A, which in turn 
is just ( 	(enf(G))) D A. This is equivalent to Vi enf'(C) i A, i.e. 
efnf(G D A). 
There are four cases for G: 
G1 V C2: By the hypothesis G1 V C2 is equivalent to enf(C1) V enf(C2), which 
is just (Ji enf'(G1)) V ( 	enf'(G2)), which in turn is equivalent to 
(enf'(G1) V enf'(G2)), i.e. enf(C1 V G2). 
C1 A C2: By the hypothesis G1 A G2 is equivalent to enf(G1 ) A enf(G2 ) which 
is just (3i enf'(C1)) A ( 	enf'(G2)), which is in turn equivalent to 
(enf'(G1) A enf(G2 )), i.e. enf(C1 A G2). 
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xG: By the hypothesis G is equivalent to enf(G), which is just Eh enf'(G), 
and so 3xG is equivalent to 3x Eli enf'(G), i.e. enf(xC). 
D' D C': By the hypothesis D' D G' is equivalent to efnf(D') D enf(G'), which is 
just efnf(D') 	enf'(G'). Due to the equivalence in I' of D 	xG 
and x D G, this in turn is equivalent to 3.i efnf(D') D enf'(G'), i.e. 
enf(D' D C'). 
We will see later how these two results may be seen as stronger versions of 
propositions 6.1.2 and 6.1.4 for a particular choice of I'. 
It is clear from proposition 6.2.1 that D' j, defp(D') when D' contains no 
existential quantifiers or disjunctions. Thus from propositions 6.4.1, 6.4.2 and 
6.2.1 we have that 
D 	j, defp(efnf(dfnf(D))) 
We will abbreviate the latter formula by core(D). From proposition 6.2.2 
we have that core(D) may be considered as a C formula if we allow universal 
quantifications in goals. This gives us a method for establishing that operational 
equivalence implies logical equivalence. A precise statement and proof is given 
below. 
Theorem 6.4.3 Let D1 and D2 be Dmod programs, and let C range over Cmod 
goals. 
Then 
(VC D1  1-8 C D2 F3 C) = D2 , D1  
Proof: We will show that if VG D1 F8 G = D2 F C, then D2 F1, D1. It is clear 
that this will establish the result. 
Assume that VC D1 F3 C = D2 F8 C. From lemma 6.3.1, we know that this 
implies that VC' D1 l- C' = D2 F8  G', where C' ranges over GHHF goals. 
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As mentioned above, we know from propositions 6.4.1, 6.4.2 and 6.2.1 that 
D 	p core(D), and from proposition 6.2.2 that core(D) is a GHHF formula, 
as it contains no negations. Thus we have that D1 H3 core(D1), and so 
D2 H 9 core(D1), which gives us that D2  F-P  core(D1 ), i.e. D2 Hp D1 . 
Thus for any such logic I', operational equivalence implies logical equivalence. 
As the two desired equivalences are true classically, this property also holds for 
classical logic. 
An interesting interpretation of this result it is that for any such logic I', if two 
programs D1 and D2 differ, i.e. D1 j, D2, then there is a goal which distinguishes 
the two. More precisely, from the contrapositive of theorem 6.4.3 we have that if 
D2 I/i, D1, then there is a goal G such that D1 I 3 C but it is not the case that 
D2 I- G. 
6.5 	Choice of Intermediate Logic 
Whilst theorem 6.4.3 holds when I' is interpreted as classical logic, it is clear from 
earlier discussions that this is not an ideal choice, and so the desired logic I' lies 
strictly between intuitionistic logic and classical logic. 
One intermediate logic of interest in this context is the extension of intuition-
istic propositional calculus (IPC) called lc by Gabbay [36]. This may be charac-
terised by adding to IPC the rule (in a Hilbert-style proof system) 
(pD(qVr))D((pDq)v(pDr)) 
However, ic appears to be too strong, as it loses the disjunctive property, 
i.e. it is not true that if A V B is provable then either A is provable or B is 
provable. Also, some of the alternative characterisations of ic do not fit in well 
with computational intuition. For example, another way to characterise this logic 
is to add the following rule to IPC: 
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(p D q) V (q D p) 
This does not seem to be a rule which can be justified in terms of computation, 
especially due to the restrictions which first-order hereditary Harrop formulae place 
on implications. In addition, the models are characterised as all finite partially 
ordered sets for which Vxy (x < y V y < x), and hence are linear in that any 
given worlds w1 and w2 must be related by either w1 w2 or w2 w1. This is 
in direct contradiction with the Kripke-like model theory given in [77], in which 
it is certainly not true that all worlds are comparable. Thus it seems that the 
best way to proceed is to use the Kripke-like model theory as the guiding intuition 
for the particular choice of logic P. This is particularly relevant since we are not 
interested in all first-order formulae, but only in hereditary Harrop formulae, and 
so the fact that all models of ic are linear only shows that it is not of great interest, 
rather than indicating problems. 
The Kripke-like model clearly relies heavily on the fact that the formulae in-
volved are hereditary Harrop formulae and not arbitrary first-order formulae. An 
interesting observation is that programs have similar properties to prime theories 
(also known as saturated theories) [21,107] which are used in the proof of the 
completeness of intuitionistic provability with respect to Kripke models. This sug-
gests that hereditary Harrop formulae are of interest as the worlds of some special 
kind of Kripke model. Further work in this area would presumably indicate more 
precisely the relationship between hereditary Harrop formulae and full first-order 
logic, particularly in relation to the Independence of Premise rules. 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, another intermediate logic of interest 
is the logic of constant domains. As the domain is constant for all worlds in the 
Kripke-like model, it is clear that any results which we derive for the Kripke-like 
model will hold for the logic of constant domains. 
One way to analyse the nature of I' is to explore the relation H 9 c V x Cj 
in terms of a relation on V x V and a relation on g x g. The main obstacle 
to viewing F- directly as a consequence relation in the traditional sense is that 
such relations are usually defined on .1 x .T where .1 is the set of all well-formed 
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(first-order) formulae. Hence, as is done in [77], we may view F as the restriction 
of 1-1  to V x G, as it is known that D F0 C if D F- I G [77] , and as F0 and F3  
coincide on Dmod X Gmod when there are no completely defined predicates, this 
implies D F3 G if D F1 G. However, we cannot use F3 directly for questions of 
equivalence between programs or between goals, and so for such equivalences we 
need to use F. 
An important property of the Kripke-like model is that whilst worlds are D 
formulae, the formulae which are provable from a given world are G formulae. 
Nevertheless, there is still an underlying notion of truth for D formulae in a given 
world. As discussed in the previous chapter, we may think of this second notion 
of truth along the lines of "D is assumed in world w", rather than "C is provable 
in world w". In this way there is already an implicit relation on W x V. Also 
in the same chapter we saw how we may find an interpretation T'(11) such that 
T"(11), PH-- G if P F3  G. We may think of this as a semantic characterisation 
of the relation F3. In order to think of this in terms of a relation on V x g, we 
will write Tw(I±),  P 	G as just P H= G. 	In this way we fix the choice of 
interpretation I in the triple of I,P and C, as we do not wish to consider arbitrary 
interpretations, but to investigate the nature of F3. This makes it possible to 
interpret the Kripke-like model directly as a Kripke model, as we can now consider 
which worlds prove which goals, and we may abbreviate Vw w 	G as J= G 
as is usually done. We then have that H= D D C if Vw w 	D D G if 
Vw w U {D} 	C. Now from the access relation between worlds we know that 
this is just Vw > D w 	C, as wU{D} > D for all worlds w. This in turn is 
just DH-- C, which is not surprising given that we consider. = as a semantic 
characterisation of F3. However, in a Kripke model one expects w j= D D C to 
be equivalent to Vw'> w w' = D = w' = G for some relation H. As mentioned 
above, in our case we need to consider two different consequence relations, and so 
4Strictly we should write j= T(I), to denote our choice of interpretation, but it will 
always be clear from the context what is meant. 
Chapter 6. Semantic Properties of Hereditary Harrop Formulae 	 236 
we interpret this as Vw' > w w' =D  D = w' 	G, for some appropriate definition 
Of I=D An obvious choice is given below. 
Definition 6.5.1 Let D1 and D2 be Dmod  programs. Then 
D1 I=D D2 iffT(I j )(D2 ) E Tw(1 )(D1 ) 
The results below show that =D  behaves in the expected manner. 
Lemma 6.5.1 Let D1 and D' be Dmod programs and let C be a Gmod goal. 
If D1 = C and D2  J=D D1 then D2 = C 
Proof: From D2  I=D D1 we have that Tw(1 )(D1 ) Tw(11)(D2), and so by lemma 
5.3.2 T°'(1 ), D1 H= C = T"(11), D2 j= C. Hence, as D1 j= G, we have 
that D2 	G. 
F. 
In this way =D  respects operational equivalence, as a consequence of the above 
result is that if two programs D1 and D2 are such that D1 ED D2, then the 
programs are operationally equivalent. Another interesting property of =D  is 
given in the lemma below. 
Lemma 6.5.2 Let D be a Dmod program and C be a Gmod  goal: Then 
Proof: 
(): w > D implies that {D} c w and so T°'(1 )(D) 	Tw(Ij)(w), i.e. 
W J=D D. Hence w J=D D = w Jj= C implies that w > D =:> w = C. 
(=): Vw w > D = w J= C implies that D H= C, and so if w I=D  D, then 
by lemma 6.5.1 we have that w ft= G, and so we have Vw w =D  D 
wJ=G. 
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Having defined a model-theoretic notion of consequence for programs, we next 
look for a proof-theoretic consequence relation which matches this one, so that 
we expect D1 F I, D2 if D1 F=D D2. As mentioned above, we want I-I, to include 
all intuitionistic consequences (i.e. Ii  C H11), but also for the Independence of 
Premise rules to hold, i.e.: 
DjxGH11axDjG 
D D (GI vG2)H11(D D GI ) v(D D G2 ) 
Note that the converses of both these rules hold in intuitionistic logic. 
The simplest way to define Ip is to add the two rules above to the deduction 
rules of first-order intuitionistic logic. A sequent-style proof system for I' is given 
below. This is the standard sequent system for intuitionistic logic augmented by 
the two desired rules. 






F — B C,F —*F 
B D C,F -p F 
D-L 
F,B[t/x] -* F 
V-L 
F,VxB -* F 









F -)BDC  
F '  B[y/x] V-R 
F —*VxB 
F -* B[t/x] 
F - 	xB 
F— DjxG 
F -f axD C 
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The rules V-R and -L have the side condition that y is not free in F, B or F, 
and the rule 3-D has the side condition that x is not free in D. 
We also include the standard structural rules of interchange, contraction and 
thinning. As is done in [77], we may omit the interchange and contraction rules 
if we allow the antecedents of sequents to be sets.*' Thinning may be introduced 
by a technique of antecedent thinning described in [77], but it is not vital to the 
discussion here. 
An initial sequent is a sequent F -* F where F is either an atomic formula or 
I and F E F. A proof for the sequent F -* F is a finite tree, constructed using 
the above rules, whose root is F -) F and whose leaves are initial sequents. 
We refer to proofs in the above system as I'-proofs. 
Note that the two extra rules are only applicable when the consequents are 
a particular kind of C formulae, but that the extra rules ensure that there are 
programs D1 and D2 for which D1 I/ D2 but D1 F-1, D2. For example, p D 
xq(x) I-I, 3Xp D q(x), and so (3xp D q(x)) D r i-fl (pD Bxq(x)) 
The relation F1, then gives us both the desired relation on V x V and on g x g. 
One important feature of the above proof rules is that the restriction of F-11 to V x  
is precisely F3. In this way we have not altered the way that goals are derived 
from programs, but strengthened the provability relation between programs and 
between goals. A formal proof of this property is given below. 
The following lemmas are analogous to lemmas 9 and 10 in [77], and are ex-
tended to include I'-proofs. 
'The succedent can only be a singleton set, and so we write succedents as single 
formulae. 
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Lemma 6.5.3 Let F be a set of Dmod and Gmod  formulae. Then there is no I'-
proof Of r, —) 1. 
Proof: Suppose there is such a proof of F -p I for some F. 
We proceed by induction on the height of . Clearly there is no initial 
sequent for which I E F. 
Hence the hypothesis is that for all sets F of D and C formulae, there is no 
I'-proof of F -* I of a given height or less. 
Consider the possibilities for the final rule in E. None of V-R, A-R, V-R, 
D-R, -R, 3-D and V-D are applicable, as the consequent in the resulting 
sequent must be just I. 
This leaves the following cases: 
A-L: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent must be B, C, F -f 
I, and as B A C is a D or C formula if B and C are both D formulae 
or both C formulae, this contradicts the induction hypothesis. 
V-L: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent must be B, F—L, 
and as B V C is a D or a C formula if B and C are G formulae, this 
contradicts the induction hypothesis. 
V-L: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent must be F, B[t/x] - 
I, and as VxB is a D or C formula if B[t/x] is a D formula, this con-
tradicts the induction hypothesis. 
B-L: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent must be F, B[y/x] -i 
I, and as 3xB is a D or C formula if B[y/x} is a G formula, this con-
tradicts the induction hypothesis. 
D-L: For this rule to be applicable, the previous two sequents must be F -f 
B and C, I' -f I. Now as B C must beaDor a G formula, there 
are two cases. 
In the first case, B must be a goal G and C must be an atom A, 
making the two prior sequents F -f G and A, F -f I respectively, 
which contradicts the induction hypothesis. 
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In the second case, B must be a program D and C must be a goal C, 
making the two prior sequents F -f D and C, F -f I respectively, 
which contradicts the induction hypothesis. 
I-R: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent to F -f I must be 
just F - ..L, which contradicts the induction hypothesis. 
Thus there can be no proof of F -) I when F is a set of D and C formulae. 
L 
As we often wish to restrict our attention to V x g, the following notion will 
be useful. 
Definition 6.5.2 A sequent F -p F is an O-sequent if F is a set of Dmod 
formulae and F is a Cmod formula. 
The following lemma is analogous to lemma 9 in [77]. 
Lemma 6.5.4 Let I' be a set of Dmod formulae, C be a Gmod goal and E be an 
I' -proof of F -p G. Then contains no instances of the rules V-L, -L or VLR, 
and all sequents which appear in are 0-sequents. 
Proof: We proceed by induction on the height of E. It is clear that if the root 
sequent is initial, then the antecedent must be a set of D formulae and 
the consequent just an atom A, which is clearly an O-sequent, and so the 
property holds when has height 1. 
So the inductive hypothesis is that the property holds for all I'-proofs whose 
height is less than a given value. Consider the last rule used in the proof 
of the sequent F -f C. 
It is clear that the final rule used in EE cannot be V-L, i.-L or V-R as the 
sequent resulting from such a rule will not be an 0-sequent. By lemma 
6.5.3, we need not consider the I-R rule either. 
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It only remains to show that applying the remaining rules to 0-sequents 
results in O-sequents, as then we know that the last rule used in is applied 
to an 0-sequent, to which we may apply the hypothesis. 
The cases are: 
A-L: For this rule to be applicable, we must have that B A C is a Dmod  
formula and that F is a Gmod formula, and so B and C must both be 
Dmod formulae, and so the previous sequent is an 0-sequent. 
A-R: For this rule to be applicable, we must have that B A C is a Gmod  
formula, and so B and C must both be Gmod  formulae, and so the 
previous sequents are O-sequents. 
V-R: For this rule to be applicable, we must have that B V C is a Gmod  
formula, and so B and C must both be Gmod formulae, and so the 
previous sequents are 0-sequents. 
D-L: For this rule to be applicable, we must have that B is a Gmod formula, 
C is an atom and F is a Gmod formula, and so the previous sequents 
are 0-sequents. 
D-R: For this rule to be applicable, we must have that B D C is a Gmod  
formula, and so B is a Dmod formula and C is a Gmod  formula, and so 
the previous sequent is an O-sequent. 
V-L: For this rule to be applicable, we must have that VxB is a Dmod formula, 
and so B[t/x] is a Dmod formula, and so the previous sequent is an 0-
sequent. 
-R: For this rule to be applicable, we must have that 3xB is a Gmod  formula, 
and so B[x/t] is a Gmod formula, and so the previous sequent is an 0-
sequent. 
-D: Clearly 3xD.D C is a Gmod formula if D D 3xG is a Cmod formula, 
and so the previous sequent is an 0-sequent. 
V-D: Clearly (D D G1 ) V (D D C2 ) is a Cmod formula if D D (C1 V C2 ) is a 
Cmod formula, and so the previous sequent is an 0-sequent. 
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FEW 
An easy extension to this result is given below. 
Definition 6.5.3 A sequent F -f F is an I'-sequent if every element of F is 
either a Dmod or Gmod formula, and F is either a Dmod formula or a Gmod formula. 
Note that F may contain both Dmod and Gmod  formulae, so that 
{Vxp(x), 3xq(x)} -b p(a) A p(b) 
is an I'-sequent. 
Lemma 6.5.5 Let F -p F be an I'-sequent and let E be a proof of F -+ F. 
Then every sequent which appears in is, an I'-sequent. 
Proof: We proceed by induction on the height of E. It is clear that the base case 
holds, as then F - F must be an initial sequent. Hence the property holds 
when has height 1. 
So the inductive hypothesis is that the property holds for all I'-proofs whose 
height is less than a given value. Consider the proof EE of the sequent F -* F. 
Consider the final rule used in 
The are a number of cases: 
A-L: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent must be B, C, F -f 
F, and as B A C is a D or G formula if B and C are both D formulae 
or both C formulae, this is clearly an I'-sequent. 
A-R: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequents must be F - B 
and F - C, and as B A C is a D or C formula if B and C are both 
D formulae or both C formulae, these are both clearly I'-sequents. 
V-L: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequents must be B, F -p F 
and C, F -) F, and as B V C is a D or G formula if B and C are both 
C formulae, these are both clearly I'-sequents. 
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V-R: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent must be either 
F -p B or F -p C, and as B V C is a D or G formula if B and C are 
both G formulae, in either case it is clearly an I'-sequent. 
-L: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequents must be F -p B 
and C, F - F. now as B D C must be a D or a G formula, there are 
two cases. 
In the first case, B must be a G formula, and C must be an atom, and 
as F must be either a D or a G formula, clearly both prior sequents are 
I -sequents. 
In the second case, B must be a D formula, and C must be a G formula, 
and as F must be either a D or a G formula, clearly both prior sequents 
are I'-sequents. 
-R: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent must be B, F -f C. 
As B D C must be a D or G formula, there are two cases. 
In the first case, B must be a G formula, and C must be an atom, and 
so clearly the previous sequent is an I'-sequent. 
In the second case, B must be a D formula, and C must be a G formula, 
and so clearly the previous sequent is an I'-sequent. 
V-L: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent must be F, B[t/x] -+ 
F, and as VxB is a D or C formula if B is a D formula, the previous 
sequent is clearly an I'-sequent. 
V-R: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent must be IF, -f 
B[y/x], and as VxB is a D or G formula if B is a D formula, the 
previous sequent is clearly an I'-sequent. 
ThL: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent must be F, B[y/x] - 
F, and as 3xB is a D or G formula if B is a C formula, the previous 
sequent is clearly an I'-sequent. 
-R: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent must be F -f 
B[y/x], and as *rB is a D or C formula if B is a C formula, the 
previous sequent is clearly an I'-sequent. 
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-D: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent must be F -f D 
G, which is clearly an I'-sequent. 
V-D: For this rule to be applicable, the previous sequent must be F -f D D 
(C1 V C2), which is clearly an I'-sequent. 
I —R: By lemma 6.5.3, this rule cannot occur in E. 
t 
As noted above, the Kripke-like model incorporates features of the logic of 
constant domains, and so we desire I' to be at least as powerful as this logic. The 
standard proof-theoretic way to enhance intuitionistic logic in this way is to add 
the following rule (in a Hilbert-type proof system): 
Vx (cV&(x)) D (qfVVx(x)) 
We may incorporate this rule into the sequent system for I' by adding the 
following inference rule: 
F 	Yx (0 V (x)) CD 
We refer to the extended proof system as 
However, if we restrict our attention to D and C formulae, then this rule can 
never be used, as neither of the above two consequents are D formulae, and as 
we do not allow universal quantification in goals, they are not G formulae either. 
Hence, this rule will not affect the provability relations between D formulae or 
between C formulae. We give a formal proof of this result below. 
Proposition 6.5.6 Let F -* F be an I'-sequent. Then any I'CD-proof of 
F -f F is an I'-proof. 
Proof: We need only show that the CD rule is never used in 
We proceed by induction on the height of E. It is clear that the base case 
holds, as the formula Vx (0 V &(x)) is not an atom. 
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Hence we the induction hypothesis is that all ID  proofs of F -p D or 
F - C of no more than a given size contain no occurrences of the CD rule. 
Consider the final rule used in . As 0 V Vx '(x) is neither a D formula nor 
a G formula, the final rule cannot be the CD rule. Hence by lemma 6.5.5 
all the previous sequents must be I'-sequents, and so by the hypothesis, the 
CD rule is not used in the sub-proofs of any of the prior sequents. 
Hence by induction we get that the CD rule does not occur anywhere in E, 
and so is an I'-proof. 
101 
Next we show that when we restrict Ip to V x G, we get precisely I-s , i.e. that 
our extension to intuitionistic logic does not affect the provability relation between 
programs and goals. 
Proposition 6.5.7 Let D be a Dmod program and C be a Gmod goal. Then 
DF JIGDF3 G 
Proof: AsDFs GDHj G and I-i CHi,,we only need to show that DH1 G. 
D l- G. Let be an I'-proof of D -p C. By lemma 6.5.4, all antecedents 
in 	are sets of D formulae, and so the only uses of the rules 	and V- 
are of the form 
IF 	D' DxG 
	
F -i D' D (C1 vG2 ) 
F -p xD' D C' F -f (D' D C1) V (V' D C2 ) 
where F is a set of D formulae. It is clear that we may view F as either a 
set of D formulae or as a conjunction of D formulae. 
Now 
F F1 D' D 3x G' F F3 D' j 3xG' 
IF, D' k., axG' 
<=> F, D' F3 G'[t/x] for some term t U 
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4 IF, D'[t/x] F 5 G'[t/x] as x is not free in D' 
4 F F D'[t/x] D G'[t/x] 
F H8 IxD' D G' 
4 F H1  3xD' D C' 
Similarly 
FF-1 D' D (G1 vG2)FH3 (D' (C1 vG2 ) 
r, D' H3 C1 vG2 
r, D' H 9 C1 or r, D' I 3 C2  
r, D' D G or F H 9 D' D C2  
FH3 (D' D GI ) v(D'DC2 ) 
FH1 (D' DG1)v(D' D C2) 
Hence the forms of the two rules -D and V-D are derived rules of intuition-
istic logic on the fragment V x Q, and so any I'-proof of D - G is an 
I-proof of D -f C, i.e. D In C D F-I G. 
In this way I' proves the desired equivalences between programs and between 
goals, but does not affect computations, i.e. the consequence relation between 
programs and goals. This property is also reflected in the following two corollaries 
of the above proposition. 
Corollary 6.5.8 Let D1 and D2 be Dmod programs and let C be a Cmod goal. 
If D1 H8 G and D2 H11 D1 then D2 H3 G 
Corollary 6.5.9 Let D be a Dmod program and let G1 and C2 be Gmod goals. 
If D H3 C1 and C1 H11 G2 then D H5 C2  
Thus the same goals may be derived from programs which are provably equiv-
alent in I', and goals which are provably equivalent in I' behave identically. 
Chapter 6. Semantic Properties of Hereditary Harrop Formulae 	 247 
We are now in a position to prove the equivalence of the two relations on D 
formulae. 
Theorem 6.5.10 Let D1 and D2 be Dmod  programs. Then 
D1 F-1, D2 D1 D  D2 
Proof: 
(=.): D1  F-1, D2 implies that 
VGD2 I-JIG=D1 I- JIG 
and by proposition 6.5.7 this is equivalent to 
VGD2 F-3 G=D1 H3 G 
which in turn is equivalent by theorem 5.4.5 to 
VGT(I1),D2 ft=G=7T(I1),D1 H=G 
Now in particular, we have that 
T"(Ij,D2 I=A=T"(I1),D1 H=A 
for any atom A, and so 
A E pos(T)(I1)(D2) = A E pos(Tw)(Ii)(Di) 
i.e. 
DI I=D D2 
(=): D1 	D2 implies that T"(I1)(D2) 	Tw(I±)(D1), and so by lemma 
5.3.2 we have 
VG T(I1), D2 4= G = Tw(11), D1 ft= C 
which is equivalent by theorem 5.4.5 to 
VG D2 H3 G = D1 H3 C 
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and by theorem 6.4.3 this implies that D1 1-1, D2. 
El 
The corresponding result for Gmod formulae is more problematic. One way 
to derive a model-theoretic notion of equivalence between goals is to consider two 
goals to be equivalent if there is no program on which they behave differently. 
This is a natural dual to theorem 6.4.3, as we may interpret that result as stating 
that if there is no goal which behaves differently for two given programs, then 
the programs are equivalent. For these reasons the following definition seems a 
natural way to define HG 
Definition 6.5.4 Let G1 and G2 be Gmod goals. Then 
It is easy to show an analogous lemma to lemma 6.5.1. This is done below. 
Lemma 6.5. 11 Let G1 and C2 be Gmod goals and let D be a Dmod program. Then 
If D = G1 and C1 G G2 then D 4= C2  
Proof: C1 =G C2 implies DH-- C1 = D = C2, and so clearly the result holds. . 
We also expect the analogous result to theorem 6.4.3 to hold. A formal state-
ment is given below. 
Conjecture 6.5.12 Let C1 and G2 be Gmod  goals. Then 
(VD DI-3 G1 	DH3G2)G1H11C2 
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The problem in proving this result is deriving the analogous result to lemma 
6.3.1; in particular we require that the operational equivalence of C1 and C2 over 
all Dmod programs is sufficient to establish the operational equivalence of C1 and 
C2 over all DHHF programs. The difficulty is that in the corresponding case for 
the operational equivalence of programs, there was a simple way to decompose 
goals into simpler goals, and so there was a straightforward induction argument. 
However programs are not so easily decomposed, and so it seems unlikely that an 
inductive argument will work. A model-theoretic argument seems to be the most 
promising, but has not borne fruit yet. 
If we had such a result, then we may expect a proof of the above conjecture to 
run as follows: from VD D I-, G1 = D F- C2, by the assumed result and propo-
sition 6.2.1 we may conclude that defp(V(QO)) I-s C2, where V(QO) is an answer 
form of G1. From this, proposition 6.5.7 and another application of proposition 
6.2.1, we get that V(Q10) Ip G2, i.e. that any answer form of G1  is also an answer 
form of G2, and as this must hold for any answer form of C1, we conclude that 
G1 F- C2 . 
A further conjecture is that the two notions of consequence for C formulae 
coincide. One direction may be easily shown, and the other follows from the 
above conjecture. 
Proposition 6.5.13 Let G1 and G2 be Gmod goals. 
If G F-1, C2 then C1 hG  C2 
Proof: If D I-i, G1  then by proposition 6.5.7, D F-3 C1, and so by corollary 6.5.9, 
if D H 3 C1 and C1 H1, C2 then D F-3 C2 . By theorem 5.4.5 this in turn is 
just D H= C1 and C1 }-, C2 implies D 	C2, and so C1 F-I, C2 implies that 
G1 	G  C2. 
II 
The conjecture below is the converse to proposition 6.5.13, and follows imme-
diately from the conjecture above. 
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Conjecture 6.5.14 Let C1 and G2 be Gmod goals. 
If G G C2 then G1 I — jiG2  
6.6 Discussion 
We have seen that the natural logic in which to express the equivalence of Dmod 
programs and Gmod goals is slightly stronger than intuitionistic logic, but still 
less than classical logic, and is at least as strong as the logic of constant domains. 
However the properties of interest are affected by the fact that we are interested in 
only a fragment of first-order logic - namely the Dmod  and Gmod formulae, although 
it is desirable to extend this fragment to include DHHF and GHHF formulae. 
Looking at a restricted class of formulae means that the possible worlds need 
not necessarily have a linear relation between them, as is suggested by ic. The 
Kripke-like model seems to be the best way to investigate I', as it is relatively 
well understood. One problem with the proof theory outlined above is that it is 
obviously hacked to derive the required results, rather than inherently natural. It 
is clearly desirable to find a more informative proof system. 
An interesting result reported in [34] says that for formulae which do not 
contain 3 or V, the logic of constant domains is equivalent to intuitionistic logic, 
and so the extensional interpretation of V is then a natural way to implement 
universal quantification. This also suggests that our choice of I' is a natural one. 
One way to think of the difference between I' and intuitionistic logic is to 
think of I' as preserving the constructive spirit of intuitionistic logic but using a 
slightly stronger proof system in order to allow a more uniform method of finding 
proofs, and so being more amenable to implementation. The main problem with 
intuitionistic logic for first-order hereditary Harrop formula is the treatment of the 
connectives on either side of D, as specified by the five equivalences below. 
D j (xG) , x(D D G) 
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D D (VxC) =p Vx(D D G) 
D D (C1 V C2) =P  (D C1) V (D D C2) 
DD (GI AG2 ) 11(DJG1)A(DDC2 ) 
D (D' C) (DAY) DG 
As the first and third equivalences are not intuit ionistically valid, this uni-
formity is not maintained in intuitionistic logic. We may think of this uniform 
property as reflecting the underlying structure of the formulae involved. A uni-
form proof proceeds by decomposing the structure of the goal, and when the 
simplest structural component, i.e. an atom, is reached, the usual unification and 
backtracking methods may be used to generate another goal, which is then struc-
turally decomposed, and so on. Clearly this process relies on the fact that atomic 
goals may be easily handled, and hence uses a particularly restricted form of con-
sequent (i.e. the right hand side of ) in programs. In this way it is the structural 
properties of the formulae used as programs that leads to a proof system which is 
sufficiently straightforward that it may be interpreted directly as computation. 
As the result of section 6.1 suggest, the class of formulae used may have the 
same expressive power as a larger class of formulae, and so may be used as an 
implementation vehicle for the larger class of formulae. As mentioned earlier, we 
may allow C D D as a definite formula, as we know that we can re-write such 
a formula as a conjunction of definite formulae in which the conclusions of all 
implications are just atoms. In this way the smaller class of formulae represents 
a compromise between expressive power and feasibility, in that we can express 
the same information in a more restrictive language, which is all that is necessary 
to be implemented. This principle of maximality of information seems important 
when discussing the semantic nature of P. From programming principles, it seems 
intuitively clear that it is best if the ratio of information to structure is as large as 
possible. This not only leads to greater feasibility, but also presumably to greater 
clarity. 
This principle of maximality of information may also be used to explain the 
choice of formulae. Due to the fact that we may define D formulae in either of the 
following ways, 
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D:=AJVxDID1 AD2 IGJA 
D:=AIVxDDi AD2 ICDD 
if we were to allow 3xD and D1 V D2 as definite formulae, then all formulae of the 
positive fragment of first-order logic may be used as programs. However, neither of 
the formulae 3xD and D1 V D2 may be considered to convey a maximal amount of 
information, as if 3xD is true, there must be an instance t of x such that D[t/x] is 
true, and so if the programmer knew such a t, more information would be conveyed 
by the program D[t/x] than by the program 3xD. Similarly, in order that D1 V D2  
be true, it must be the case that either D1 or D2 is true, and so either of the latter 
two programs will convey more information than the former program. In this way 
hereditary Harrop formulae force the programmer to give the maximal amount of 
information. 
From the point of view of possible worlds, we may think of this property as 
minimising the necessity to examine future worlds in order to prove something 
about the current world. This is clear from the definitions of truth under ft= for 
D 	G, -A and VxG when compared to their counterparts in a Kripke model. The 
only time it is necessary to move to a world above the current one is in order to 
prove an implication, and the only world that is considered is the extension to the 
current world given by assuming the antecedent of the implication. In this way our 
philosophical thrust is somewhat different from that of intuitionistic logic. The 
Kripke model semantics is usually motivated by the idea of an ideal mathematician 
who increasingly builds up knowledge and who has unlimited resources. We may 
think of this ideal mathematician as answering the question "What is true?", 
and hence searching for truth in a timeless fashion. If a given statement involves 
examining several possible futures, then he, not unlike the approach of a brute 
force chess program, explores them all and comes to a conclusion. 
This is not really in keeping with the notion of programming, which is more 
concerned with finding out what is known now, rather than what is currently 
known and what will be discovered in the future. In contrast with the global 
approach of the ideal mathematician, who starts from no assumptions and aims 
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to explore all possible worlds eventually, we think of exploring the possible worlds 
from within, in that we envisage our explorer setting out from a given spot in the 
partial order and seeing what may be deduced from there. Hence our exploration 
is a part of the overall exploration, but is local rather than global in nature. 
The difference in perspective seems to be reflected in the difference between in-
tuitionistic logic and the intermediate logic I'. In the former case, we are concerned 
with a particular logical system, and wish to explore a variety of possibilities. In 
the latter case, we are concerned with a particular class of formulae, and we are 
thus able to come to stronger conclusions than is possible in intuitionistic logic. 
We do not wish to consider all possible models, but generally only the models of a 
particular program. In this way we are generally more interested in consequence 
in I' than theoremhood in I', and as such we are able to use a more interesting 
model theory than is given by related intermediate logics such as ic. Overall, the 
fact that we have a narrower motivation than that of intuitionistic logic means 
that we can derive appropriately stronger results. 
Chapter 7 
Meta-programming Features of Hereditary 
Harrop Formulae 
In this chapter we use some results from the previous chapter to allow memoisation 
to take place for a large class of programs. Due to the kind of formulae needed to 
memoise goals, this leads to a natural separation into an object level and a meta-
level. This separation may be used for several common programming tasks, and 
seems to be a natural way to explore memoisation properties. We also disçiss the 
possibilities for extending memoisation to full first-order hereditary Harrop formu-. 
lae, which would allow a greater degree of flexibility at the object level. Another 
issue is the use of implication in the bodies of clauses as a meta-programming 
device. Whilst there are many meta-programming tasks which require the use of 
programs as objects, and are hence necessarily higher-order, there are some which 
may be performed in a first-order framework. We give several examples of how 
this may done. 
7.1 Memoisation Properties 
In chapter 5 we gave a Kripke.-like model for DHHF_ programs, that is 
D:=AlVxDID1 AD2 tGJA 
G:=Al -'AlxGtVxGIGi AC2 IGi VG2 IDDG 
254 
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As has been mentioned above, the Kripke-like model naturally incorporates a 
notion of program development in the form of the reachability relation between 
worlds. We have seen how the reachability relation given above may be thought of 
as requiring that all extensions of the current program be consistent. We may use 
this notion to study the programming process, as we may consider the programmer 
to begin at the bottom world and work his way up to the final program via the 
access relation. In order to carry out such a process, the programmer needs some 
specification of the desired program's behaviour, which we may think of as some 
particular interpreted world, i.e. (S, F) where S is the set of atoms which the 
programmer desires to succeed, and F is the set of atoms which the programmer 
desires to fail. We can then think of the development /debugging process as finding 
a program P such that T"(I1)(P) = (8, F). Naturally one way to specify (5, F) 
is via an interpretation I and a program P such that 1(P) = (5, F). In this 
way our framework may be an interesting one in which to study formal program 
development. 
At the conclusion of the development of the program, so that we now have 
T(I1)(P) coinciding with the program's specification in the above sense, we may 
consider that the programmer passes the program to the machine so that deduc-
tions may be made from the knowledge encoded in the program. These deductions 
take the form of searching for uniform proofs of goal formulae, but it is interesting 
to note that a successful search for a uniform proof of a goal G may be thought 
of as converting C into a more definite statement. 
As discussed in chapter 6, we may think of this process as searching for in-
formation to complete our knowledge of the truth of the goal G. We saw that if 
(D, N) I- C, then in many cases the extra information that has been computed 
enables us to express the success form of G as a definite formula D. 1  We may 
then record this information as a larger program (DU {D'}, N) which has the same 
consequences as (D, N). This larger program may lead to shorter proofs than the 
'The exceptions are the cases where the failure of Proposition 6.1.4 in the presence 
of negation is relevant. 
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smaller one, as we may use previous computations in subsequent proofs, rather 
than recompute known results. Thus the larger program has the same meaning, 
but may be more efficient, as we can record the results of previous computations, 
rather than throwing them away. 
This technique is known as memoisation [72], and is known to be useful for 
avoiding redundant computation, as it allows known results to be stored for later 
use, thus reducing the amount of work that must be done. In our case, this consists 
of storing consequences of the program, so that the proof search process need not 
start from scratch each time that a new goal is presented. This is akin to the 
way that a mathematical theory is built up; one starts from the axioms of a given 
theory, and derives some basic results. Subsequent proofs then refer to this list 
of results, rather than resort to the axioms each time, and in so doing often re-
discovering known proofs. In this way the reasoning process produces an increasing 
set of consequences of the axioms, and later proofs refer to this set of consequences, 
rather than the original axioms alone. Some aspects of memoisation for Dmod 
programs were discussed in [77], where the emphasis was on the memoisation of 
atomic goals. 
We saw in the previous chapter how we may think of the computation process 
as removing disjunctions from goals and replacing existential quantifiers with zero 
or more universal quantifiers, which is very similar to the processes described in 
section 6.1 which exploit the structure of programs to show that disjunctions and 
existential quantifiers are not necessary. Thus the memoisation process seems to 
be a natural extension of this process of "tightening up" the program. 
However there are some technical difficulties with the answer form of the goal. 
As shown above, this is of the form V(G10) where G• is a 	formula 2  i.e. 
Gi is of the form 
20f course, if the goal contains a negation, it may not have such an answer form, 
due to the failure of Proposition 6.1.4 for such goals. However, for the purposes of this 
discussion we will assume that such an answer form exists. 
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G:=Aj -'AIG1 AG2 IDJG 
D:=AIVXDID1 AD2 IGJA 
It is clear that V(G9) is very close to a D0bi t .. formula. That is, by proposition 
6.2.2 we have that defq(G10) is a Dmeta formula and so we may memoise V(GO) by 
adding V(defq(GO)) to the program if this is a D0 b t _ formula, and by proposition 
6.2.1 this is equivalent to the original formula. 
There are two possibilities which may ensure that Vdefq(G10) is not such a 
formula: the possible occurrence in G1 of a subformula D' D G', and the possible 
occurrence of a negation in G1. The first possibility will require that universal 
quantifiers be allowed in goals, as whilst D D A is a Gobject _ formula, in order to 
view it as a D formula, we need to allow the possibility that D contains universal 
quantifiers. The second possibility will require that we treat negated literals in a 
symmetric way to positive literals (i.e. atoms). 
For example, if we find that the goal (Vxp(x)) D -'q succeeds, then we cannot 
store this formula as a clause due to the fact that the conclusion is not an atom, 
and the premise is not a G,, 0d_ formula. 
The first possibility destroys the property of the proof search process that 
disjunctions are not necessary in any answer form of a goal, as in a goal such as 
Vx even(x) V odd(x), the disjunction cannot be removed as it was previously. As 
discussed in section 2.4.3, the second possibility involves non-trivial questions of 
consistency. These considerations would tend to imply that there is no appropriate 
memoisation property for Dm0 d_ formulae. 
Fortunately, this does not seem to be the case. We imagine that the program-
mer desires the greatest amount of flexibility possible when writing programs, and 
so whilst any program he or she writes which contains existential quantifiers or 
disjunctions may be re-written as an operationally equivalent program which con-
tains neither connective, the programmer would presumably wish to use the more 
general form for writing programs and the more restrictive one for proving prop-
erties of programs and so forth, which may be easier in the more restrictive case. 
In this way there are two ways to view the program: the human view, in which we 
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desire as great a degree of generality and flexibility as possible, and the machine 
view, in which we desire as great a degree of specific information as possible. The 
precise level of generality desired in each view is not the issue here; what is impor-
tant is that the programmer and the machine tend to have two different attitudes 
towards the same program. 
These two different views may be characterised as an object level and a meta-
level. The programmer is generally concerned with the data which the program 
will manipulate, and so thinks of the program as a way to capture and describe 
the properties of the real objects of his or her concern. On the other hand, the 
machine sees the same program as an object which will require certain resources, 
so that the program itself, rather than the objects it manipulates, is the prime 
concern. 
As we envisage memoisation being performed by the system and not by the 
programmer, a natural way to resolve the above difficulties is to define object level 
programs as above, but to allow a more general class of programs as meta-level 
programs, i.e. Dmeta formula, which may be defined as follows: 
D:=AJ —lAIVxDIDiAD2jGJAIGD - A 
G:=AI -'AIxGJVxG JG1 AG2 1G1 VG2 I'D D G 
Whilst we allow some potentially more troublesome programs at the meta-
level, memoising the object level programs will not "use" all the possibilities. One 
example of this is given by theorem 6.1.6, which states that existential quantifica-
tion and disjunction are redundant constructs in Dobject programs. Also, the fact 
that we allow negations in the heads of clauses in meta-level programs may lead 
to inconsistent programs, but as we shall see, memoising object level programs 
can never lead to an inconsistency. Thus we wish any program which satisfies 
the appropriate definition to be an object level program, but we do not wish for a 
corresponding property for meta-level programs. This is due to the fact that meta-
level programs are constructed in a known way from object level programs. Hence, 
any meta-level program will satisfy the above definition, but we do not necessarily 
wish to consider anything which satisfies the definition as a meta-level program, 
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as we will only consider meta-level programs which arise from the memoisation of 
object level programs. So in this case the only genuine difference between the two 
classes of programs will be that in meta-level programs, universal quantifiers may 
appear in the body of clauses and negations may occur in the heads of clauses. 
The combination of these two properties will then allow us to consider the answer 
form V(GO) of a goal G as a program clause, and so we may consider that the 
program at the meta-level is now (D U {Vdefq((GO))}, N). 
This seems a natural way in which to view memoisation, in that the program 
has not changed, and so the programmer's view of it should be the same, whereas 
the machine's view has been extended, in that some of the consequences of the 
program have been calculated and then reflected back into the program. Hence the 
internal knowledge contained in the program remains the same; external knowledge 
about the program has been increased. 
For example, consider the program 
p(f(a)) : q 
r(f(a)) 
where r is completely defined. The goals (Vx p(x)) D q and —r(a) both succeed, 
and so the memoised meta-level program is 
p(f(a)) D q 
r(f(a)) 
(Vxp(x)) :: q 
-r(a) 
It is obvious that V(A) and V(-A) are both meta-level programs. Note also that 
for V(-A) to be an answer form, we must have that every instance of -'A succeeds, 
i.e. that every instance of A fails, and so there can be no inconsistency arising 
from memoising negated formulae in this way. Thus we do not allow any new 
form of negation at the meta-level; all we are concerned with here is memoising 
the object level program, and so whilst -IA may appear in a meta-level program, 
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we still require that negation only be applied to completely defined predicates. 
It is this restriction that allows the negations in the meta-level programs to be 
consistent, as then we may apply the NAF rule, and it is obvious that if A fails it 
is consistent to add -iA to the program. 
In this way we do not expect the programmer to use negated atoms as defi-
nite clauses, but that the memoisation procedure may, and so whilst we may not 
extend completely defined predicates positively, we may extend such predicates 
negatively, provided that the extension is consistent with the program. For exam-
ple, if P = (D, N) is the standard append program (so that append e den(N)), 
then we wish to be able to memoise \/x -append([], [] [x]), and so we desire that 
the program P' = (D U {Vx -'append([], []' [x])}, N) be accessible from P. Note 
that the goal append([], [], [1,2]) D G will cause no problems, because the program 
(D U {Vx-append([], [], [x])} U {append([], [], [1, 2])}, N) is not accessible from P', 
due to the fact that the larger program extends the positive definition of a com-
pletely defined predicate of F', and so append([], [], [1,2]) D G will fail. Thus the 
access relation between worlds needs only to look at the positive extensions to a 
completely defined predicate, as all negative extensions which are addedin the 
safe way described above are consequences of the program. 
Now that we have a precise description of how memoisation may be performed 
in this context, we may consider the computation process as a natural continuation 
of the programming process, which started from the empty program and proceeded 
to larger and larger worlds as the process went on. After this phase is concluded, 
we may consider the process of moving upwards in the cone of worlds to continue, 
as we may memoise each successful goal, and so move to successively larger worlds 
which are accessible from (and hence consistent with) the original program. Thus 
computation in this setting is envisaged in precisely the same way as the ideal 
mathematician of the intuitionistic school; a process of ongoing acquisition and 
assimilation of knowledge. 
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7.2 	Memoisation for Larger Classes of Programs 
The results of sections 6.1 and 6.2 depend crucially on the fact that we are using 
Gmod formulae and not GHHF formulae as goals. We may interpret these results as 
indicating that the above class of programs and goals is in some sense maximal, as 
any extension to the class of goals (other than extending the negative fragment) 
will lose the memoisation property. We cannot extend the above approach in the 
obvious way to the case when universal quantification is allowed in goals. The 
problem is that a universal quantifier may "block" the process of pushing the 
disjunctions outward. For example, consider the piogram below. 
(Vxp(x) V q(x)) D r 
There is no way to move the disjunction outside the universal quantification, 
as there was previously. 
An alternative conclusion is that the above class of programs needs,,._to be 
extended so that goals such as 
Vx even(x) V odd(x) 
may be memoised. This requires a significant extension to the class of programs 
defined above. 
Such an extension seems undesirable, as an essential property of uniform proofs 
is that they depend only on the structure of the goal, and so a large goal may be 
systematically broken down into smaller goals (possibly increasing the program 
along the way), resulting eventually in an atomic goal, which may then be matched 
against the head of a clause in the program, and a new goal generated. To allow 
the above goal as a clause would mean that this systematic method of searching 
for a proof of a goal would break down, in that the search for a proof of the goal 
even(0) V odd(0) may need to do more than search either for a proof of even(0) 
or for a proof of odd(0). It is not clear that such a search procedure still retains 
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the flavour of logic programming due to the fact that uniform proofs will not be 
complete for these programs. Whilst the approach of disjunctive databases has 
been along these lines [83,98], these are designed to deal with uncertain information 
rather than as a programming language per Se. In this way we need to keep our 
information certain in order to maintain the property that uniform proofs are 
complete. 
One important observation about clauses is that they represent information in 
a maximal way. For example, given the program 
even(0) 
Vs even(s) D even(.s2(x)) 
odd(s(0)) 
Vs odd(s) D odd(s2(x)) 
it is clear that even(s(0)) Vodd(s'(0)) succeeds for all ii > 0, but it is not possible 
to derive the above program from the statement Vs even(s) V odd(s). In this way 
the fact that the heads of clauses are just atoms allows us to build up to formulae 
of arbitrary depth, and so we can use the program to analyse goals of an arbitrary,  
size. If however the heads of the clauses were of some larger complexity, e.g. 
containing at least three logical connectives, then it is not clear how we could 
ascertain the truth or otherwise of an atomic goal. In this way clauses allow us, 
indeed require us, to express information in a manner which allows the greatest 
number of conclusions to be reached, and it is this maximality property which 
allows us to use uniform proofs, rather than arbitrary proofs. 
Thus in order to allow DHHF programs to have the memoisation property, we 
need to find some way of expressing goals such as Vs even(s) V odd(s) in a clausal 
form. 
One method of deriving results similar to those of section 6.1 in the presence of 
universal quantifiers in goals is to interpret universal and existential quantifiers as 
shorthands for an infinite conjunction or disjunction respectively. In this way the 
versions of the program which do not contain disjunctions or conjunctions need 
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not be finite. The infinitary version of the program is not particularly interesting 
in its own right, as we cannot hope to write it down explicitly, but it may serve as 
a useful way to manipulate the program. Hence, our interest in these constructs is 
restricted to those infinitary programs which are generated from finite first-order 
hereditary Harrop formula programs in a certain way, just our interest in meta-
level programs was restricted to the meta-level programs which were generated 
from memoisation of object level programs. 
Under this scheme a program such as 
(Vx p(x)) D q 
may be considered equivalent to 
(Ap(t)) : q 
tET 
and similarly a program 
3xp(x)q 
may be considered equivalent to 
(Vp(t)) D q 
tET 
which in turn is just 
tET 
Once we have replaced the quantifiers which occur negatively in the program 
(i.e. those which occur as part of a goal) by such infinitary constructs, we then 
need to remove the disjunctions from the program. This is a little more tricky 
than in the previous case, as we may need to use an infinite number of infinitary 
conjunctions or disjunctions. For example, consider the goal 
Vxyp(x,y) 
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We replace the universal quantifier by an infinite conjunction to get 
A 3Y At, y)) 
t€T 
so that we have 
A( 'V At , t' ))) 
tET VET 
Now in order to push the infinitary disjunction outside the conjunction, we 
require an infinite number of infinitary disjunctions, as we need to represent all 
mappings of T to itself, i.e. p(t, f(t)) for any such map f. This we need to allow 
not only the infinitary constructs, but to allow them to be used infinitely often. 
Hence, the size of the "formulae" involved is considerable, and so this approach, 
whilst retaining some attractive features, does not appear to be the best solution 
to the problem. 
An alternative solution is to use Skolem functions to push existential quantifi-
cations outwards, and so the problem with the interaction between universal and 
existential quantifiers may be resolved by using quantification over functions as 
well as variables. This allows us to use Skolem constants in the standard way, so 
that the goal 
Vx 3y  p(x;y) 
may be re-written as 
f Vx p(x, f(x)) 
This function f is considered semantic rather than syntactic, in the sense that f 
is not necessarily one of the functions named in the signature, but represents a 
functional relationship between terms in T, and so dealing with such a function 
will involve considering all mappings of T to itself. 
This requires an extension to the usual unification procedure, but such an 
extension should not incorporate any unusually difficult problems, as it is "essen-
tially" first-order [74]. 
This approach will not help us memoise goals such as 
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Vx even(x) V odd(x) 
and so one way to tackle the problem may be to combine the two approaches, 
so that the Skolem functions are used to replace existential quantifications within 
universal quantifications, and infinite disjunctions are used to replace disjunctions 
within universal quantifications. 
Note that the first approach may be considered as an explicit form of Skolemi-
sation, in that rather than giving a name to the semantic function mapping T to 
itself, we consider all possibilities for the value of such a function. This is really 
a different side of the same coin: in the implicit case, the work is done in the 
extension to the unification process; in the explicit case, the work is done in ma-
nipulating the program generated. Either way we need to consider the possible 
mappings of T to itself. 
7.3 Programming at the Meta-Level 
There has been much attention given recently to meta-programming issues in logic 
programming [2]. An obvious setting for meta-level logic programming is higher-
order logic. This has the natural advantage that all computation, at the object 
or meta-level, may be thought of as logic programming, rather than being logic 
programming at the object level, and some other programming paradigm at the 
meta-level, and possibly in a significantly different meta-language. Given that the 
meta-language itself may be interpreted as some logic, then we may claim that 
any features explained by the meta-language but not by the object level have been 
given a logical interpretation, thus giving a more appropriate semantics to a logic 
programming language. Better still, if the meta-language is a logic programming 
language, then we may easily program at the meta-level, with a natural and well-
understood relation to the object level. 
A computational form of a higher-order logic has been given in [79], and is based 
on a subset of higher-order intuitionistic logic known as higher-order hereditary 
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Harrop formulae. Some other approaches in this area may be found in [91,47,97, 
92,102]. There are some features of the meta-theory of Horn clauses which require 
the use of programs as first-class objects, and thus are necessarily higher-order. 
One such feature is that of program transformation, and has been studied in [44]. 
However, there are aspects which may be studied in a first-order setting, i.e. by 
using first-order hereditary Harrop formulae as a meta-language. 
An example of such an aspect was given by Gabbay et al. In [37] it is shown how 
some procedural control rules for Horn clauses may be given a logical explanation in 
N-Prolog, an extension of Prolog, which is similar to first-order hereditary Harrop 
formulae. We show how the same explanation will hold for first-order hereditary 
Harrop formulae. One example of such a control rule is the restriction that a goal 
may only use certain clauses in the program. As the meta level represents a subset 
of first-order intuitionistic logic, seemingly non-logical or procedural operations at 
the object level, such as adding a clause to a program or specifying that only 
certain clauses are to be used in the computation of a particular goal, may be 
given a logical interpretation at the meta level. 
Meta-theoretic aspects of logic programming have been considered byBowen 
and Kowalski [10], Bowen and Weinberg [111,- and Gallaire and Lasserre [40]. The 
approach by Bowen and Kowalski, extended by Bowen and Weinberg, is centred 
around a Demo predicate, which takes a program as its first argument and a goal 
as its second, and Demo(P, G) is true if the derivation of the goal G from the 
program P is successful. This approach is strictly higher-order, as it involves the 
use of programs as objects. However, we can achieve something equivalent in 
hereditary Harrop formulae by the use of implication. 
An interesting consequence of the results of chapter 6 is that we may use 
the techniques described above to achieve a similar function to that of the Demo 
3Note that for Horn clauses (i.e. DHorn formulae), classical logic and intuitionistic 
logic coincide, so that the fact that we use intuitionistic logic and Bowen and Kowalski 
use classical logic makes no difference to this discussion. 
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predicate for a wider class of programs and goals than Horn clauses - namely Dmod 
programs and Gmød goals. Now as we know for such programs that D F3 G if there 
is an answer form V(G10) such that efnf(dfnf(D)) F3 V(G10) and V(GO) F1  G (when 
considered as meta-level programs), if we can memoise the formula efnf(dfnf(D)) D 
V(GO), then this is effectively representing the Demo predicate in our language. 
We know that we can indeed memoise this formula, as we know that 
efnf(dfnf(D)) D V(GO) 
is intuitionistically equivalent to 
defp(efnf(dfnf(D))) D V(defq(G10))) 
and we may clearly write this formula as Dmeja clause, as indicated by proposition 
6.2.2. 
Thus whilst our conception of object and meta level does not amalgamate the 
two, as is done in [10], it can achieve the same end. 
A further observation that may be made in the light of proposition 6.2.2, as 
Dmod programs may be interpreted as meta-level goals and Gmod  answer forms may 
be interpreted as meta-level programs, is that we may represent the equivalence 
of object level programs as meta-level programs. For example, if (D1 , N) and 
(D2, N) are Dmod programs, then the formula D1 D D2 may be re-written as a 
Gmeta formula provided that D2 may be re-written as a Gmeta  formula, and by 
proposition 6.2.2 we know that this is the case. Similarly, the same formula may 
be considered as a Dmeta formula provided that we may re-write D1 as a Gmeta 
formula, which we know is possible, and we may then use the techniques suggested 
by the definition of defp to produce the desired Dmeta  formula. This means that 
we may ask D1 D D2 as a goal, and if it succeeds, we may state it as a program. 
In this way we have not only a method for determining the equivalence of object 
level programs, but also a way to record the equivalences so derived. Thus we may 
use our conception of object level and meta-level programs as a calculus for the 
determining the equivalence of object level programs. 
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For example, let D1 be 3xp(x) D q and D2 be p(a) D q. Then D1 D D2 is 
(xp(x) D q) D (p(a) D q), and it should be clear that this is a Gmeta  formula as 
D2 is a Gmeta  formula. Now D1 may be re-written as Vx(p(x) D q), which is a 
Gmeta formula, and hence D1 D D2  is equivalent to a Dmta formula. 
Another possibility is to represent the information that two Dmod programs 
prove the same goal. We may rewrite the formula (1)1 D C) D (D2 D C) as a Gmeta 
formula by first re-writing it as ((D1 D C) A D2) D C, and then re-writing the first 
occurrence of Gas (G1 V ... VG), so that we get ((D1 D (Gi V ... VG))AD2 ) 
C, which is operationally equivalent to V(D1 D (C1 V . . . Ga)) A D2 D C. This is 
turn is operationally equivalent to V((V(D1 D C1)) A D2) D C, which is clearly 
equivalent to Vu1((D1 D C) D C), and finally we get the Gm ja  formula 
V(/\((defq(D1 D C1) A D2) D C)) 
It is difficult to see how the original formula can be re-written as a Dmeta  for-
mula due to the possibility that there may be existential quantifiers or disjunctions 
occurring positively in C. However, it is not hard to see that if V(G10) is an answer 
form of C, then we may re-write the following formula as a Dmeta  formula 
(D1 	V(G10)) (D2 D V(C10)) 
This is done by moving D2 to the left of the D as is done above, and then using 
the defp technique to derive a Dmeta formula. 
This is perhaps not surprising, given that we know that the existential quan-
tifier and disjunction are redundant constructs in Dmod programs, and so Dmod 
programs may be considered equivalent to Dob ect programs. These in turn are 
a sub-class of the meta-level core, i.e. those formulae which are both meta-level 
programs and meta-level goals, which may be given as 
M:= A I -' A I VxM  J M1 A M2 I M1 D M2  
Thus we are effectively dealing with programs which are within the core, and 
hence there is great potential for reflecting information back into the program. 
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Gallaire and Lasserre's approach, like that of Bowen and Kowalski, was also 
strictly higher-order, and used a system with a similar structure to Horn clauses 
to specify metarules. We shall see how we can imitate some similar features in 
hereditary Harrop formulae, especially clause ordering. 
The work of Gabbay et al. had a slightly different motivation, which was to 
extend the formulae available to the programmer, in a manner similar to the 
extension provided by hereditary Harrop formulae. It was shown in [37] that this 
extension allowed for the description of control information, and so the language 
was used to express some of its own meta-theory. In our approach, all such control 
information would be encoded at the meta level, thus allowing the clear separation 
of the (object level) program and the control information, and yet retaining a 
natural connection between the object and meta-level. 
Gabbay and Reyle [37] have shown how the meta-language property of first-
order hereditary Harrop formulae extended to include negated atoms may be put 
to good effect. This revolves around the trick of "naming" clauses, so that we 
write 
(D D name) Dname 
rather than just D, and similarly we write 
(G D name) j name 
in place of C, where name does not appear anywhere in either D or G. We may 
use this device to control which clauses are used in the computation and which 
are not, so that we may specify that the computation for the goal C may only use 
the clause D1 and not the clause D2 by renaming both.clauses as 
(D1 D name1) D name1  
(D2 D name2) D name2 
and the goal C as (C D name,) D name1, where name1 and name2 do not appear 
anywhere in D1 , D2 or C. The idea is that due to the fact that the names are 
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new, the computation of G can only gain access to the clause D1 and not to D2. 
The first step is to add G D name1 to the program, so that we get 
G D name1  
(D1 D name1) D name1  
(D2 D name2 ) D name2 
and the goal is now name1. As neither name1 nor name2 appear in C, the second 
clause cannot lead to a success, and so the only way for name1 to succeed is to 
use the first clause above, so that the goal is now 
D name1  
Now the program becomes 
D1  
C D name1  
(D1 D name1),D name1  
(D2 D name2) j name2 
and the goal is name1. Now provided that we can prevent name1  from matching 
against the third clause above and thus looping, the only possible match is the 
second clause, so that the goal becomes G. As neither name1 nor name2 appear 
in D1 , D2 or G, only D1 can be used in the computation of C, and not D2. 
It is then shown in [37] how a simple loop detection mechanism may be pro-
vided, so that the above process may work. However, it is possible to provide the 
same facility in such a way that the loop detection is not required. If we name the 
two clauses in the following manner 
(D1 	fire) D load1  
(D2 	fire) D load2 
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and the goal as (G D fire) D load1, where fire, load1 and load2 do not appear 
anywhere in D1 , D2 or C, then we may achieve the same effect. The computation 
may be performed as follows: first we add G D fire to the program, giving us 
Gfire 
(D1 D fire) D load1  
(D2 D fire) D load2 
and the goal load1. The only clause that this can match is the second one, and so 
the new program is 
D1  
G  fire 
(D1 D fire) D load1  
(D2 D fire) D load2 
and the new goal is fire. This can only match the second clause, and so the next 
goal is G, thus allowing G only to use D1 and not D2, as none of fire, load1 and 
load2 can match anything in G. 
In this way we can get a more straightforward implementation of deterministic 
exclusion, i.e. using one given clause but not another during computation. A 
refinement of the above idea can give non-deterministic exclusion, where it does 
not matter which clause is used, provided that once some clause is chosen, the 
other clause cannot be used. All we need to do is to use the same name for both 
clauses, so that D1 and D2 become 
(D1 D fire) D load 
(D2 D fire) j load 
and C becomes (C D fire) D load. The computation proceeds by adding the clause 
C D fire to the program and the goal is then load. Now there are two clauses it 
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may match, and so the next goal is D, j fire, where i = 1 or 2, which involves 
adding Di to the program, and the next goal is C. Hence, which clause is added 
may be decided arbitrarily, but once it is chosen, only that clause and not the 
other may be used in the computation of G. 
If we consider the order of the clauses in the program to be significant (as 
happens in Prolog systems), then, as shown in [37], we may use this device to 
arbitrarily re-order clauses in the program. This is done by encoding the desired 
order of the clauses in a goal so that the clauses are added in the desired order 
before the goal is asked. For example, if there are three clauses 
(D1 D fire1) D load1  
(D2 D fire2) j load2 
(D3 D fire3) D load3  
and the desired order is D2 followed by D3 followed by D1, then this order may 
be achieved if we use the goal 
(((((G D fire2) D load2) D fire3) D load3) D firer ) j load1  
and we assume that clauses are added to the beginning of the program. Thus 
we first load D1, then D3, and finally D2, thus giving the required order, before 
the computation of C. Thus we represent the six different object level programs 
(as the order of the clauses is significant here) by the same meta-level program, 
but with six different goals, one corresponding to each arrangement of the clauses. 
This is intuitively attractive, as the meta-level program is the same in each case, 
but the way it is used in computation varies, which seems to capture our intuitive 
notion of the difference between the six object level programs, i.e. that they all 
represent the same declarative information, but vary on the operational details. 
Another possible application of this separation into an object level program 
and a meta-level program is to deductive databases. A deductive database often 
contains a set of conditions which must be satisfied at all times in order to guar-
antee that the information represented in the database is consistent and does not 
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get garbled. Such conditions are known as integrity constraints, and are usually 
checked after each database update to ensure that the changes will not render the 
database useless or redundant. Hence, the constraints are not themselves part of 
the database, but conceptually separate, and we consider a change to the object 
level program, i.e. a database update, to be conceptually very different from a 
change to the integrity constraints. By considering the integrity constraints as 
a meta-level program in the above sense, we get a natural representation of a 
database and its associated information. 
The integrity constraints may be represented by Gmea formulae, and the 
database by two D0b t _ formulae D1 and D21  where D1 is the database before 
the change and D2  is the database after the change. Checking the integrity con-
straints then reduces to checking whether D2 Ij C, which specifies a meta level 
computation. If this succeeds, then the changes are allowed and the database is 
now D2. If this fails, then the changes are not allowed and the database remains 
D1. 
For example, consider a database containing information on student enrol-
ments. The institution has a rule that no student may be enrolled in both the 
Science faculty and the Arts faculty. This rule may be expressed by the fact that' 
the goal 
x enrolled(x, science) A enrolled(x, arts) 
must fail, and so if D is the (object level) database, we may think of the meta-level 
view of the program as 
D A (x enrolled(x, science) A enrolled(x, arts)) ic_violation 
After making a change to D, we then ask the goal ic_violation of the meta-level 
program, and if it succeeds, then the change is disallowed. If it fails, then the 
change is allowed. This computation is done at the meta-level, as the integrity 
constraints are not able to be changed by the user, and so should not be visible 
at the object level. Hence the "internal", or machine view of the database is the 
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meta-level one, whilst the "external", or user's view of the database is the object 
level one. 
The point of these examples is to show that the separation of computation 
into an object level program and a meta-level program seems to be a natural one, 
and this difference in level may be naturally studied in the context of hereditary 
Harrop formulae. This approach may be used to show how some typical program-
ming techniques, such as memoisation and clause re-ordering, may be given an 
explanation in terms of logic, rather than purely operational notions. One may 
think of the completion of a program, as defined in chapter 3, as a meta-level pro-
gram corresponding to an object level program, and hence interpreting Negation 
as Failure in a logical context. 
Clearly this approach cannot be a full answer to the problems raised, such as 
the fact that A is not necessarily commutative, as the order in which the conjuncts 
are selected may affect termination properties. However, it does show that such 
properties are not as "extra-logical" as may be initially thought. Fuller and better 
answers are probable using a higher-order approach, but it is interesting to note 
that "meta" and "higher-order" need not be synonymous. Rather thanrnerely 
let the meta-theory of logic programming be expressed in the (usually) informal 
language used by computer scientists to communicate with one another, we in-
terpolate a third level between the object level and this informal meta-level. As 
formulae of this new level may be given a computational interpretation, we may 
think of this as an executable meta-language, in which programming and to some 
extent meta-programming may both be accommodated. 
Chapter 8 
Conclusion and Further Work 
We have seen how first-order hereditary Harrop formulae may be used as basis 
for logic programming via the paradigm of uniform proofs. This notion of proof 
requires that we use intuitionistic logic as the semantic basis for the language, and 
allows us to expand the class of formulae which may be used as programs and 
goals whilst retaining features which are natural to a logic programming system. 
We have shown how negation may be incorporated into this system, and have 
shown how the usual techniques may be interpreted in a constructive framework. 
We also saw how to give a extensional interpretation of universally quantified 
goals. 
The model theory most appropriate in this context seems to be Kripke or 
Kripke-like models, and so we have explored model-theoretic issues in regard to 
negation and universal quantification. A closer examination of the model theory 
has shown how we may exploit the structure of the formulae to explore issues 
of equivalence, and this in turn led us to intermediate logics. Finally, similar 
considerations of structure allowed us to explore some issues of memoisation and 
meta-programming. 
More work remains to be done, and below we briefly summarise the various 
possibilities. 
275 
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8.1 	Completions and Inconsistencies 
As mentioned in chapter 3, it is important to restrict the class of programs so that 
the completion of every program is consistent. The completion is an explicit form 
of dealing with NAF, in that an explicit formula PC  is given for which PC  F-1  A L 
if P F 3 -IA. As NAF is inherently implicit, in that the programmer only writes 
down the definition of success rather than the definition of success and failure, 
this approach requires some restriction to be placed on the class of programs. 
There are less restrictive assumptions than that of local stratification, which will 
presumably lead to similar result to those reported here; there have been some 
efforts in this direction given by Przymusinska and Przymusinski [93], as well as 
Sato [103] and Cavedon [14]. 
It seems difficult to define precisely which class of programs leads to consistent 
completions, other than that it must exclude programs such as -'p D p. Whilst 
the precise definition of this exact class may be possible, an easier approach may 
be to use a weaker logic, in which inconsistencies are less problematic, such as 
minimal logic. Inconsistency is more of a problem for the choice of logic than from 
programming considerations, and so this latter approach has some appeal. 
One such method of dealing with inconsistent completions was given by Gabbay 
[36], in which, in essence, the failure of an atom A is perceived as the modal 
statement -'DA, i.e. that it is not necessary that A be true. This view of NAF 
as a modal operator means that the completion of the program -A D A becomes 
A -+ -IDA, and so whilst being locally inconsistent (i.e. nothing sensible can be 
said about A), the completion of P U {-'A D Al is not empty. Indeed, it has 
the nice property that comp(P1 A P2) = comp(P1) U comp(P2). In this way the 
completion may be inspected piece by piece and packed together, and so may be 
a useful way of dealing with the completion of non-locally stratified programs. 
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8.2 	The Role of Induction 
As mentioned in chapter 2, an inductive method of establishing the truth of Vx p(x) 
from the program 
p(a) 
Vx p(x) D p(f(x)) 
where the signature of p is {a/O, f/1} will be useful in order to implement a 
stronger form of extensional universal quantification in goals. This may be more 
useful at the meta-level than the object level, due to the nice memoisation proper-
ties of Gmod formulae. One obvious area of further work is to define the inductive 
strategy in an operationally feasible way. The methods of [12,13] may be useful in 
this regard. 
Another application of such an induction strategy is to the problem of finding 
answer substitutions -for existentially quantified goals. The methods of chapter 4 
had some difficulties with programs such as the one above. However, the methods 
used to find a proof of Vx p(x) and of x-ip(x) are closely related, in that we may 
consider both as looking for instances of p(x) which either succeed or fail. Hence, 
if the search for a proof of p(c), where c is a meta-variable (i.e. an arbitrary term) 
succeeds, then Vx p(x) succeeds and 2x -p(x) fails, whereas if p(c) fails due to the 
fact that p(t) fails, then a correct answer substitution for3x-p(x) is x +- t. For 
example, given the program 
p(a) 
Vx p(x) D p(f(x)) 
and the signature {a/0,b/0,f/1}, then the goal Vx p(x) fails, as p(b) fails, and so 
3x-p(x) succeeds. 
Clearly such an inductive method will make use of implications in goals, as 
often we would wish to add p(c) to the program (where c is a new constant), and 
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see if p(f(c)) succeeds from this larger program. This seems to give an elegant 
connection to lemma 6.3.1, in that one may consider the inductive method as 
showing that the two programs 
p(a) 	 Vxp(x) 
Vxp(x) D p(f(x)) 
are operationally equivalent for the signature {a/0, f/1}, and in order so to do it 
is usually necessary to look at certain extensions of the longer program. In this 
way, if we find that a few choice mutual extensions of the programs prove the 
same select goals, then we may conclude that the two programs are operationally 
equivalent for a certain class of goals. Hence the inductive method gives us a way 
of checking whether two programs are equivalent for a given goal, rather than for 
all goals, which may be thought of as a localisation, or top-down implementation, 
of the ideas expressed in lemma 6.3.1. 
Our approach to equivalence may be strengthened by using canonical programs 
[50,8], so that there is a stronger notion of equivalence between programs. 1t may 
be interesting to combine the notion of a canonical program with that of a normal 
form, which may lead to an interesting notion of equivalence. 
Another possibility is to explore the relationship between negation and the efnf 
transformation more closely, so that a stronger result than Proposition 6.1.4 may 
be shown. 
8.3 Model Theory 
The relation between the Kripke-like model of chapter 5 and standard Kripke 
models may be worthy of deeper investigation. It has recently been shown how 
the model theory of [77] may be extended to hereditary Harrop formulae under 
the "new constant" interpretation of the universal quantifier [76], and that this 
is also an S4 model. An investigation along these lines would make it easier to 
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identify the role of negation in the intermediate logic I', as well as leading to a 
better understanding of I' itself. This will presumably help in settling conjecture 
6.5.12 about the equivalence of F-1  and I=G  on Gmod formulae. The notion of 
increasing knowledge which is inherent in Kripke models may be useful for formal 
development of logic programs, and so this approach to model theory may have 
some interesting connections to program specification. 
It is well-known that intuitionistic logic may be interpreted in a topological 
space [64,21], and so another natural direction to take is to give a topological 
interpretation of first-order hereditary Harrop formulae. Just as classical proposi-
tional calculus is sound and complete with respect to interpretations over Boolean 
algebras, one may define a Heyting algebra over a topological space for which intu-
itionistic propositional calculus is sound and complete. The same line of thought 
may be extended to intuitionistic predicate calculus, and so it may be interesting 
to explore the difference between the interpretations of full first-order logic and 
hereditary Harrop formulae in this context. 
Kripke models may be thought of as a special case, in that the topologies in-
volved are restricted to be partially ordered sets. Hence, a less restrictive topology 
may allow us to use a more semantically meaningful structure than that given by 
Herbrand interpretations. 
This may also be useful in order to characterise I' more naturally. 
Clearly there is also the problem of constructing the Ti" interpretation when 
universal quantifiers are allowed in goals (under the inductive interpretation). This 
is not as straightforward as it may appear, as it is not clear how to build the 
interpretation within w steps. Naturally it may be possible to do so by using 
larger ordinals. 
Another possibility is that a more detailed analysis of the operational method 
of proving Vx p(x) may lead to a more subtle construction. In the above example, 
it is clear that by using induction it is possible to derive the truth of Vxp(x) in 
only a finite number of steps, and so the construction process may imitate such a 
derivation. 
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As mentioned earlier, intuitionistic logic may not be the most natural way 
to deal with inconsistencies. An alternative approach may be to use relevant 
logic [3,22,99], in which inconsistencies remain localised. A step in this direction 
has already been taken by Fitting [31], although the programs involved did not 
contain any inconsistencies. Another possibility is that such a logic may be able 
to incorporate the features of the Kripke-like model, so that there is no change for 
consistent worlds, but still deal with inconsistencies in a desirable way. 
A related issue is the side condition on implicative goals, i.e. that a goal D D 
G only succeeds or fails when the addition of D to the program only extends 
the definition of predicates which cannot be completely defined. As we saw in 
chapter 5, this restriction is made principally for model-theoretic reasons. Whilst 
this ensures that the Kripke-like model is significantly simplified and this approach 
does concur with programming intuitions, it seems desirable to remove this side 
condition. Not only would this be a conservative extension of the work of Miller 
[77], unlike the version above, it would also simplify the notion of an 0-derivation. 
Whilst the notion of separating predicates into completely defined and otherwise 
may correspond to programming intuition, there do not seem to be any: '-Strong 
proof-theoretic arguments against allowing arbitrary extensions of the program to 
be used; if a more sophisticated model theory can be found to deal more cogently 
with the problem of extending completely defined predicates, then there would be 
no point in keeping the side condition. Hence, if we can find a natural way to deal 
with inconsistencies in the manner discussed above, we will presumably be able to 
lift this restriction. 
8.4 Meta- and Higher-Order Programming 
It was seen in chapter 7 how certain meta-programming tasks may be handled in 
a first-order setting. However, there is clearly a limit to what may be done along 
these lines compared to a higher-order approach. We have seen how attempting 
to get a memoisation property for first-order hereditary Harrop formulae leads 
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naturally into higher-order issues. Higher-order logic programming is an expanding 
area, and there are several papers in the literature which deal with various issues, 
and hereditary Harrop formulae have been shown to be particularly amenable to 
higher-order extensions [27,44,45,79,87,80]. It would be interesting to see how the 
results reported here in the first-order case may be generalised to the higher-order 
case. One may view the thrust of this thesis as exploring to some extent the limits 
of what may be achieved in a first-order framework; this will presumably lead to 
a clearer idea of the precise advantages and pitfalls of a higher-order approach to 
logic programming. 
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Appendix A 
Proof of the Disjunctive Identity 
Lemma A.O.i (C1 V C2 ) D A = (C1 D A) A (G2 D A) 
Proof: 
(=): From figure A—i it is clear that 
G, (C1 D A), (C, D A) I- j A 
when either i = 1,j = 2 or i = 2,j = 1. Thus we may derive the up-
permost sequents in figure A-2, which in turn clearly shows the result. 
(=): It is clear that the uppermost sequents of figure A-3 may be derived, 
as it is obvious that 
Ci Ii Ci V C2  
A, G2 F-1  A 
where i = 1, 2. Hence, the result follows. 
0 
A,G,CJ DA —A 
Gi,GiDA,Gj DA )A 
Figure A—i: Useful subproof 
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A,G2 A—+A 	G2,G1 DA,G2 D A—A 
r 
G1 vG2,G1 D A, G2 D A —+ A 
Gi DA,G2 DA(G1VG2)DA 
(G1 DA)A(G2 JA)—*(G1VG2)A 
A-L 
Figure A-2: Proof that (G1 D A) A (G2 D A) H 1 (G1 V G2 ) D A 
G1 —G1 vG2 A,G1 —*A G2 —G1 vG2 A,G2 —A 
D-L 
G1, (G1 vG2) A -p A 	 G2, (GI vG2) A -+ A 
(G I VG2)DAG1 DA (G I VC2)DAG2 DA 
A-R (GI VG2)DA—(G1 DA)A(G2 A) 
Figure A-3: Proof that (C1 VG2) D A H 1 (C1 D A) A (G2 D A) 
